There are two possible approaches to philosophy which cannot be adequately enough designated in terms of 'closed systems' and 'open horizons' as it has been often attempted in modern presentations. In a deeper approach to man's reflective life both are equally necessary and the problem of their coexistence cannot be solved by dialectical tricks nor can it be pragmatically neglected by a philosophy whose purpose it is to be personally lived. Actual philosophising springs always again from a naively genuine material a priori, and the task of its philosophical elucidation is not to reduce this primordial evidentness to any kind of pure formality or to eternalise its abstract scheme by confining it within a transcendental demarcation line, though the task of philosophical analysis consists in transcendental elucidation. The dilemma is not between a 'prophetically' sealed and sanctioned system on one side and a critical assessment of actual possibilities and problems which never can be comprized by any system nor even by any whatsoever kind of knowledge on the other. There is simply the fact of a two-sided approach to which also the terms 'inward' and 'outward' can be applied only metaphorically, if at all. As far as the urge toward philosophical elucidation is explicit in my human condition, the indicated relation has to be avowed in its primordial transparence. It is not revealed to me either as 'Cogito' or as 'Sum'.

Jainism

In my very personal case—in the sense in which my approach to Indian philosophy has become my approach to philosophy—the naive modus of the material a priori revealed itself as the inborn core of my being, expressed by the principle of ahiṃsā. Striking examples of its repulsion against the given conditions of existence reach to my early childhood. Why am I bound by ahiṃsā? Such direct questioning is not the proper way to attain to an answer in existential questions, as authentically un-prejudiced as these questions may be.
If ahiṁsā is the basic feeling of devotion which keeps me afloat in existence, there is no possibility of questioning it before at least a tentative desecration has occurred. But then again you will not be in a mood of questioning deep enough, because you are still under the influence of a pseudo-answer. From the bias of my personal experience it is very questionable whether such moods will ever bring you by themselves to existential questioning. It seems to me that Dostoevski believed they would, as far as he believed in the power of conversion. For this reason his influence on our generation of thinkers overloaded with European heredity has been amazing. Yet, this ultimately proves only that moods depend on tempers. A person condemned to find the way out to life from the devotional sanctuary of ahiṁsā need never become a convert, as it may happen to those who start from the experience of violence in their inner attitude. Hence the former may never learn the use of the spectacular tools of dialectics for the purpose of his own struggle for life. Anekānta-vāda is essentially the method of ahiṁsā. I never could imagine the two being dissociated.—You must not harm by thought!

A way to transcendental analysis and to discursive philosophizing has to disclose itself by itself, not as a technical need but as a grace indwelling the heart of ahiṁsā. The explicit formulation of the question comes at a relative end-point, as the sun appears some time (not always and everywhere equally long) after the day-break and sets at an equally approximate distance before the night-break. As to my explicit approach to Indian philosophy, I walked into it at the age of about fourteen when I first heard of karma and sāṃsāra as principles of vital concatenations, and tried to imagine existence in a schematism provided by corresponding categories. Subsequently I wanted to know more about the darṣana theories and also about the anti-darṣana position of the Buddha, an attitude which in corresponding Greek terms consists in applying (within the span of meditation—dhyāna) eposhe to doxa.

Buddhism

There are things one cannot grasp before one's very mature age. You cannot understand the Buddha through any other device but by exposing yourself to the influence of his Sutta-piṭaka discoursed during several years of patient reading and keeping pace with the speed of the piṭaka style. Thinking of it retrospectively, I still cannot understand why it is so. There is certainly nothing mystical about it. It is most probably due to some prejudice about absolute time-limits of the "pre-philosophical thought" that we refuse, both in the West and in India, to expect "in that stuff" statements formulated clearly and distinctly in a sequence and in explicit conformity with principles of a subtly elabo-
rated system of logic (as e.g. the catuṣ-koṭika principle, applied in the most rational definition of the nirvāṇam that I can imagine in ontological thinking)\(^1\).

