THE INDIAN ORIGIN OF PYRRHO’S PHILOSOPHY OF 
EPOCHE

“If a man has an inclination ... a report ... a consideration of reasons ... a reflection on and approval of an opinion and says: ‘Such is my reflection on and approval of the opinion’ — speaking thus he preserves truth, but not yet he inevitably come to the conclusion: ‘This alone is the truth, all else is falsehood’.”

(Gotamo Buddha, Caṅkī-suttaṃ, Majjhima-nikāyo discourse 95)

I

One of the earliest contacts of a Greek philosopher with Indian śramaṇaḥ, ascetics “striving” towards the attainment of wisdom, registered in the history of philosophy, was that of Pyrrho of Elis, who together with Anaxarchos, a follower of Demokritos, and with Onesikritos, a disciple of Diogenes, the famous Kynik, joined the scientific retenue of Alexander the Great’s expedition to India. The basic characteristic of Pyrrho’s philosophy was the attitude of Epoché, or refraining from judgment and ‘views’ (Greek doxa, Sanskrit dyṛṣṭik, Pāli ditṭhi). Pyrrho’s principle “Not rather this than that” — ouden māllon — suggests the analogy with the Jain principle of anekaṇta, the “theory of indeterministic truth” or “toleration of many modes of truth”, as defined by K. C. Bhattacharyya, the best known Indian philosopher in the twentieth century who founded his philosophical investigation on his study of “The Jaina Theory of Anekānta” (published in 1925).

Among several analogous aspects to whose documentation the present paper wishes to serve, the basic tenet of Jaina religious teaching — ahimsā, or non-violence should be considered as a prominent motive on both sides (although in later philosophical discussions it remained neglected, as we shall see in the sequel). There are good reasons to support the hypothesis that the “naked sages”
(Greek gymnosophists) at Takṣaśīla (Taxila), described in the reports of Alexander’s expedition (most detailed were those of Onesikritos) were Jaina munis (“silent sages”) and not so much Buddhist samanā whose influence on Hellenistic culture prevailed later, particularly in Alexandria, though some analogies between Pyrrho’s and Buddho’s formulation of the same basic ideas may astonish the conversant reader at the first glance. They will therefore be singled out first in the following survey. In keeping with his teaching of epoché Pyrrho lived after his return from India as a “silent sage” (muni) practicing the virtues of epoché: aphasia (not talking), ataraxia (dispassion), metriopatheia (moderation), apatheia (non-suffering resulting from indifference to pleasure and pain), adiaphoria (equanimity), isostheneia (equilibrium, cf. Pāli tatra-majjhath' upakkhā, mainly with reference to judgment, in the sense closest to the Jaina anekānta-vāda).

Diogenes Laërctius, the author of the first extensive and systematic “biographies of great philosophers” and historian of ancient philosophy, quotes Pyrrho’s saying that “refraining from judgment is followed by peace of mind like a shadow” (D.L. IX, 108). This could be understood almost as a quotation from the opening gāthās (stanzas) of the most popular Buddhist sayings, the Dhamma-padaṅga: “If with a clear mind one speaks or acts, happiness follows him like his never-departing shadow.” — In his native town of Elis Pyrrho was honoured as the high priest, though he refrained from all public offices.

Cicero praises him only for these high moral and ascetic virtues (De jinibus, III,4,12), emphasizing also that his moral standards were higher than those of the Stoics (Academica, II,12,130). Diogenes Laërctius (IX, 55, 49), comparing the import of the virtues of adiaphoria and apatheia in Pyrrho’s theory of epoché with the position of the same values in the systems of Demokritos and Aristotles, states that neither of these two developed a theory of epoché. For the system of Demokritos these values had
no constitutive significance. In Aristotle’s ethics the term *epoché* does not yet appear either. As to its importance for the post-Pyrrhonic philosophy, D.L. was so much impressed by it that he took it for the widest basis of his classification of all systems of philosophy in two groups: *dogmatic* and *epoctic* (or based on *epoché*; both terms — *epoctic* and *epoché* are derived from the Greek verb *ephein*, ‘to refrain’ from apodictic judgment. Also the later most misused term ‘skepticism’, as we shall see from its history in the sequel, is of the same origin.⁵ (Cf. D.L. I, 10, Introduction).

