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# KANT-STUDIEN

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dispositions: both the material dispositions of its body and the so-called “non-material” dispositions of its empirical will. Furthermore, the person recognizes that it is rational, and knows that it has sensations, emotions, beliefs, etc. because unless the capacities making these things possible are in place – unless a person *could* experience pain, share thoughts with a friend, think about what ought to be done, and, most importantly, represent ‘I think’ – its ability to even question these capacities would be undermined. This is *not* to say that every apparent manifestation of one such capacity is incorrigible. One can wonder whether or not one is angry, or feeling pain, or believing ‘that p’. And subsequent experience may, in fact usually does, bear on the answers to such questions. But *that* a person is rational and that a person does sometimes feel pain or anger is not something that can be questioned in a meaningful way. Kant’s argument to demonstrate this is not that his own, personal experience would be incoherent unless these abilities were presupposed, because Kant sees clearly that one cannot start from a subjective position and *then* build a world. Instead, Kant asks us to consider what is required if there is to be coherent experience. His question is: How could a rational being, endowed with a body and a particular form of sensibility, be possible? And he answers this question by considering the *formal* requirements for such a being. He shows us the formal constraints for coherent or unified experience. Because Kant does not argue from his own, subjective viewpoint, but rather from the concept of a person, he has no trouble accounting for other minds.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>31</sup> I gratefully acknowledge many conversations and classes with Gordon Nagel. His pioneering work on Kant has given me a toehold onto the Kantian system. I also would like to thank J. Fell, L. Pineau, D. Savan, C. Sharp, the CPA referees and the referees of this journal who read and commented on earlier drafts of this paper.

## The Ethos of Knowledge in Kantian and in Buddhist Philosophy

Remarks on some Theses from Standpoint of European Philosophy

by Bhikkhu Ñāṇajīvako, Nuwara Eliya / Sri Lanka

### *Thesis I*

*There are philosophies which cannot even be thought by those who do not live in accordance with their postulates.*

This principle is postulated, at least formally and implicitly, by all systems of Indian philosophy and their methods of instruction in wisdom, from their early beginnings (pre-Aryan in Jainism and post-Aryan in the *upaniṣads*) until the late medieval scholasticism and its distintegration under the pressure of later foreign invasions.

I consider this statement as the first thesis of the first philosophy in the meaning of the classical terms *prima philosophia* and *philosophia perennis* (Sanskrit: *sanātana dharmah*).

This existential attitude does, however, *not* imply, and should not prejudice, a philosopher’s viewpoint concerning the hypothesis, prejudicial for modern European philosophies, on the dialectical contradiction of rationalism and irrationalism, and its fundamental importance for metaphysical speculation. What I have in view in this respect is a return to Kant’s critique of transcendental dialectic.

The following attempt to elicit the thesis aims in the first place at a historical re-examination and re-establishment of the theme of the *ethos* of knowledge (*Erkenntnis*) to the central place which it originally occupied in the organic whole of Kant’s philosophy. A wider understanding and the renewal of an approach to Kant out of his own central conception requires, unfortunately, now more toil than ever before at unblocking landslides, clearing undermined grounds and removing pitfalls and traps spread around a narrow groove by which critical transcendentalism was supposed to be brought down, either dialectically or pragmatically, to the narrow-minded and short-sighted perspectives of an “antimetaphysical” and even totally “antiphilosophical” scientific positivism, or still worse to semanticist formalism.

For our historical orientation the thesis on the *ethos* of knowledge can be elicited from Kant’s intention to establish the *discipline of the practical reason* as a link

connecting the metaphysical and the ethical faculty of knowledge (*Erkenntnisvermögen*) as stated in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>1</sup>:

"So far, therefore, as our Critique limits speculative reason, it is indeed *negative*, but since it thereby removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason, nay threatens to destroy it, it has in reality a *positive* and very important use. At least this is so, immediately we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary *practical employment of pure reason – the moral* – in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Though (practical) reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance from the speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself."

Some aspects of this basic relation between the "speculative" and the "practical" reason, significant for the sequel of our investigation, have been explicated already in the first edition, particularly in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method"<sup>2</sup>:

"It is humiliating to human reason that it achieves nothing in its pure employment, and indeed stands in need of a discipline to check its extravagances, and to guard it against the deceptions which arise therefrom... The philosophy of pure reason... serves not as an organon for the extension but as a discipline for the limitation of pure reason, and... of guarding against error. – There must, however, be some source of positive modes of knowledge which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which, it may be, give occasion to *error solely owing to misunderstanding*, while yet in actual fact they form *the goal of liberation of the reason*."

This last sentence, and especially the expressions underlined by me, correspond almost literally to the formulation of the fundamental tenet in all significant systems of Indian philosophy.

The postulate of "a discipline for the limitation of pure reason... against *error solely owing to misunderstanding*", corresponds, in all scholastic systems of Indian world-views (*darsanam*), to the primeval motive of their *philosophia perennis*, as mentioned above, to start from *a-vidyā*, literally "ne-science", as the transcendental (*paramārtha*) reason of "misunderstanding", epistemologically elicited and elucidated in the prolegomena to all those systems as their theory of *māyā*. Schopenhauer's approach to Indian philosophy through this Vedāntic term as the broadest analogical principle for all subsequent positive attempts at comparative philosophy, has been recognized beyond any reasonable doubt at least on the fundamental level of the proposed Indo-European dialogue.

Among the oldest *upaniṣads* the title of *Kena* ("by whom") formulates and elicits this initial question of transcendental subjectivism: "By whom willed and directed does the mind alight on its objects?" (Radhakrishnan's translation).

Buddho's most concise definition of *avidyā* as the first cause and *primum mobile* of the whole "chain of suffering" – the *circulus vitiosus* on whose elucidation his "first noble truth" is based – implies the analysis of "interdependent origination" (*paṭicca samuppādo*) of factors (*saṃkhārā*) or constituent properties of mental and material phenomena (*nāma-rūpam*) and the existential reason of their constitution in and by the empirical discriminative consciousness (*vi-ññāṇam*):

"Due to nescience are the factors (constituent of phenomena); due to constituent factors is the (empirically discriminating) consciousness..."

"Thus mental and material factors are the reason of consciousness, and consciousness is the reason of mental and material factors (of phenomena)."