It seems therefore to be still indispensable in discussions on this subject to start with quoting a few examples such as the text of the Brahma-jāla-suttam, the opening one of the Dīgha-nikāya collection (considered to be the relatively oldest systematized series of texts), in order to demonstrate the accomplished logical structure of an explicitly transcendental system whose archaically formulated schematism suggests to me a neatly performed insertion of examples taken from Dante’s cosmology into an ingeniously adapted structure of Kant’s transcendental dialectics. Yet, the cosmogonic extension of the schematism, thus propedetically illuminated, can easily be removed in view of different technical requirements of another age or place, or simply to satisfy the imaginative poverty of ‘scientifically’ minded philosophers wherever they may arise. I shall venture to put forward the essential systematic structure of the suttam, in Buddha’s own words, as follows:

“It is in respect only of trifling things, of matters of little value, of mere morality, that a worldly man, when praising the Tathāgata, would speak. And what are such trifling, minor details of mere morality that he would praise?

Putting away the killing of living beings, samaṇa Gotama holds aloof from the destruction of life...from taking what is not given...from unchastity...from lying words...from wrong means of livelihood...

But there are other things, profound, difficult to realise, hard to understand, tranquillising, not to be grasped by mere logic, subtle, comprehensive only to the wise...And what are they?

There are samaṇā and brāhmaṇā who reconstruct the ultimate beginning of things, whose speculations are concerned with the ultimate past, and who (on 18 grounds) put forward various assertions regarding it: They are eternalists (sassata-vāda), who (on 4 grounds) proclaim that both the soul and the world are eternal;...or eternalists with regard to some things, and in regard to others non-eternalists...

There are certain samaṇā and brāhmaṇā who are extensionist (antāntaṇṭika) and who (in 4 ways) set forth the infinity or finiteness of the world...

There are others who teach accidental origination (adhicca-samup-pannika) and who (in two ways) maintain that the soul and the world arise without a cause...

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There are those who hold the doctrine of a conscious existence after death, who maintain (in 16 ways) that the soul after death is conscious, or...that it is unconscious (in 8 ways), or...that it is neither conscious nor unconscious (in 8 ways),...and those who are annihilationists, who maintain (in 7 ways) the cutting off, the destruction, the annihilation of a living being...

Whosoever of the samanā and brāhmaṇa are such and maintain this, they do so in these (established number of) ways or in one or other of the same, and outside these there is no way in which this opinion is arrived at...

All of them are entrapped in the net of these 62 modes; this way and that they plunge about, but they are in it; this way and that they may flounder, but they are included in it, caught in it,—Just as when a skilful fisherman or fisherlad should drag a tiny pool of water with a fine-meshed net he might fairly think: ‘Whatever fish of size may be in this pond, every one will be in this net...’—just so is it with these speculations about the past and the future...”

It may be sufficient to add to this carefully elaborated categorical determination of the four antinomies of the pure reason (limits of time and of space, causality and immortality of the soul), the concluding statement of Kevaddha-suttam (Digha-nikaya, XI) on the categorical limitation of our understanding (viññāgam, Sansk. vijñāgam, in the technical terminology of the Buddha) to complete this prima facie evidence against accusations that the Buddha was a unsystematic agnostic and moralist preacher and divulgator of common-sense ideas and ‘truisms’ of his age and race:

“Where do earth, water, fire and wind; long and short; fine and coarse; pure and impure, no footing find? Where is it that both name and form are nihilated, leaving no trace behind?

When intellect (viññāgam) ceases they all cease too.”

Another peculiar circumstance imposed itself with the time to my understanding of these backgrounds, as their historical character became more and more explicit: I never could find a perspective from which to look at the Buddha’s teaching except from what I consider to be the existential origin of his thought in the tradition of the tirthankarā as the common source of two contemporary reforms—the orthodox conservative reform by Mahāvīra, with the intention to purify and reduce to its traditional essentials the religion of the Jains, and the philosophical reform of the Buddha who went down to the roots of all principles in order to re-examine them critically at a time propitious for thorough
reforms. It seems more and more probable that a support for doxo-graphic hypotheses on the specificity of the Magadhan branch of Aryan culture at those times may be confirmed by archaeological researches in course (Narmada Valley, Kaushambi). There is no doubt that, for example, the catuṣ-koṭika principle, as applied by the Buddha in his logical definition of the nibbāṇaḥ, is essentially different, not only in structure but also in the intended meaning, from sapta-bhangi. But would its specific gnoseological advantage have come to evidence without a pre-existing development of logical thought in Jain tradition? Has not, further, the anatta (nairūrya) theory appeared as a logical attempt to replace by a pure abstract law of reason the datelessly old and overburdened hylozoistic teleology of monads, the casuistic classification of whose natures had reached the utmost limits of imaginable dispersion in space, time, and memory. The minutization of specific characters of karman, leṣya, nigoda, dravya, pudgala and even jīva up to the nirvāṇic state—mainly with regard to their physiological capacities of reacting—could be compared for its phantastic complexity with the structures of Tycho de Brache’s epicycles in pre-Copernican astronomy.