Pyrrho’s discipline Timon summarized his teacher’s doctrine as follows:

— He who wishes to live happily should apply three criteria in considering, first, the nature of things in themselves;⁶ then the attitude that he ought to take towards them, and finally the consequences of such attitude. — In themselves things do not differ from each other, they are equally unclear and uncertain. As for our sensations and judgments, they do not confirm either truth or falsity. We therefore should not trust either our sensations or our reasoning, but should persist in not holding views (*doxa*)⁷ nor commitments either for the one or for the other side. Whatever issue may be at stake, we should say that it has to be *neither affirmed, nor denied, nor both affirmed and denied, nor neither affirmed nor denied*. Taking this attitude we shall attain first to *aphasia* (silence, cf. Sk. *maunyam*, Pāli *monam*, the attitude of the *muni*), and then to *ataraxia* (indifference, Pāli *upekkhā*).

The underlined formulation corresponds *verbatim* to the basic rule of Buddhist logic, *catu-kotikam* — tetralemma, applied by Buddha in the case of *avyākatāni*, or questions “not expounded” by him (comparable, as we shall see, to the antinomies formulated by Kant). The formula has remained foreign to European logics since Aristotle till our days.
The basic criteria of Pyrrho’s method of epoché were formulated in a scheme of ten tropes. Their survey is contained in the report of Diogenes Laërtius (IX, 79-88). We shall point out first their implicit analogy with Buddhist principles, and then consider the Jaina alternative.

The first trope deals with the same problem as the First Noble Truth of Buddha — the difference among living beings concerning joys and sorrows, harms and advantages (cf. kusalā and akusalā dhammā). The conclusion is that equal stimulations do not provoke equal representations in our minds. This inconsistency should induce us to refrain from apodictic judgments.

The second, third and fourth tropes extend the same argumentation to the structure of bodies, sensations and feelings. They can be compared, in the same sequence, to the fifth, sixth and seventh nidānam or ring in the chain of interdependent causation in the Buddhist paṭicca samuppādo (salāyatanaṁ, phasso, vedanā).

The fifth trope refers to ways of living as regulated by laws and beliefs. The “right way of living” is the topic of the fifth step on the Noble Eightfold Path of Buddha.

Tropes 6 — 9 deal in a broader sense with the objective nature of world-constituting relations, according to Pyrrho’s principle “not rather this than that”. This criterion, “ouden māllon”, as mentioned above, could easily be interpreted as Pyrrho’s formulation of the Jaina principle of anekāntaḥ.

The tenth trope deals with the correlativity or mutual dependence of phenomena (Pāli dhammā): light and heavy, strong and weak, bigger and smaller, higher and lower etc., or the interrelation between day and night, or anything brought into relation with our mind.

Thus Pyrrho’s principle “not rather this than that” has been elicited in a scheme of ten tropes. Unlike such occasional points of comparative reference to Buddhism as
could be singled out above, a comparison with the Jaina homology should comprise the entire structures of corresponding schemes on both sides. The Jaina anekānta-vādaḥ, theory based on the analogous principle “not only one meaning”, is explicated in two correlative structures of sevenfold (saptā-bhaṅgi) schemes: seven nayāḥ or methodological criteria, and seven “modes of truth” (according to K. C. Bhattacharyya’s terminology) of a ‘theory of possibility’ (syād-vāda).

The last three of the seven nayāḥ and the last four terms of the saptā-bhaṅgi are modes of predication. In the first set they are designated as śabda-nayāḥ and refer to etymological criteria for the use of ‘names’ or derivation of words. In the second set the word avyaktavyam expresses the impossibility of either affirming or negating being (or non-being) in any categorical form of logical predication.