"The goal of liberation of the reason" from the transcendental illusion conceived as *māyā* is in this connection the way of elimination by the same liberating reason of "links" (*nidānam*) constituting this chain – one by one in their proper sequence of existentialia (in the meaning analogous rather to Heidegger's term for such structures of categories) – from "decay and death" to their source in birth, and up to their ultimate constituents in empirical consciousness, chained by the transcendental nescience of *māyā*. This way of reasoning by phenomenological reduction, in its purport to existential maturing, is called "the path of purification" (*visuddhi-maggo*) emerging from a clarified ethos of knowledge. Its goal – described with partly different connotations in various systems of Indian philosophy – is generally designated as liberation – *mokṣaḥ*. The specific designation in Pāli Buddhism, *vi-mutti*, emphasizes most explicitly that it is "liberation from...", and not "liberation to...", in the meaning of the ultimate attainment of *nibbānam* (Sk. *nirvāṇam*), which is "extinction without remainder" (*an-avasesam*).

Schopenhauer had in view the same existential turning when criticizing Kant's "return to an unconditioned cause, to a first beginning" in his Transcendental Dialectic, which for Schopenhauer "is by no means established in the nature of our faculty of reason". This "is, moreover, proved in practice by the fact that the original religions of our race, which even now have the greatest number of followers on earth, I mean Brahmanism and Buddhism, neither know nor admit such assumptions, but carry on to infinity the series of phenomena that condition one another... Kant, who by no means wishes to maintain his pretended principle of reason as objectively valid, but only as subjectively necessary, deduces it even as such only by a shallow sophism... Such a historical investigation would have saved Kant from an unfortunate necessity in which he is now involved..."

In the sequel of the quoted passage on the "error" and "the goal of liberation of the reason", Kant explicates the attitude of the practical reason as follows:

"How else can we account for our inextinguishable desire to find firm footing somewhere beyond the limit of experience?... Presumably it may look for better fortune in the only other

<sup>1</sup> Quotations are from *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, MacMillan, 1950. – Quotations of the *Critique of Practical Reason* are from the translation by Lewis White Beck, The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill & Co., New York 1956; the pagination of the Prussian Academy edition, Vol. V., referred to in the sequel under "Ak". – Other texts, quoted from Th. K. Abbott's translations in *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, London, Longmans, 1923, correspond to Rosenkranz edition, referred to in the sequel under R. Page-numbers from the Academy edition are added in parentheses.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter II, "The Canon of Pure Reason", A 795 f.

<sup>3</sup> *Mahā-nidāna-suttantam*, *Dīgha-nikāyo*, 15.

<sup>4</sup> *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. I, translated by E. F. J. Payne, p. 484–7. A. Hübscher's edition, pp. 574, 578.

path which still remains open to it, that of its *practical* employment... There is therefore no canon of its speculative employment; such employment is entirely dialectical... Consequently, if there be any correct employment of pure reason, in which case there must be a canon of its employment, the canon will deal not with the speculative but with the *practical employment of reason*<sup>5</sup>."

Unlike the earlier and the later European philosophy, Indian systems have concentrated most persistently on elaborating just this aspect of the pure reason (*śuddhā kalpanā*),<sup>6</sup> designated usually with the generic term *yogaḥ* ("discipline") under its various aspects (cf. e.g. *yogācāraḥ* in Buddhism).

The following further references in the *Critique of Pure Reason* are significant for Kant's rational approach to this problem:

"As this concerns our attitude to the supreme end, it is evident that the ultimate intention of nature in her wise provision for us has indeed, in its constitution of our reason been directed to moral interests alone<sup>7</sup>."

"In this way all investigation of nature tends to take the form of a system of ends...<sup>8</sup>."

"In this marvelous faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law first reveals to me, I should indeed have, for the determination of my existence a principle which is purely intellectual<sup>9</sup>."

Discussing the problem of a critical solution of the antinomy of pure reason, Kant singles out also the basic transcendental structure of ethics as a "pure rational science":

"In addition to transcendental philosophy, there are two pure rational sciences, one purely speculative, the other with a practical content, pure mathematics and pure ethics<sup>10</sup>."

Thus the rational foundation of Kant's ethics has been established in his first *Critique*. In this background he found his closest historical connection with the "fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals" in Indo-European philosophy as laid down in the *ethos* of knowledge taught by Socrates, by the Stoics and the kindred schools of Hellenistic philosophy, about whom Schopenhauer has noticed, mainly from his studies of Indian philosophy, that the whole complex of ideas in the later Greek and Roman philosophy would appear as a "colossal paradox" from any viewpoint except that of Eastern asceticism<sup>11</sup>.

"This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed Moral Philosophy. On account of this superiority which moral philosophy has over all other occupations of reason, the ancients in their use of the term 'philosopher' always meant, more especially, the *moralist*; and even at the present day we are led by a certain analogy to entitle

<sup>5</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A 796 f.

<sup>6</sup> See about this analogy in "the *a priori* conditions" of the "empirical knowledge", Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 78; Dover Publications, N. Y. 1962.

<sup>7</sup> A 801/B 829.

<sup>8</sup> A 816/B 844. Cf. the explication of the same thought in B 425.

<sup>9</sup> B 431.

<sup>10</sup> A. 480/B 508.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Parerga und Paralipomena* I, § 6, on Stoics, and § 7, on Neoplatonists (pp. 53 and 58 in E. F. J. Payne's translation).

anyone philosopher who appears to exhibit self-control under the guidance of reason, however limited his knowledge may be<sup>12</sup>."

"Plato very well realized that our faculty of knowledge feels a much higher need than merely to spell out appearances according to a synthetic unity, in order to be able to read them as experience. He knew that our reason naturally exalts itself to forms of knowledge which so far transcend the bounds of experience that no given empirical object can ever coincide with them, but which must none the less be recognised as having their own reality, and which are by no means mere fictions of the brain. – Plato found the chief instances of his ideas in the field of the practical, that is, in what rests upon freedom, which in its turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are a peculiar product of reason<sup>13</sup>."

These are explicitly designated as "notions of virtue, not derived from experience".

"It is in regard to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where the experience, in this case of the good, is itself made possible only by the ideas – incomplete as their empirical expression must always remain<sup>14</sup>."