Finally, with respect to Buddha’s position to ahiṃsā itself, my considerations centered around, and identified themselves with those of the physician Jivako, the most noble figure at the royal court of Rājaṅrā. The answer given to him by the Buddha on the question of meat-eating (in Majjhima-nikāya, 55; without any need of commentarial additions in later parentheses) was obviously and clearly enough in full agreement with Jivako’s own Jain tradition, and satisfied me just as it did him. Similarly many other shameless clerical relapses in the absurd casuistic schematism of the most dry and dead parts of the Vinaya-pitaka (as reverently old as they may be) can easily be discarded in the light of the Teacher’s living word. Visiting Rajgrī, I found the presumed location of Jivako’s garden to be the most suitable place for meditative orientation among the surrounding archaeological sites, Jain on one side, Buddhist and Jain on the other.

The Upaniṣads

Alongside with a number of philosophically clear and coherent texts from the Sutta-pitaka—such as the Brahma-jāla, Sāmañña-phala, Poṭṭha-pāda or Kevaddha-suttam (Digha-nikāya, 1,2,9,11), or Dhammapadina’s synopsis of philosophical problems in Cūlavedalla-suttam (Majjhima-n., 44) — I found most revealing, from the view-point of comparative philosophy, a series of details in the oldest Upaniṣads (Chāndogya and Brhadāraṇyaka), particularly those containing non-brahmanic teachings in the violent clashes of discussion.
The richness of intellectual events staged at the court of king Janaka and elsewhere has to be compared with another description of the same speculative richness of the Indian mind at that time, contained particularly in the Sāmañña-phala-suttam (mentioned above). It is an original and different picture which can be studied further and more extensively in the Jain Bhagavati-sūtram, as both often refer to the same persons (the ājīvikā).

In this complexity of the early Indian thought, the conflict between the traditional Vedic wisdom of the brāhmanā and a "nature lore" foreign to them, newly introduced by the kṣatriya, is documented more richly than anywhere else in the history of ancient civilizations where the same theories (mainly hylozoistic cosmogonies) are mentioned and discussed in literary fragments. This impression becomes striking particularly when we compare the Upaniṣadic condensation of ideas in one point of time and space with the scattered remnants of the Greek pre-Socratics. For some time I tried to follow independently from all the rest the study of the Upaniṣads in comparison with the pre-Socratic hylozoism in its East-Mediterranian version. The result of those studies was my thesis on "Indian and Greek Philosophy" (Zagreb, 1961)². This, at the same time was my practical training in comparative method to whose specific elaboration those interested in similar subjects should pay much more attention. This being a less intimate subject, it will be dealt with in the second part of this paper.

II

The increasing interest in comparative philosophy is due to the importance of its unquestionable part in any whatsoever up to date philosophy of culture. And the contemporary European philosophy is becoming more and more explicitly a philosophy of culture, in as much as it determines the scope of its interest as "humanist", "personalist", or even "anthropological" in a "cosmically" minded sense.

It is in this connection that arises the question: What does the structure of a universally minded anthropological philosophy basically imply? In dealing with problems of our immediate human situations the actual philosophy of existence can determine its theoretical coordinates exclusively in the "historical" of its categories which thus become "existentialia". As the space of the human world is created out of the wordliness of our civilised modes of life, and is not preceding that wordliness, so is time constituted by the historicality of our being in that world. The logics of humanist sciences must be reshaped on foundations different from those adequate to the idea of an objectivity dehumanized to purely formal shapes of a neutral nature.
As long as the logics of humanist sciences is still in its initial stages, applied more implicitly than explicitly in gnoseological or ontological speculations, the idea of a comparative philosophy, as understood here, can be, and uses to be, gravely misunderstood in its scope. It is most often oversimplified also by those who believe in its importance. The author of the first systematic treatise on "Comparative Philosophy", Masson-Oursel (1923) was brought by his methodological considerations to the general conclusion that comparative philosophy should eventually become the only type of philosophy adequate to the standards of scientific knowledge of our age, and therefore purely empiristic and positivistic. The later development of European philosophy has shown that in this respect just the opposite tendencies have prevailed, also among those interested in comparative studies for the purposes of a philosophy of culture. No scientific principles can determine the primordial selection of the subject of our philosophical interest, but the subject-matter does predetermine methodological principles.