While such criteria of predication are only implicitly admitted in Pyrrho’s wider theory of relations (tropes 6-10), on the Indian side special attention should be paid to the analogy of the four avyaktavyam modes in the saptā-bhaṅgi scheme in Jain logic with the application of the same principle of avyākataṃ by Buddho in his formula catu-koṭi (tetralemma). In his logic, too, the formula is essentially applied to existential judgments: “Neither being, nor non-being, nor both being and non-being, nor neither-being-nor-non-being” can be predicated in answering antinomical questions (in some other formulations astonishingly adequate to Kant’s Antinomy of Pure Reason;) standardized in a set of 4 x 4 topics:

“Whether the world is eternal .... Whether the world is infinite .... Whether the soul is the same as the body, or distinct from it .... Whether a man who has attained to the truth (buddho tathāgato) exists after death .... ”

The difference between the Jaina and the Buddhist scheme appears in the first Jaina mode and in the last Buddhist mode:
Jaina syād-vāda
(4) syād avaktavyam
(it may be indetermined)
(5) syād asti avaktavyam
(it may be, but indetermined)
(6) syād nāsti avaktavyam
(it may not be, but indetermined)
(7) syād asti nāsti
    avaktavyam
(it may both be and
not be, but indetermined)

Buddho’s catu-koti
(1) (avyākatam) atthi
(it is not declared :
‘it is’
(3) (avyākatam) n’atthi
(it is not declared :
‘it is not’
(3) (avyākatam) atthi ca
    n’atthi ca
(it is not declared :
‘it both is and is not’
(4) (avyākatam) n’ev’athhi
    na n’atthi
(it is not declared :
‘it neither is nor
    is not’

The first three bhaṅgī (‘sections’) of syād-vādah state simply that an object “seen from a chosen standpoint (syāt) can be signified (1) as existent, (2) as non-existent (i.e., regarded under the aspect of another object) and (3) as both existent and non-existent (the former seen under its own aspect and the latter under alien ones). The three corresponding formulae are: “syād asti eva, syād nāsti eva, syād astināsti ca.”

Much more significant for comparison with Pyrrho’s tropes are the first four nayāḥ.

(1) naigama-nayāḥ, “the figurative standpoint” (or “conventional mode of contemplation”) “takes into account the purpose or intention of something which is not accomplished”, or a “general custom, according to which the intention alone is referred to as the basis of an unaccom-
plished thing”. — It can be compared with Pyrrho’s fifth trope on the relativity of social customs.

(2) samgraha-nayāk “synthetic standpoint which comprehends several different modes under one common head through their belonging to the same class. For instance, existence (being), substance,...” — This is the logical method of abstracting the notion of genus. — It can be compared with Pyrrho’s sixth trope concerning the relativity due to association of ideas (“mixtures and connections”).

(3) vyavahāra-nayāk, “the analytic standpoint,... the division of objects comprehended by the synthetic viewpoint ... up to the limit beyond which there can be no further division into sub-classes.” This is the method of abstracting the particular qualities of the species, interpreted as the empirical standpoint.11 It can be compared with Pyrrho’s tropes 7-8, concerning “different aspects of a picture” due to the relativity of “relations in space ... in quantity and quality”.

(4) tījusūtra-nayāk, “The straight (direct) viewpoint ... It confines itself to the present moment ... as no practical purpose can be served by things past and things unborn”. It is a theory of momentariness, corresponding to the Buddhist kṣanika-vādāk. It can be compared with Pyrrho’s 9th trope, concerning “duration of phenomena”.

In the suggested comparison it appears obvious that the Indian scheme is based on a much more explicitly elicited system of logic. Also the intention of the method is to serve a wider range of scientific investigation. This advantage should, however, be ascribed to a considerable extent to a much later formulation and interpretation of the basic teaching.

Further speculation on this comparativistic subject — on a purely doxographic ground12 — might raise the question, how far a prevalently humanistic turning, distinguishing Pyrrho’s basic interest from the Jaina epistemological
inquiry, could have been influenced or suggested by his possible acquaintance with specific Buddhist trends. For our context it may suffice to underscore one basic difference of the Jaina anekānta-vādah from both Buddhist (cf. Nāgasena's Milinda-pañhā, about 2nd c.B.C.) and Pyrrho's "skepticism".