"Without soaring so high" as Plato, for whom the archetypic ideal was "an idea of the divine understanding", Kant compares his model of human perfection with "the wise man" of the Stoics, who "is, however, an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea gives the *rule*, so the ideal in such a case serves as the *archetype* for the complete determination of the copy, and we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of the divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed. Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as figments of the brain; they supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it; providing it, as they do, with a concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree in the defects of the incomplete<sup>15</sup>."

Max Scheler, insisting on the difference between Kant's and Christian ethics, tends often to equate Kant's attitude to that of the Stoics, e.g. in their doctrine that "only due to a connection of *duty* and '*dignity*' a good person may also be happy". "The postulate of a supreme good and of a moral world-order is based on this connection of their 'ought' (*Sollensverknüpfung*)<sup>16</sup>." Discussing in the sequel the problem of eudaimonism with reference to these "connections of the emotive state and moral value", Scheler compares Stoic ethics with its Buddhist analogy, with a view to emphasize the contrast of both to Christianity. In rejecting the view of "the Stoa and the old Skeptics who considered apathy, i.e. dulling of the sensuous feelings, to be good", Scheler

<sup>12</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A 840/B 868.

<sup>13</sup> B 370-1.

<sup>14</sup> B 375.

<sup>15</sup> A 568 ff./B 596 ff.

<sup>16</sup> Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*; quoted in the sequel from the 4th ed., Francke, Bern 1954, M. Scheler, "Gesammelte Werke", Band 2. – Cf. II. V. 8, p. 342.

reproaches all pre-Christian "ancient ethics that they knew only this method of dulling (*Abstumpfung*) or that of an arbitrary misinterpretation of suffering as a judgment of 'reason' (the Stoic: 'Suffering is not an evil'), i.e. a sort of *illusionism* and autosuggestion against pains and sufferings of the life. The Buddhist doctrine, on the other hand, knew only the method of *objectifying* suffering through the knowledge of its (presumed) ground in the very essence of things and a resignative settlement therewith<sup>17</sup>."

Remarkable, implicitly for Scheler's thesis too, but also much beyond it, for the adequate meaning and the essential position of the moral value of *apatheia* (*upekhā* in Buddhism) in these systems of ethics is for our context Kant's apology of this pre-Christian basic virtue of moral character in the "Preface to the *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*", under the heading, "Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength)"<sup>18</sup>:

"This word (apathy) has come into bad repute, just as if it meant want of feeling, and therefore subjective indifference with respect to the objects of the elective will; it is supposed to be weakness. This misconception may be avoided by giving the name *moral apathy* to that *want of emotion* which is to be distinguished from indifference. In the former the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on the moral feeling... The true strength of virtue is the *mind at rest*, with a firm, deliberate resolution to bring its *law* into practice. This is the state of *health* in the moral life."

If we translate and interpret the word "law" in the foregoing statement with the Indian *dharma*, the eliciting of terms emphasized by Kant – "moral apathy" and "mind at rest" – may appear as a quotation from a Buddhist *abhidhammo* (= *periphainomena*) text.

In the best known and most often repeated sequence of reductive processes of emotional states of mind (*epoché*, *viveko* in the specific meaning of these Buddhist texts) on the levels of *jhānam* (meditative absorption leading to the one-pointedness of mind), "moral apathy" as "want of emotion" in "the mind at rest" is described as the state of *upekhā*, described in the transition of stages of "purity of attention" (*sati-pārisuddhi*) from the third to the fourth and last *rūpa-jhānam* (formative consciousness) as follows: – Equanimity about formations (*Gestaltungen*) – equanimity about insight – reduction of intentionality to the pure flux of consciousness (*bhavaṅga-soto*)<sup>19</sup>.

For our *prima facie* analogy it deems hardly necessary to extend this documentation to the farther comparison of these attentional states with Husserl's distinction of *noema* and *noesis*. It may suffice to add for our context that the preliminary stage of the first *jhānam* consists in reduction of emotional and volitive adherence, and the second in reduction of intellectual intention and attitude toward noematic contents.

The basic formula of the third *jhānam* begins with the statement that the so dispassionate meditator (*virāṭi*) "remains in equanimity (*upekhako*, apathetic); mindful and fully aware, he feels with his body that ease which the noble ones talk of when they

say: 'He who has equanimity and is mindful dwells at ease'. So he attains the third *jhānam*, and abides therein."

Kant, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* ("Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason"), formulated a similar statement of fact:

"Do we not have a word to denote a satisfaction with existence, an analogue of happiness which necessarily accompanies the consciousness of virtue, and which does not indicate a gratification, as 'happiness' does? We do, and this word is 'self-contentment' (*Selbstzufriedenheit*), which in its real meaning refers only to negative satisfaction with existence in which one is conscious of needing nothing. Freedom and the consciousness of freedom, as a capacity for following the moral law with an unyielding disposition, is independence from inclinations...<sup>20</sup>."

In the preceding chapter<sup>21</sup> of the same "Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason" Kant considers that

"Philosophy as well as wisdom itself would always remain an ideal, which objectively is represented completely only in reason and which subjectively is only the goal for the person's unceasing endeavors. No one would be justified in professing to be in possession of it, under the assumed name of philosopher, unless he could show its infallible effect (in self-mastery and the unquestioned interest which he preeminently takes in the general good) on his own person as an example. This the ancients required as a condition for deserving that honorable title."

The superiority of the practical reason over the 'speculative' or dialectical is formulated as the basic tenet of the *Critique of Practical Reason* in the Preface<sup>22</sup>:

"The concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other concepts (those of God and immortality) which, as mere ideas, are unsupported by anything in speculative reason now attach themselves to the concept of freedom and gain, and with it and through it, stability and objective reality. That is, their possibility is proved by the fact that there really is freedom, for this idea is revealed by the moral law."

In the concluding chapter of the same work, "Methodology of Pure Practical Reason", Kant elicits the spring and the development of the theoretical reason from the practical and its dependence on the cultivation of the *ethos* of knowledge:

"Now there is no doubt that this exercise and the consciousness of cultivation of our reason which judges concerning the practical must gradually produce a certain interest even in its own law and thus in morally good actions. For we ultimately take a liking to that the observation of which makes us feel that our powers of knowledge are extended, and this extension is especially furthered by that wherein we find moral correctness, since reason, with its faculty of determining according to *a priori* principles what ought to occur, can find satisfaction only in such an order of things<sup>23</sup>."

The Canon of the pure use of reason, mentioned by Kant in the statement quoted above<sup>24</sup>, which "will deal not with the speculative but with the practical reason", can be

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 358.