There is a still greater danger, rooted deeply in the history of our western civilization. The affectionate "rediscovery" of the "East" by the Romanticists reconnected itself almost immediately with the early Greek and later Hellenistic speculations on Asian wisdom, even from times preceding Alexander the Great. The danger consists still today among favourably minded universalists in reducing essential, or simply ideological values of different civilizations to common denominators. The danger is just the same in cases of reducing "single", specific, more or less water-tight civilizations (such as Asian and European, Eastern and Western, Buddhist and Christian) to extracts of generalizing procedures (as the "ideas of nations") and then refusing, from a certain point on, to proceed further in such generalisation, as in, ideologically opposite cases of preconceived beliefs in unlimited and absolute universal equations. The historical stage of so general reflections and rough estimates is over and very far behind our actual knowledge of specific facts and problems in their various shadings in each specific event and recurrence. Yet, better knowledge of backgrounds should never prevent a good and qualified comparison.

All historical, systematic and methodological failures point out to a shortcoming which is primarily philosophical and does not depend from any lack of scientific instruments of investigation. The improvement of such instruments and the respective increase of information (as supplied e.g. now by archaeology) can only incite and widen our eternal interest in "destroying the history of our knowledge" in the urge to thus attain its deeper sources shattered by various strata of traditions. However, all philosophical investigation has to start from an intimate
confession of its concrete aims. This never can be replaced by a critical justification of one's available tools.

I am glad that I can produce a ready-made confession of aims to which I can subscribe, and which since almost half a century seems to correspond more and more to the intimate feeling and requirement of an increasing number of contemporary thinkers both in the East and in the West. I shall quote two philosophers, at a distance of some decades, the first in India and the second in Europe, to whom I owe most in this respect.

Aurobindo

"It may be useful in approaching an ancient Scripture ... to indicate precisely the spirit in which we approach it and what exactly we think we may derive from it that is of value to humanity and its future... We hold it therefore of small importance to extract ... its exact metaphysical connotation as it was understood by the men of the time—even if that were accurately possible ... But what we can do with profit is to seek ... for the actual living truths it contains, apart from their metaphysical form, to extract from it what can help us or the world at large and to put it in the most natural and vital form and expression we can find that will be suitable to the mentality and helpful to the spiritual needs of our present-day humanity ... But precisely for that reason it cannot be shut up in a single trenchant formula, it is not likely to be found in its entirety or in all its bearings in any single philosophy or scripture or uttered altogether and for ever by any one teacher, thinker, prophet or avatar... We may be sure of finding in it as much real truth as we are capable of receiving as well as the spiritual influence and actual help that, personally, we were intended to derive from it. And that is after all what Scriptures were written to give; the rest is academical disputation or theological dogma".8

Thanks to a fortunate coincidence in the contemporary European philosophy, there is no need for me to argue on my own behalf alone that the word "Scripture" in this text implies also the wider meaning of "Philosophy" in its contemporary humanist sense. The European thinker referred above for corresponding conclusions is Karl Jaspers. Less than ten years ago he has undertaken to analyse the achievements of "The Great Philosophers" throughout history by classifying them in groups according to the essential congeniality of their thought, neglecting the coincidences of time and space by which they were separated from each other. In this "attempt of establishing an ideal, almost essential communion of free spirits throughout history, beyond their chronological order", the Buddha is dealt with in the same group with
Confucius and Sokrates, and Sankara with Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Hegel.

Before he started elaborating his conception of a universal philosophy on such comparative bases, Jaspers had cleared his position towards the problem of "The Perennial Scope of Philosophy" where his congeniality with Aurobindo's humanist interpretation of the sanātana dharma seems to be still more striking.