In order to indicate the differential elements on the ideal point of intersection of the three trends in whose comparative study we are interested — the Jaina, the Buddhist, and the Pyrrhonian — I wish to refer first to the concluding paragraph 30 of K. C. Bhattacharyya's essay on The Jaina Theory of Anekānta, mentioned at the beginning of the present paper:

"The Jaina theory elaborates a logic of indetermination not in reference to the will — but in reference to the knowing, though it is a pragmatist theory in some sense. As a realist, The Jaina holds that truth is not constituted by willing, though he admits that the knowledge of truth has a necessary reference to willing. His theory of indeterministic truth is not a form of scepticism. It represents, no doubt, but toleration of many modes of truth. The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance."

The principle of anekāntah seems, however, to be closer to Pyrrho's ouden mallon than to the catu-kofi criterion as applied by Buddho. This latter, as stated above, seems to be a reduction and readaptation of the sapta-bhaṅgi scheme, without the semantic reduplication, from an essentially different standpoint and for a specific methodological purpose pursued by Buddho (viz. in early Pāli texts) by strictly rational means.

On the other hand, the Jaina standpoint remains always realistic. It is never skeptic, not even in the primordial meaning implied in Pyrrho's method of epoché. The Jaina
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epistemology serves the purpose of establishing a theory of cosmological realism in ontology. To that effect the anekântaḥ “realism” can be envisaged as an endeavour to connect the polyvalent criteria of truth into a coherent cosmology. For the same reason the semantic modes had acquired a prevalent importance in the methodology of the nayākā scheme. This aspect of a theory of truth had no more meaning for the Buddhist model. The acosmic attitude of Buddho was the most radical and consequent rejection of all cosmological and ontological standpoints in the history of philosophy until our days.¹⁴ For a theory of nothingness (svaṁna-vādo), arising from a purely meditative epoché, concentrated on the reductive effort of the meditator to attain the level of both subjective (ajjhattam) isolation “born of seclusion” (vivekajam), and objective (bahiddhā) abstraction from disturbing influences (vivicca akusalehi dhammehi) — as the level of nothingness (akṣīṇaṁcaṁḥāyatanam) is described in the aspect of meditative experience; — for such a theory of pure introversion there is no more need of methodological dichotomy of insight and verbal expression as it was requisite for the Jaina anekánta-vādaḥ aiming at the analysis of a pluralistic world-structure.

At the time of Pyrrho’s acquaintance with the Indian alternatives of epoché, Nāgārjuna was not yet born; the Buddhist theory of ‘indeterministic truth’ (as formulated in Buddho’s antinomies concerning ‘world-views’ in general) from a nihilist standpoint (or standpoint of ‘nihilation’, to adopt the adequate expression coined by Sartre) was not yet elaborated in its dialectical aspects. Thus Pyrrho’s theory of epoché, both in its historical provenience and systematic scheme, remains half way between the cosmological interest of the Jains and its acosmic reversal by Buddho. The inquiry of comparative philosophy has brought us on this crossroad to three possible directions that may be followed by a meaningful interpretation of the basic problem of anekânta-vādaḥ: The original Jaina interpretation, its Buddhist alternative, and Pyrrho’s intermediate
position, unprotected against later ‘sceptical’ misunderstandings on an alien soil.

Fragments of a philosophical poem by Pyrrho's disciple Timon (in D. Laert. IX, 65, and in Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos*, XI, 20) contain the following rhetorical question of the disciple to the master:

“I would like to know, O Pyrrho, how is it that you, being only a man, can have such a light and quiet life? How is it that you are able to guide men like a god who revolves the fiery circle of his sphere all around this earth, and makes it visible to our eyes?”

To this man was allotted by the “objective” history of philosophy the responsibility for what has been labelled “scepticism”. Skepticism, in this historical meaning, was a product of a later development, at the beginning of the Christian era, due mainly to Sextus Empiricus and Aenesidemus, under obvious influence of the predominant trend in the later Platonic Academy. Cicero, in his critique of the Academic skepticism (Acad. I, 12, 44; II, 23, 72ff) never mentions Pyrrho in this connection. For him, too, Pyrrho was above all a staunch opponent of the sophists. Even according to earlier testimony, he has to be compared rather to Socrates, though more “appeased and resigned. He has destroyed sophistry, and did not attempt to replace it.”