<sup>18</sup> R 258 (Ak VI, 408 f.).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *Visuddhi-maggo*, Part II, Ch. IV, 156–170, on "equanimity of ten kinds".

<sup>20</sup> Ak V, 117.

<sup>21</sup> Ak V, 108 f.

<sup>22</sup> Ak V, 3 f.

<sup>23</sup> Ak V, 159–160.

<sup>24</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A 795 f.

compared with the understanding of the discipline of *yogaḥ*, carefully developed in various systems of Indian philosophies. The extent of the analogy can be best conceived from Kant's summary on the "Methodology of Pure Practical Reason" where he endeavours to show the importance of its innate character and its obvious necessity in education. He regrets both the lack of an adequate elaboration of this discipline in theory and its neglect in educational practice.

"Certainly it cannot be denied that in order to bring either an as yet uneducated or a degraded mind into the path of the morally good, some preparatory guidance is needed to attract it by a view to its own advantage or to frighten it by fear of harm. As soon as this machinery, these leading strings, have had some effect, the pure moral motive must be brought to mind. This is not only because it is the sole ground of character (a consistent practical habit of mind according to unchangeable maxims) but also because, in teaching a man to feel his own worth, it gives his mind a power, unexpected even by himself, to pull himself loose from all sensuous attachments (so far as they would fain dominate him) and, in the independence of his intelligible nature and in the greatness of soul to which he sees himself called, to find himself richly compensated for the sacrifice he makes<sup>25</sup>."

The arduous effort required by the ideal attainment described here, notably in expressions underlined by me, can be compared with descriptions of *yogaḥ* as the discipline of ascetic ardour (*tapah*) emphasized already in the early *upaniṣads*. Thus, e.g. Varuṇaḥ (the vedic Uranus) teaches his son Bhṛguḥ<sup>26</sup>:

"Through austerity (*tapah*) seek to know *brahma*. *Brahma* is austerity." [It can be seen from the sequel how far the meaning of *brahma* here is analogous to *das Umgreifende* in the philosophy of Jaspers.] – "He performed austerity; having performed austerity he knew that life (*prāṇaḥ*) is *brahma*... mind is *brahma*... consciousness is *brahma*... bliss is *brahma*."

Even though Buddho was against exhibitions of yogic "powers surpassing that of ordinary men for the lay folk clad in white garments", and recognized only "three sorts of wonders which I, having myself understood and realised, have made known to others: the wonder performed by psychic power, by prophesy, and by education"; he however (unlike Kant) admitted in another text<sup>27</sup> that by fulfilment of moral precepts (*śīlam*) even the traditionally recognized models of miraculous achievements may be attained:

"If a bhikkhu should frame a wish to exercise supernormal powers (*abhiññā*)...: 'Let me hear with a divinely clear hearing, surpassing that of men, sounds both celestial and human, far and near... Let me by my own mind investigate and discern the minds of other beings... Let me call to mind many previous states of existence... Let me with a divinely clear vision, surpassing that of men, behold beings as they pass from one existence and spring up in another existence... Let me, through the destruction of moral corruption, in the present life and in my own person, attain to freedom from moral corruption, to deliverance of the mind, to deliverance by wisdom' – then he must be perfect in the moral precepts, bring his thoughts to a state of quiescence, practice diligently the meditative absorptions (*jhānam*), attain to insight, and be a frequenter of lonely places."

<sup>25</sup> Ak V, 152.

<sup>26</sup> *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*, III, 1–6.

<sup>27</sup> *Majjhima-nikāya* 6.

I am far from considering Buddho's moral disinclination against performing miracles for the purpose of attracting and converting "common worldlings" (*puṭhujjanā*) for the purpose described in the text quoted above that "this town, Nālandā, of ours would become still more devoted to the Exalted Buddho" – as an attitude corresponding to Kant's precepts for "the education of youth" in the "Methodology of pure practical reason". Albeit Kant's statements quoted in the sequel may still suggest a worthwhile parallel with Buddho's *yogāvacaram* (practice of spiritual exercises) as far at least as "the miracle of education" is singled out as the highest and the only serious feature in the described circumstances.

"If we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies consisting not merely of scholars and subtle reasoners but also of business people or women, we notice that besides storytelling and jesting they have another entertainment, namely, arguing... Now of all arguments there are none which excite more ready participation... than one about the moral worth of this or that action from which the character of some person is to be made out... One can often see the character of the person who judges others revealed in his judgments<sup>28</sup>."

"I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon most subtle examination of practical questions put to them, and why, after laying the foundation in a purely moral catechism, they have not searched through biographies of ancient and modern times with the purpose of having examples at hand of the duties they lay down, so that, by comparing similar actions in various circumstances, they could begin to exercise the moral judgment of their pupils in marking the greater or less moral significance of the actions. They would find that even very young people, who are not yet ready for speculation of other kinds, would soon become very acute and not a little interested, since they would feel the progress of their power of judgment, what is most important, they could confidently hope that frequent practice of knowing and approving of good conduct in all its parts, and of noting even the least deviation from it with sorrow or contempt, would leave a lasting impression of esteem for the one and disgust for the other, even though this practice is pursued only as a game of judgment in which children could compete with one another<sup>29</sup>."

"I assert further that, if in the admired action the motive from which it was done was esteem for duty, the respect for the law, and not any pretension to inner greatness of mind or noble and meritorious sentiment, is that which has the most power over the mind of the spectator<sup>30</sup>."

"With these remarks I have intended only to point out the most general maxims of the methodology of moral cultivation and exercise... The manifold variety of duties requires specific definitions of each kind...<sup>31</sup>."

With these words ends Kant's exposition of the method of pure practical reason.

The most popular Indian ethics of duty, contained in the *Bhagavadgītā*, is summarized in the following statements<sup>32</sup>:

"Duty consists only in your work, but not in the enjoyment of its fruit. Do not produce the fruits for your own sake, and do not acquiesce to inactivity. Do your work steeped in discipline (*yogaḥ*), renouncing to attachment, indifferent to success and failure. This equanimity is called *yogaḥ*. Activity is far inferior to the discipline of pure reason (*buddhi-yogaḥ*). Seek refuge in pure

<sup>28</sup> Ak V, 153.

<sup>29</sup> Ak V, 154.

<sup>30</sup> Ak V, 156 f.