Jaspers

"Nowhere at any time has a philosophia perennis been achieved, and yet such a philosophy always exists in the idea of philosophical thought and in the general picture of the truth of philosophy considered as its history over three millennia which become a single period." "In truth there is only the elucidation of the Comprehensive; this elucidation is never completed." "Hence no meaningful philosophy can be a self-contained conceptual system." "Only through philosophical faith, which always goes back to the primal source, is always capable of recognizing itself in the other, can the road be found through the tangle of aberrations in the history of philosophy to the truth that has dawned in it." Faith is the "dialogue with this tradition." "A proved God is no God." "To-day philosophy is the only refuge for those who, in full awareness, are not sheltered by religion" and "the unsheltered individual gives our epoch its physiognomy". "Deprived of his faith by the loss of his religion, man is devoting more decisive thought to the nature of his own being... No longer does the revealed Deity upon whom all is dependent come first, and no longer the world that exists around us; what comes first is man, who, however, cannot make terms with himself as being, but strives to transcend himself." "The elucidation of communication from its multiple sources in the modes of the Comprehensive is becoming a central theme of philosophical endeavour."

I wish to close this ideal dialogue with direct references from both sides on the meaning of sanātana dharma and philosophia perennis in the common spirit as explained above:

Aurobindo: "What is of entirely permanent value is that which besides being universal has been experienced, lived and seen with a higher than the intellectual vision." (Id.)

Jaspers: "A truth with I can prove, stands without me; it is universally valid, unhistorical, timeless, but not absolute—a truth by which I live stands only if I become identical with it; it is historical in form; as an objective statement it is not universally valid, but is absolute."
In these statements I find my *prima facie* material criteria for the West-East dialogue on which comparative philosophy, conceived as a part of the philosophy of culture, can be based.

*Radhakrishnan*

There is another aspect of the problem that has to be mentioned in this connection. It is the wider objective historical approach to specific questions by appropriate culture-logical methods. Here I can only trace in part its volume on the best known example of actual investigation that has been undertaken in the sphere of Indian philosophy, in the first half of the twentieth century, in the work of S. Radhakrishnan.

If I had to specify whom I mean when speaking of the contemporary philosophers of culture, then I would mention primarily Jaspers in Europe and Radhakrishnan in Asia.

The problem of comparative method has always remained implicit in Radhakrishnan's works the same as in the case of most other philosophers and historians of philosophy whose books are of a particular interest for modern studies of comparative philosophy, at least since P. Deussen. One exception was P. Masson-Oursel. His thesis *La Philosophie Comparée* (1923) deals with the methodological problem from the standpoint of the French positivist school of Levy-Bruhl. However, if we compare Masson-Oursel's approach to the same complex of historical problems in his later work *La Philosophie en Orient?*, we can see how insufficient the methodological framework of the *Philosophie Comparée* has become in the meantime in view of the substantial changes in the matter of fact knowledge that have taken place between early twenties and late thirties. At least the orientation in ancient philosophy, particularly Indian and East-Mediterranean, including the Asian, Ionian, origins of the Greek thought, has been changed radically. This affected equally Masson-Oursel's approach to the subject of his second mentioned book and Radhakrishnan's comparative analysis of the ancient Greek and early Christian philosophy in his *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (Oxford, 1940).

Both Masson-Oursel in his first book and Radhakrishnan in his *Indian Philosophy* (both appeared in 1923) limited their comparative interpretations on *doxographic analyses* of pure analogies of ideas, abstracting from any possible form of wider homologous development on parallel lines in time and space. As far as homologies had to be taken in consideration (particularly by Masson-Oursel, as earlier occasionally by Deussen or Stcherbatsky in logics) they had to be
explained by overstraining the anthropological capacities of an ālaya-vijñānam or sub-conscious container of material apriori ideas of the Reason, which at the time of Masson-Oursel had, of course, to be reinterpreted sociologically, if at all.

In their second mentioned books both Masson-Oursel and Radhakrishnan take into very serious account the evidence of the chronological documentation supplied in the meantime by historical sciences, particularly by archaeology. Thus a method of chronological documentation in the comparative history of ideas appears de facto again in its contra-position to the doxographic method. The problem of coordination of these two approaches is unfortunately loaded with a burden of precedents in philosophical historiography which prejudice a much wider scope than a limited reorientation in the sphere of the earliest periods of both eastern and western philosophies. An uncritical belief in a chronological documentation, often belated and unreliable, concerning direct Indian influences on the Greek philosophy since Pythagoras, characterized the Hellenistic period of the ancient Mediterranean civilization, the same as an uncritical belief in exclusively Egyptian influences characterized, since Herodotos, the politically influenced Greek historiography of the earlier period as an antidote against the Indo-Iranian historical reality. The Romanticist revival of the Hellenistic trend has been mentioned above in a wider connection of our problem.