At about the same time and in the same ambience of Hellenistic culture, when the ‘skeptic’ trend reached its culmination in the academic school of philosophy, in Alexandria Pyrrho’s teaching and its representatives were identified with Buddhist samaṇa and made responsible for the same course of ideas. It is interesting to read in the light of these historical circumstances the explanations of the Buddha-dhammo that Nāgaseno tried to adapt to his Hellenistic interlocutor in the *Milinda-panhā*. In the subsequent distortion of their misunderstood ideas under Christian and Muslim biases ultimately the Arabic term *sumaniya*, or the
“heresy” of Indian samañā, became a synonym of “scepticism” as understood in the Latin Christian tradition.

II

Due to such alien historical conditions which provoked a fast degeneration of the original philosophy of epoché into “scepticism”, it is understandable also that its modern revival could occur only in an indirect way without explicit reference to the forgotten Indo-Ionian depths of its origins. Thus epoché in its essential meaning reappears in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl as the pivotal point of his transcendental logic which, in the first half of the twentieth century was recognized as the most suitable and broadest methodological platform for the contemporary European philosophies beyond their differences in trends, individual views or thematic aspects for whose analysis it is applied.

The method of epoché in such application is designated as “phenomenological reduction” (to eidetic, intuitive, essences), “suspension”, or “bracketting”, or “switching off”, of the “doxic” (dogmatic) character or of existential determination by “viewpoints”, of phenomena as they appear to the immediate, theoretically unprejudiced and unbiased intuition in and for themselves. In the “back-stage” (as Nietzsche ridiculed the Kantian conception of “things” of phenomena as they appear (Greek phainestai—phantasia) there is no hidden “thing-in-itself”. Though Husserl remained a consequent idealist in claiming that by his method of epoché only “the transcendent in the immanent” is attainable to the insight of our immediate experience, his basic principle, “Back to the things themselves!”, has encouraged his followers and critics to transcend the aporia of idealism and realism as an artificial Kantian device, and thus to disclose new dimensions and approaches to philosophical problems in our existential immediacy. The predominance of this specific interest in overcoming the difficulty of the Kantian heritage in the philosophy of the early twentieth century has diverted some of the early followers
of Husserl’s phenomenology (Max Scheler and the existentialists) to pathways on which at first they could make little use of his initial conception of *epoché*.

At a later stage of advanced critical pondering over the *value-aspect of existence* the meditative inclination disclosed again a deeper import of *epoché*. This has been recognized most unequivocally in the later meditations of Heidegger, both distinguishing and reconnected himself as “Heidegger II” to “Heidegger I”. In deepening his meditations on the “forgetfulness of Being” and on the essentially antiontological direction of “metaphysics, which as such in its proper intention is nihilism”. Heidegger disclosed a new existential purport of *epoché* in the “withdrawal of Being” and its tendency of hiding in forgetfulness and nothingness. Thus the primary intention of *epoché* to serve as a method of disclosing the essence of Being (Heidegger’s *aletheia*, also in his “phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology”) has been extended to encompass at the same time the dialectical opposite of concealment in its meaningful withdrawal.

Without entering any further into such possibilities of extending the scope of the philosophy of *epoché* in its modern phenomenological context, I shall add to this survey a few hints at specific points on which Husserl, implicitly but essentially remained on fundamental positions laid down by Pyrrho.

The *antidogmatic standpoint* of Pyrrho’s philosophy implies *epoché* as “refraining from judgment” for reasons which can be summarized broadly for the purpose of our analogy as follows (in the wording of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhoneion hypotyposeon*):

1. Within the purview of *view-points* the intention of the Skeptic is to remain undisturbed (*ataraxia*) by their aporetic appearances (*phantasia*), since as soon as he begins to philosophise how to judge of them and to
understand which are true and which false, with a view to reach an undisturbed certainty, instead of that he will be caught in an equally strong contradiction, and being unable to solve it, he will apply *epoché* — refraining from judgment. (I, 12)

(2) The reason for such abstention is the failure to attain imperturbability (*ataraxia*) by a definite judgment in view of the inadequacy of the appearance on one hand and the thought referring to it on the other. (Ibid.)