<sup>31</sup> Ak V, 161.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. the second chapter, 47–50.

reason. Motives of actions for the sake of fruit are evil. Disciplined by pure reason one renounces to both, good and evil deeds. Therefore restrain yourself by the discipline (of *yogah*). *Yogah* is the skill in deed."

In the first section of the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, dealing with the "Transition from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morals to the Philosophical", Kant formulates the proposition:

"An action done from duty derives its moral worth, *not from the purpose* which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the *principle of volition* by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire<sup>33</sup>."

Later, in the "Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics", Section X ends with the statement:

"The power (*facultas*) to overcome all imposing sensible impulses..., regarded as strength (*robur*) is something that must be acquired by the moral *spring* (the idea of the law) being elevated by contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of reason in us, and at the same time also by *exercise*<sup>34</sup>."

The advantage of the *rational insight* in the Indian analogy of the discipline of practical reason (*yogah*) in comparison with the Christian "Logics of the heart" is one of the keynotes in Nietzsche's praise of Buddhism. There is no doubt for me that his maxim "beyond good and evil" was taken over from Indian, specifically Buddhist, sources. In his longest and best known statement on Buddhism in *Antichrist*<sup>35</sup> Nietzsche points out as an advantage of Buddhism its "deep difference from Christianity" in that it stands "beyond good and evil", which he explains in the sequel:

"For the same reason, he does not ask his followers to fight those who think otherwise: there is nothing to which his doctrine is more opposed than the feeling of revenge, antipathy, *ressentiment* (Not by enmity is enmity ended – the exciting *refrain* of the whole Buddhism...). And all this is quite right: these emotions would indeed be utterly *unhealthy* in view of the basic hygienic purpose."

In *Ecce Homo*<sup>36</sup> he reverts to the same quotation from *Dhammapadam* (I, 5):

"'Not by enmity is enmity ended: by friendliness enmity is ended', these words stand at the beginning of the doctrine of Buddho. It is not morality that speaks thus; thus speaks physiology."

Kant was explicit enough in his appreciation of the Stoic model of the *ethos* of knowledge and of the advantage of its humanist measure and limit in comparison with Plato's extolling of archetypal ideas in the sphere of divine transcendence. Nietzsche's

anthropological attitude, as skeptical with reference to Kant as it is, remains nevertheless, as close to the original *ephexis* of Pyrrho's<sup>37</sup> *ethos* of knowledge, transplanted by him directly from India on the unfavourable Greek soil. In his own use Nietzsche makes a distinction between the Greek terms *ephexis* and *skepsis*. It is not possible to enter here into a farther analysis in order to find out how far the first term implies a closer reference to Pyrrho's *ethos* of knowledge as its primary meaning<sup>38</sup>.

## Thesis II

*The discipline of practical reason is a discipline of transcendental logics.*

The relation established by Kant's analysis between the region of pure theoretical and that of practical reason can serve as a classical model for a theory of knowledge where the scope of the metaphysical problem is determined by structural intentions *encompassing heterogenous regions* of objects of superior degrees (*Gegenstände höherer Ordnung* in the meaning of Meinong's terminology)<sup>39</sup>.

The integration of the transcendental region of the *Critique of Pure Reason* into the wider scope of the *Critique of Practical Reason* establishes also for the discipline of the pure practical reason its transcendental-logical function fundamental for the constitution of a formal-ontological region *sui generis*. The structural importance of this region and its theoretical location are clearly specified (although not explicitly elicited) in the concluding chapter of the first volume of Husserl's *Ideas*<sup>40</sup>:

"What we have said applies automatically to *Formal Axiology and Praxis* as well as to the *formal ontologies* to be set alongside these as theoretical desiderata, and treating of *values* (in a very broad sense of that term) of goods – in short, of all the ontic spheres which are correlates of the affective and volitional consciousness. – The reader will notice that the concept of 'formal ontology' has broadened its meaning in the course of these discussions."

The structural constituents implied by the thesis, as formulated from the standpoint of modern European philosophy, cannot be explicated systematically within the frame of the present documentary survey. Instead of a systematic proceeding it may suffice

<sup>37</sup> The Jain indeterministic theory of truth, *anekānta-vādaḥ*, corresponding to Pyrrhos *ouden māllon*, later formulated in seven modes (*sapta-bhaṅgi*) and seven criteria (*nayah*) whose contents are to some extent even homologous to Pyrrho's tropes, was reduced by Buddho to the tetralemma (*catu-koṭi*) principle of Indian polyvalent logics. (See further references in footnotes 64 and 74.)

<sup>38</sup> A characteristic example can be found in Nietzsche's discussion upon the "ascetic ideals" in the *Genealogy of Morals*, III, 24.

<sup>39</sup> The essential function of encompassing heterogenous regions of such objects in the structure of metaphysical problems has been elicited specifically by my teacher P. Vuk-Pavlović in *Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik* (Bulletin International of the Yugoslav Academy, Vol. 3, Zagreb 1932.)

<sup>40</sup> *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, § 148, p. 308. Transl. W. R. Boyce Gibson.

<sup>33</sup> R 20 (Ak IV, 399 f.).

<sup>34</sup> *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak VI, 397.

<sup>35</sup> Section 20. For other references to Buddhism in connection with the principle "beyond good and evil" see my article *The Philosophy of Disgust – Buddho and Nietzsche* in 58. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 1977, p. 129, footnote 27; reprinted in my book *Studies in Comparative Philosophy*, Vol. I, Colombo, Lake House, 1983.

<sup>36</sup> *Ecce Homo*, "Why I Am So Wise", section 6.

for our general orientation to single out the formal-ontological character of the discipline of practical reason by the method of criticism, in re-examining Scheler's critique of Kant's "formalism in the ethics" with a view to set limits to the justified meaning of its aspects relevant for our intention. To this end the *formal discipline of practical reason*, established by the method of phenomenological reduction (*epoché*) applied to the noetic aspect of moral judgment, has to be clearly *distinguished from the axiological investigation of its contents* in the noematic correlate.

Scheler's phenomenological analyses of "material values" and of the hierarchical structure of their contents have to be recognized as fundamental for that part of the metaphysical doctrine of ethics which from the viewpoint of Scheler's critique has to be considered as a structural deficiency in the Kantian system. In his investigation of the ontology of values Scheler has not even neglected the transcendental-logical dimension of the noetic aspect of moral judgments<sup>41</sup>.