Thus the problem of first reconciling and then readjusting the two methods for the purposes of philosophical research appears as an urgent task to be undertaken explicitly. It has, of course, to be understood only as part of a wider problem of the epistemology of historical and specifically of cultural sciences.

Aurobindo’s statements “that mental life, far from being a recent appearance in man, is the repetition in him of a previous achievement from which the Energy in the race had undergone one of her deplorable recoils”; that “the savage is perhaps not so much the first forefather of civilized man as the degenerate descendent of a previous civilization” and that “barbarism is an intermediate sleep, not an original darkness” do today no longer refer only to a hypothesis which since ancient times was considered as purely occultistic. It is gaining more and more support in the contemporary science. I wish to support it with a few reflections by an archaeologist: “Scholars of tomorrow, will probably decide that the “golden age of mankind was in the second and third milleniums B.C., after which barbarians took command and messed things up so thoroughly with their machines and mechanical inventions that they finally brought their civilization to crash on their own heads.” The Sumerians “did not think philosophy useless, and
they recorded whatever theories they had in their documents... It will take another fifty years at least before a comprehensive chapter on ancient philosophy can be written.\textsuperscript{19}

In order to recapitulate the essential elements characteristic of the actual situation in comparative studies of Indo-European philosophical traditions, I wish to stress the following:

While the doxographic method remains restricted to an essential and basic analysis of ideas constituting the structure of systems to be compared, the method of chronological documentation should help us, on the side of objective historical research, to estimate possible indirect or direct influences and wider homologies in historical development between comparable points of two systems of thought. Purely doxographic analysis of any particular subject from the viewpoint of comparative philosophy should be considered as partial and restricted as long as an research into the objective historical circumstances by the method of chronological documentation can be reasonably postulated. The two methods and their specific fields of research being essentially different from and independent of each other, though overlapping on the level of history of ideas, the final aim of producing a coherent and synchronized unit of philosophical actuality in comparative philosophy cannot be attained alone by a global analysis of ideas essential for the immanent structure of a closed system of thought, as it used to be attempted too often until now (in spite of several other, purely doxographic, reasons against wholesale comparisons).

While maintaining the primacy of the doxographic method of analysis and its exclusive adequateness in establishing basic criteria for the selection of comparativistic subjects, we must however admit that its application can contribute to the formation of a valid basis for further investigation only if by applying this method special attention is paid to such comparative elements that may facilitate, or at least do not ignore, parallel research in the field of chronological documentation, and vice versa.

At the end I wish to point out a model example of up to date contribution made by the research of chronological documentation for the benefit of further doxographic analyses. It is contained in J. Filliozat's essay, \textit{La doctrine brahmanique à Rome au III\textsuperscript{e} siècle},\textsuperscript{10} which gave me new incentive to investigate doxographically some analogies in the system of Plotinus with the early Indian thought.

Comparing some doxographic analogies in Radhakrishnan's comments on the \textit{Principal Upaniṣads} with his occasional analogies in
Indian Philosophy it is easy to see that in this third phasis his comparative criteria have attained a deeper penetration reflecting also the harmony established between successively predominating trends in his earlier works.

1. *Nirvāṇa* defined as “neither being, nor non-being, nor both being-and-non-being, nor neither-being-nor-non-being”.

2. The conclusion referring to the origins of the hylozoistic theories was that both the Upaniṣadic and the Greek versions were derived from a third common source situated in the intermediate Mesopotamian area, probably since Sumerian and Elamite times. Cf. archaeological reference to the same source and its philosophical relevance in n. 9.


6. O.c., p. 10.


9. E. Chiera, *They Wrote on Clay*, The University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp. 135, 233. - Cf. Chiera’s conclusion on this subject: “Suffice it for the present to say that we shall have to abandon most of our old ideas and completely re-write the earliest chapters of Greek history in the light of the new information which is constantly being given by the clay tablets”. p. 221.