(3) If therefore perceptions do not grasp *external things*, thought cannot comprehend them either. Refraining from judgment on *external things* should consequently follow also for reason. (I, 14, 16, 6)

Thus the theoretical faculty of reasoning reaches its highest critical attainment in abrogating itself. What was considered as the advantage of dialectics for speculative views and systems, appears now as a danger for the skeptical critique of thought, both in its theoretical and practical intentions. In this way objects are never contemplated as they are given without interference of intellectual views and theses in their contents. With the rejection of logical proofs the skeptical critique excludes at the same time the procedures of syllogism, induction and definition as *valid means of knowledge*. (II, 14-16)

(4) Notwithstanding the correct statement that “we do not take part in the research of nature” (I, 9) — yet “those who assert that the Skeptics deny the world of phenomena, are not correctly informed of the proper meaning of our statements. When we are in doubt whether an object (in itself) is such as it appears, we still do recognize that it appears, and we do not doubt of what appears, but of the statements made about it.” (I, 10)

In other words, the principle of “refraining from judgment on external things” does not imply either a
psychologicist or subjectivistic idealism in the meaning analogous to that in which Husserl criticized the neo-Kantian idealism and established his “Principle of principles”, as we shall see in the subsequent analogy.

(5) In Indian logics the critique of valid “means of knowledge” (pramāṇam) is the epistemological precondition for the construction of any system of world-views (darśanam, Greek doxa). The skeptic discussion of the problem of existence of God and of the possibility of its proof reminds us, also in this logical implication, of the prevalently non-monotheistic, henotheistic or pantheistic, and even atheistic (Jain and Buddhist) attitudes to this speculative problem in Indian philosophies. It may suffice for our purpose to compare it in the sequel with the adequate application of the same principle of epoché to the same problem by Husserl.

In order to conceive God it is requisite, in consideration of the statements of dogmatists, to refrain from the judgment that he either exists or does not exist... This unsolvable contradiction has brought us to the surmise that god's existence is not evident and that it requires proof... Since it is neither self-evident, nor can it be proved from anything else, the existence of God remains unattainable to our knowledge. Hence we conclude that those who with deep conviction affirm that god exists are unavoidably bound to fall into ungodliness. (III, 3)

The study of positive structural elements in the analogies of archetypal models referred to in the present survey with the modern revival of the philosophy of epoché, based on Husserl's phenomenological transcendentalism, will be considered within the frame of our investigation in a forthcoming study. A preliminary delimitation of differential elements can be mentioned at this point only summarily as a reminder of a few commonplace statements from the history of philosophy.
The refutation by the Skeptics of all these and opinions (doxa, Sk. drṣṭikā) in earlier cosmological philosophies on the first elements (archē) of Being, serves the purpose of establishing a diametrically different approach to the dialectical problems of philosophy, starting from the investigation of the structural formation of the faculty of reasoning. In anticipating an analogical designation by Husserl we can interpret the skeptical "principle of all principles" as epochē applied to all differences of opinions or beliefs, considering that Skeptics do not advance any specific assertion which might be considered as advantageous from their standpoint in comparison with any other, different and opposite views.

Without denying the objective givenness of phenomenal appearance (as stated under /4/ above), the Skeptics exclude only the presumption of valid inference from subjectively relative conceptions to the objectively established Being of that what there appears, considering that inferential (deductive or inductive) reasoning cannot ascertain anything beyond that what appears to us subjectively.

The ideal of the Pyrrhonian ethos of knowledge required that man should be enabled to establish and to maintain the state of equilibrium in his reasoning (isostheneia, cf. tatra-majjhāt' upekkhā in Pāli Buddhist contexts). The logical function of negation has to be considered as the methodological implement of this postulate. The aim of such reasoning was to demonstrate how all pre-epechtticl philosophy was onesided and dogmatic.

It is understandable that on the basic level of historical coincidences Pyrrho's ideas, even as summed up from the quoted presentation by Sextus Empiricus, corresponded just in these basic points to the dialectical intentions of Nāgārjuna in Buddhist philosophy (2nd c.A.D.). Let us remember only the statement which is representative of this school of thought.

"the mādhyamikāḥ, has no counter-thesis to offer, because that would entail yet another position".18
Therefore he is unbeatable in discussion.— In Nāgārjuna's basic formulation:

— If an exposition takes recurs to nothing (ṣūnyaṁ), then all critique is out of place and entails a petitio principii.