Reverting to Husserl's formulation of the "extended meaning of the notion of 'formal ontology'", it is of essential importance for us first to delimit and separate in their specific aspects those "ontical regions which are correlates of emotional and volitional consciousness", and then to try, on the ground of this differential analysis, to resolve Scheler's controversy with Kant's ethics. This is a controversy between ontological correlates on the higher level of their metaphysical order and intentionality, and not merely between alternative possibilities of either 'formal' or 'material' approaches to the ethical problem in its complexity.

In his dispute with Kant Scheler takes his stance in the insight that the *contents* of a value-experience (*Erlebnis*), or the intuition of its 'matter' (*hylé*), attain to the "ultimate depth level" and to the "central emotion" which is the spring of volition and the forming ground of will's expressions. The "material" level of this primordial insight lies deeper than the foundation of Kant's ethics reduced to the formal discipline of "practical reason" whose starting point is determined by the insight in the apodictical validity of the moral law whose truth-value, grounded on the a priori synthetical structure of the moral judgment, is revealed by pure reason ("*ursprünglich einwohnende Gesetzmäßigkeit, nach der gewisses Beurteilen [...] als 'richtig' charakterisiert wäre*")<sup>42</sup>. The formalism of Kant's ethics is, accordingly, not grounded on the "contents of valuing and willing, but on the legality of the will alone"<sup>43</sup>. Taking this distinction for granted we may conceive the broader range of the problem under discussion as implying also the positive task of *delimiting the regions* of emotional and of volitive experience (*Erlebnis*) as well as of *distinguishing the strata* of value-insight from those of value-judgement.

The recognition of the need to distinguish *emotional comprehension* of values from *reflective reasoning about* them implies the farther question of the possibility of

<sup>41</sup> M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (henceforth = *Formalismus*). Erster Teil, II. "Formalismus und Apriorismus".

<sup>42</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 196. Cf. p. 360 f.

<sup>43</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 309.

establishing the guiding principles for the structural divergence of the intentional directions of two ethical disciplines: Scheler's ethics of "material values" and Kant's discipline of "practical reason". In this outline the primacy of the "ethics of material values" as constituting the "ultimate depth-level" can be taken for granted, provided that the problem of the discipline of practical reason of superior degree, constitutive for the metaphysics of ethics (in the meaning of "metaphysics" as stated above). This intentional dimension is understood here in analogy to the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* in Kant's outline of both basic problems, formulated in Kant's terminology in statements as the following:

"The two parts or moral philosophy are distinguished as treating respectively of Ends and of Duties of Constraint<sup>44</sup>."

"But it does not follow that everything the doing of which is virtue is, properly speaking, a *duty of virtue*. The former may concern merely the *form* of the maxims; the latter applies to the *matter* of them, namely to an *end* which is also conceived as duty<sup>45</sup>."

"Virtue being a coincidence of the rational will, with every duty firmly settled in the character, is, like everything *formal*, only one and the same. But, as regards the *end* of actions, which is also duty, that is, as regards the matter which one *ought* to make an *end*, there may be several virtues<sup>46</sup>."

As distant as Scheler's idea of the material "end" of a virtue may be from that of Kant, on the one hand, and Kant's phenomenological analysis of the "material elements" of specific virtues in their "architectonic" structures, according to the "General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics"<sup>47</sup> from Scheler's "hierarchy of values", on the other hand, Kant's statements, relevant for their basic distinction, are clear and sufficient for the requirements of our outline.

The specifically metaphysical and consequently noetical character of the problem results on this level from the intention of transcending the archetypal level to which Scheler's ethics is limited. It is understandable, at least *ex hypothesi*, that the problem of the *ethos* of knowledge has to be located on the higher level, dealing with "metaphysical elements of moral philosophy". Kant has elicited it consequently within purview of the "general principles of the metaphysics of morals in the treatment of pure ethics" as the central theme of his *Critique of Practical Reason*.

### Thesis III

*The transcendental-logical problems concerning the analysis of material values on the noematic level have to be distinguished from the heterogenous constitutive intentionality and finality of the discipline of practical reason on the noetic level.*

<sup>44</sup> *Metaphysics of Morals*, Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, R 225 (Ak VI, 381).

<sup>45</sup> R 242 (Ak VI, 394 f.).

<sup>46</sup> R 243 (Ak VI, 395).

<sup>47</sup> R 251 (Ak VI, 403).

The transcendental-logical scope of the noematic region, as determined by Scheler's critique, does not comprise the totality of noetic intentions of the discipline of pure reason. This refers also to the fundamental scope of problems intended by Kant's elucidation of the metaphysical aspect of ethical knowledge (*Erkenntnis*). In other words, just as it was felt already by Husserl at the end of his summary "elucidation of problems concerning... formal axiology and the theory of practice"<sup>48</sup>, it appears necessary for our purpose in comparative philosophy, too, to extend and to differentiate the structural bases and architectonic elements of *heterogenous ethical disciplines* implied in an extended range of the critique of practical reason.

Both in Kant's and in Scheler's ethics there are at least some indications for such a distinction of disciplines, both in horizontal and in vertical directions. For the differentiation of "material elements" in Kant's "metaphysic of morals" were characteristic his references to the Stoic archetype of a philosopher's wisdom<sup>49</sup>. A few pointers to Scheler's scant and implicit concessions to the *transpersonal intention* of Kant's ethics may still suffice to extend the elucidation of this motive in the sequel.

In his analysis of the *a priori* and formal "elements of being and knowing" ("des Seins und der Erkenntnis")<sup>50</sup> Scheler postulates "the existence of a moral *knowledge* fundamentally different from the moral *will*". Consequently, "the autonomy of the moral knowledge and the autonomy of the moral willing and acting are fundamentally different", too.

Scheler's critique of Kant's assumption as erroneous also in this respect, admits implicitly the requirement to establish for these two regions specific disciplines on their different levels. Scheler's own formulation of the postulate of the autonomous constitution of two "fundamentally different" regions requires at this point a further explication at least in three directions concerning

- (I) the "fundamental difference" of the regional strata,
- (II) the extent of a possible agreement with Kant in the statement on the "immediately practical" nature of the Reason,
- (III) the actual relations of the differentiated regions in concrete ethical problems.