(Mādhyamaka-kārikā IV, 9)

In the modern renewal of the central conception of epoché, both its explicit final aim and the dialectical method adapted to the exclusive intention of skeptical philosophy (particularly in its later polemical degradation — "Contra mathematicos"), remained at first eliminated from the transcendentental intention of Husserl's logic. The following pointers to statements analogous to those singled out from Sextus Empiricus should be taken only as prima facie indications of possibilities for further critical studies.

(Ad 1) "The scientists speak of Mathematics and of all what is eidetic as skeptics, but in their eidetical method they proceed as dogmatics. This was their fortune: The greatness of natural sciences arose from their daring rejection of the luxuriant skepticism which had invaded the Ancients, and from renouncing to overcome it ... To the cycle of researches which can be properly designated as dogmatic, viz. pre-philosophic, pertain, among other sciences, all the natural sciences ..., sciences resulting from the dogmatic attitude turned to things and not permitting to be disturbed by problems of epistemological or skeptical nature."^{19}

For Husserl's "meditating Ego", on the contrary, applying "the universal epoché" is understood as "universal abstention from behaviour natural to the experience-belief, ... transfer of attention from the world given in experience to the experience itself, in which alone the world does possess sense and being for me".^{20} Thus the intuited (eidetic) essense appears in Husserl's "neutrality modification of a doxic consciousness ... as a pure representation", or "a neutrally modified per-
ception upon the switching off of all transcendent constituents.

(Ad 2) While Descartes still took it for granted that “knowledge of reality and knowledge of causality are inseparable”, for Husserl, on the contrary, reality has no being “in and for itself”; it is what it is only in its categorial, causal, determination, while “causality, on principle, is relative”. Neither causality nor the real in its causal implications can be simply “given” in any empirical texture.

(Ad 3) “Processes of consciousness ... have no ultimate elements and relationships fit for subsumption under the idea of objects determinable by fixed concepts ... It would be hopeless to attempt to proceed here with such methods of concept and judgment formation as are standard in the objective sciences.”

Phenomenology being “a purely descriptive discipline investigating the field of transcendental pure consciousness in pure intuition”, no mediate logical deduction is required within the limits of this scope, and, consequently, no concepts and no judgments have to be formed. As Husserl often used to repeat, phenomenology does not establish theories.

(Ad 4) “A meditating philosopher ... in a meditation of Cartesian type can neither have a use for, nor accept as given, any whatsoever scientific idea” for the simple reason that both life and positive science are naturally realistic, while the philosopher has to ask himself whether the very existence of the world is apodictically ‘evident’ ... The philosopher who is in doubt of this realism and who practice epoché will, consequently lose the world as real foundation of ‘evidences’ related there-to. Yet he will not lose, for that reason, all being and all ‘evidence’. On the contrary, behind the being of the world the very being of experience will be revealed to him ... the being of the subject, his meditation ...”
Thus the universal *epoché* applied by "the transcendental-phenomenological reflection" aims at the suspension of "the being or non-being of the world" and "lifting us off from this ground".\textsuperscript{26}

Husserl's *Principle of principles* :\textsuperscript{27} "Every type of first hand intuiting forms is a legitimate source of authority; whatever presents itself in 'intuition' at first hand, in its bodily reality, so to say, is to be accepted simply as it presents itself to be, though within the limits within which it presents itself". — Thus, complementary "to each region of objects, there corresponds a basic type of primordial self-evidence (*eidos)*". — "Each regional ontology is constituted by a specific set of categories whose *a priori* and universal validity is not limited to the condition of being formal."

(Ad 5) "After abandoning the natural world, we strike in our course another transcendence, which ... comes to knowledge in a highly mediated form, standing over against the transcendence of the world as if it were its polar opposite. We refer to the transcendence of God ... We naturally extend the phenomenological reduction to this Absolute and to this transcendent. It should remain disconnected from our field of research ..., so far as this is to be a field of pure consciousness ... There no god can alter anything."\textsuperscript{28}

The actuality of a renewal of the philosophy of Epoché becomes consequently implied also in the development of the independent thought of K. C. Bhattacharyya, whose interpretation of the Jainist *anekānta-vādah* was quoted at the beginning of the present comparative survey. As a link to the points singled out above this implicit contact can be recognized also from the summary of K. C. Bhattacharyya's basic intention as formulated by his closest friend D. M. Datta :\textsuperscript{29}
"The recognition of the indefinite would cure logic of the dogmatic tendency to treat the definite, the rational, the knowable as the sole content of thought, and would change its general outlook."