*Ad I* – In Scheler's repeated statements on the "contrast between the ethics of insight and the ethics of duty (*Einsichtsethik und Pflichtethik*) which should not be confounded as it often happens", there is an emphasis on the recognition of "the specific importance incumbent upon the 'consciousness of duty' on the *way* leading to the attainment of moral insight"<sup>51</sup>.

A differential analysis of Scheler's efforts to "rehabilitate the virtue" of the primeval Christian teaching and his arguments against Nietzsche's interpretation of Christian values as "*ressentiment*" (especially in contrast with apparently analogous virtues in

Buddhist ethics<sup>52</sup> can show how far the "way" indicated here should be understood as an authentic "way of purification" in the *ascetic direction* of a discipline of practical reason. In the negative direction (due to his Christian commitment) Scheler's disinclination towards asceticism can hardly go beyond his refutation of Kant's ascetic leanings by their reduction to "Stoic" influences comparable rather with earlier Buddhist than with later Christian backgrounds (as mentioned above). He ascribes to the "inheritance of puritan traditions" in Kant's religious education an attitude for which there is "always only a negative criterion for recognizing what is morally good. Thus good willing occurs *against* all 'propensities' that might come into consideration, but it never results from a *positive insight* that the will is good"<sup>53</sup>.

Scheler's distinction of the two levels of ethical investigation is based on his criterion for determining the different ontological status of values and duties (*Sollen*):

"On principle values are given as indifferent with reference to existence and non-existence. All duty (*Sollen*) refers, on the contrary, to the sphere of existence (or non-existence) or values"<sup>54</sup>.

Notwithstanding such existential indifference of values in their intrinsic constitution, Scheler's personalism is grounded on the thesis that "the being of the person stands beyond its willing"<sup>55</sup>. Against Kant he maintains that "neither the notion of 'duty' nor that of 'norm' can form the starting point of ethics", and therefore must not be considered as the standard on which the distinction of good and evil should depend<sup>56</sup>.

On this point Scheler agrees with Hegel's objection to Kant that ethics grounded on the notion of obligation (*Pflichtsollen*) and considering duty as the original ethical phenomenon can never obtain a correct attitude to the actual world of moral values<sup>57</sup>.

If by conversion of Scheler's statement that "the being of a person stands beyond its willing" we may establish that a person's will reaches beyond its being, and also (in connection with the quoted statement) that its intentions transcend the level of the region of "emotional root and source" of the personal essence, – then we may take it for granted as well that Scheler's delimitation of personal being and essence implies at least a possibility of establishing the discipline of practical reason in the region of will recognized as autonomous.

On the Indian side it was essential for their eliciting of the discipline of practical reason to single out as the central problem of their metaphysics of morals the "way of purification" and its ultimate aim of "liberation" (*mokṣaḥ*) or "extinction" (*nirvāṇam*) in transcending and "abandoning both good and evil", "virtue and sin" (*kusala-akusala*,

<sup>48</sup> *Ideas I*, § 147, p. 305.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason* A 569/B 597 f., quoted above under thesis I.

<sup>50</sup> *Formalismus*, pp. 68–101.

<sup>51</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 209.

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *Über Ressentiment und moralisches Werturteil*, and references to Buddhism in my paper *The Philosophy of Disgust – Buddha and Nietzsche*, 58. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 1977.

<sup>53</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 91.

<sup>54</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 221.

<sup>55</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 361.

<sup>56</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 206.

<sup>57</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 201.

*puñña-pāpa pahāya*) from the standpoint of their acosmic turning<sup>58</sup>. Consequently I cannot consider the formulation of the problem of “superman” by Nietzsche as a purely accidental analogy (and often a homology in deduction referring explicitly to Indian, mainly Buddhist sources<sup>59</sup>). Although the Buddhist term *mahā-puriso*, “the great man” seems more adequate to the common archetypal notion, the literally identical term to “superman” – *adhi-puruṣaḥ* – is also employed, specifically in vedic exegetic literature<sup>60</sup>.

Scheler's criticism of Kant, from the standpoint of the stratification of emotional and volitive levels of ethical experience (*Erlebnis*) culminates perhaps in the formulation of his disagreement with Kant's “endeavour to deny wholly the *value*-nature of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in order to replace it by ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ (*gesetzmäßig* und *gesetzwidrig*)”. Not less inadmissible is Kant's “denial of any reference of good and evil to all other values”<sup>61</sup>.

These and similar objections, typical for Scheler's criticism, can be summed up in the following conclusion:

“For his (Kant's) ethics it follows consequently that the totality of value-facts has to be disintegrated into elements of *formal lawfulness* and of *sensual pleasure*”<sup>62</sup>.

Apart from the criticist intention of Scheler's phenomenological analysis, in as far as it is directed against the *onesidedness* of Kant's ethics, the statements quoted until now seem to be sufficient to confirm the thesis that Kant's limitation of the ethical discipline to the region of practical reason (“beyond personal being” and the “emotional root and source” of values constituting the factual givenness of human existence, – as “human, all too human”) essentially correspond not only to the Stoic, but still more fundamentally to the Indian understanding of the norm (*dharmah*, *ṛtam*) designated in terms of Kant's metaphysics of morals as “*formgesetzlich*” with reference to the lower layer of “sensual pleasure” (*Sinnenlust*, *rūpa-rāgaḥ*). Scheler had, at least partially, a correct idea of the historical relationship of this rational trend in Kant's ethics with the doctrine of the “Stoics and elder Skeptics” in contradistinction from “the great innovation in the Christian rule of life (*Lebenslehre*)”<sup>63</sup>.

In the universal frame of *philosophia perennis* an essentially and not only formally terminological analogy to the Stoical and Kantian model of stratification of existential

values has been elaborated most extensively in the ethical system *yogaḥ* in India. Based on the analytical foundation of the *sāṃkhyaḥ* anthropology, the oldest Indian system which could be best defined as a doctrine dealing with “the position of man in the universe”, the structural development of the discipline of practical reason in *yogaḥ* is worked out by the method of an authentic phenomenological reduction, *citta-vivekaḥ*, which may have served as model to the original meaning and application of *epoché* in Pyrrho's *tropes*<sup>64</sup>. Despite the neglect of this discipline in the ethics of modern European activism, its *negative aspect* has still found a sufficiently adequate confirmation in Scheler's criticism:

“From this it appears that all imperativistic ethics, e.g. each ethics proceeding from the conception of duty (*Pflichtgedanke*) as the *primeval* moral phenomenon, and attempting to obtain the idea of good and evil, of virtue and sin etc. only from that position, will from its incipient point have only a *negative, critical and repressive* character”<sup>65</sup>.