Bhattacharyya's own description of "different felt modes like knowing, feeling" — and other functions corresponding implicitly to the Cartesian Cogito as interpreted in the phenomenological analysis of Husserl's "Cartesian Meditations" — seem to correspond to Husserl's Principle of principles. Bhattacharyya's formulation of his basic principles was:

"Every system of philosophical thought or religion has its own logic and is bound up with one or other of the fundamental views of negation."

The advantage of this logic of the indefinite is that it "finds categories for widely different metaphysical notions of reality", which are not reducible to common denominators.

Bhattacharyya's intention to elicit his conception of the indefinite as a "correction of dogmatic biases" is applied (in his critique of Hegel) also to the antinomy of "being and non-being":

"In fact the opposition between the two definite contents of thought, being and non-being, cannot be understood at all without something which is neither and can yet make their relation possible. Recognition of the indefinite corrects this dogmatic bias of each, and yet gives to each a new light and reformed character."

The same criterion is consequently applied, here too, to the field of religious experience which "by its self-deepening gets opposed to or synthetized with other experiences."

54, Lady McCallums Drive,  
Nuwara Elia,  
SRI LANKA.
NOTES

1. The Sanskrit word śramaṇah is usually rendered sarmanes in Greek reports (since Megasthenes, 3rd c B.C.). Prophiros (3rd c. A.D.) in his book De abstinencia calls them samanei which corresponds to the Pāli title samanā used for Buddho and his followers.


3. Cf. J. W. Mac Crindle, Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian, London 1877; and The Invasion of India by Alexander the Great, as described by Qu. Curtius, Diodorus, Plutarch and Justin, by the same author, London, 1893.

4. Kant, to whom it has been reproached that he as a representative of the rationalist era was under a stronger influence of Stoical than of Christian ethics, praised this most prominent virtue of the Stoics in one of his late treatises on ethics, in the “Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics”, under the heading “Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength)”, concluding that “the true strength of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to bring its law into practice. This is the state of health in the moral life.” — Nietzsche's reproach of resentment to Christianity (in Anti-Christ, section 20, and in Ecce Homo, “why I am so wise”, section 6) finds in the same argument of “health” and “hygiene” an advantage of Buddhism and its “deep difference from Christianity”. (Cf. my forthcoming book on “The Ethos of Knowledge in European and Indian Philosophies.”)

5. Nietzsche makes occasional distinction between ephexis and akepsis at least in the gradation of terms. (Cf. his discussion upon the “ascetic ideals” in the Genealogy of Morals, III, 24).

6. Cf. the epechitic meaning of the term yathā-bhūtam for things as they “actually are” in Buddho’s critique of “views” (dīṭṭhi, dṛṣṭiḥ, doxa).

7. Cf. Buddho’s often repeated formula on “the thicket of views, the wilderness of views, the contortion of views, the fetter of views” to whose analysis the first long discourse, Brahma-jāla-sūttaṃ, in Dīgha-nikāya is dedicated.


10. The following basic definitions are taken from Pujiyapada’s *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Engl. transl. by S. A. Jain, Calcutta, Vira Sasana Sangha, 1960, pp. 41-43. The translation quoted in brackets is by Schubring, *op. cit.*, § 76, p. 160.

11. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan’s *Indian Philosophy I*, Ch. VI, 5, on this subject.

12. For my definition of the doxographic method see C. Velyachich, *Problems and Methods of Comparative Philosophy*, in *Indian Philosophical Annual* 1965.


14. For the basic documentation on Budho’s acosmic attitude see my article *Why is Buddhism a Religion?* (Ch. II, 10), in *Indian Philosophical Annual*, Vol. VI, 1970.


22. *Ideen... III*, Husserliana Band V (1952), p. 3 f.


27. *Ideas*, I, § 24, p. 43.