Thus the point on which Scheler's ethics might perhaps find its closest approach to the Indian conception of *yogaḥ* as the “way of purification”, implies the recognition of a typical function of ethical duty serving as a link with the higher level of introversion of practical reason. The significance of this “negative knowledge”, on which is grounded the “critical and repressive” discipline of practical reason, will be further explicated in the sequel.

*Ad II* – In his analysis of “Kant's ‘moral law’ in its different formulations”, Scheler distinguishes “the laws of value-comprehension (*Werterfassungsgesetze*)” in so far as they are “laws of acts (*Aktgesetze*)” from “original laws of will (*ursprüngliche Willensgesetze*)”<sup>66</sup>. In this context he is ready to acknowledge the validity of Kant's definition of the practical reason within the limits of “correct negative knowledge”:

“On the other hand it seems to us that on principle Kant had a correct negative knowledge that these (laws regulating the will) are *not* simple applications of logical (theoretic) laws, i. e. such that they have only to be applied on moral conduct in so far as it is an object of *inference*, but in any case as *immediate* laws of moral conduct itself; even though – as he assumes it – primarily as laws of willing and not of valuing. This is how I understand Kant's thesis that in them ‘reason is immediately practical’”<sup>67</sup>.

*Ad III* – Scheler's critical examination of “Laws and types of judgements (*Beurteilung*)”<sup>68</sup> in connection with concrete relations between the region of emotional value-experience and the region of willing, arising from actual ethical problems, is exemplified in an analysis characteristic for our topic. It refers to the disposition to purify (*Läuterung*) moral intentions (*Gesinnung*) by measuring “the totally different *depth-*

<sup>58</sup> For Buddhō's own formulation of his acosmic turning compare his first statement after his spiritual “awakening”, in *Dhammapadam* 153–4, and in *Anguttara-nikāyo* IV, 5, 5. Cf. my article *Why is Buddhism a Religion?*, texts 10–11, in “Indian Philosophical Annual”, Vol. VI, 1970, University of Madras.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. my papers *The Philosophy of Disgust – Buddhō and Nietzsche* in Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 1977, and *Nietzsche and the Idea of Superman in Modern Indian Philosophy* in “World Union”, Vol. XVIII, No. 11, 1978, Pondicherry, India.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. *Mīmāṃsā-sūtram* VI, 2, 16.

<sup>61</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 46–7.

<sup>62</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 177.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. *Formalismus*, p. 358.

<sup>64</sup> The probability of direct Jain and Buddhist influences on the formulation of Pyrrho's method and its predominantly ethical intention is the topic of my essay *The Indian Origin of Pyrrho's Philosophy of Epoché*, in “Indian Philosophical Quarterly”, October 1985.

<sup>65</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 226.

<sup>66</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 103 f.

<sup>67</sup> *Formalismus*, p.

<sup>68</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 375.

layers of the feeling of displeasure (*Unlust*) varying in dependence of the value-contents by which their intentional aims are informed. In Scheler's example the displeasure felt in the case of repentance (*Reue*) is compared with the displeasure felt as "the evil of punishment (*Strafjübel*)":

"These two feelings pertain to totally different *depth*-strata. And yet it is an unavoidable effect of the evil of punishment that it turns the inner look of the wrongdoer to the deeper sphere of his person where he may behold his moral constitution (*Beschaffenheit*). In this sense the punishment gives him an opportunity"<sup>69</sup>

of moral purification through atonement. An analogous function of mediation is recognized by Scheler in the recognition of duty ("norm and imperative"), in the statement:

"The notions of the duties to believe and to love can be meaningful if we consider that a norm and an imperative exist only for the purpose of inner transformation by acts of will enabling us to perform an act of faith or an act of love"<sup>70</sup>.

Such insights of conscience in need of purification reveal both the import of the practical discipline and the significance of the transcendental structure of the reason which even in this *coincidence of ethos and knowledge* becomes "immediately practical".

This appears to be true at least from the standpoint of the suggested analogy between Kant's formulation of the ethos of knowledge and the Indian explication of the discipline of purification leading to its ultimate consequence in the realization of clear insight (*vipaśyanā*). The possibility of the development of an analogous dimension in Kant's discipline of practical reason is indicated in his summary and partial considerations on pedagogical application of his "methodology of practical reason".

Although Scheler's investigations were carried out in the opposite direction, aiming at the immediate affective awareness of values, he did not neglect to consider in his references some dimensions of the Indian analogy. Just on the point of central importance for our study of the ethos of knowledge, Scheler refers in a differential analysis to the Buddhist alternative concerning the function of "purifying" and "clearing" the consciousness (*prasannā-cittam, prasanna-mānasam = clara intentio*) by which the introversion (*Einkehr*) into the "deeper layers of being" is revealed. In his far-reaching comparison of the "stoical and old sceptical rule of life" concerning apathy, on the one hand with the Christian and on the other with the Buddhist understanding of suffering and bliss, Scheler criticizes from the standpoint of his Christian commitment the deficiency of these pre-Christian doctrines of life as suffering<sup>71</sup>.

Christianity, characterized in this context explicitly as "rejection of the negative ascetic method", does not consider "the redemption from suffering and evil to be the

<sup>69</sup> *Formalismus*, p.

<sup>70</sup> *Formalismus*, p.

<sup>71</sup> *Formalismus*, p. 358 f. quoted above in the context of the first thesis, referred to in footnote 17.

bliss – as Buddhho does –, but only as a *consequence* of bliss; and this redemption 'does not consist in the absence of pain and suffering, but in the art of enduring suffering in the 'proper manner' ...". Thus, "our law yields at least the possibility to answer the question about the place which pain and suffering actually may or may not take in the 'order of the way to salvation' (*Ordnung des Heilweges*)."

A much deeper going conformity with Buddhism, unnoticed in this reference by Scheler, although of decisive importance for our topic, consists in the emphasis expressed in almost identical terms (though not further elicited by Scheler) laid on "the proper manner" (*sammā-saṅkappo*) in "the order of the way to salvation" (*vimutti-maggo*). In Buddhho's fundamental "teaching on suffering and the cessation of suffering" this order consists of eight degrees of intellectual, moral and contemplative discipline forming the backbone of the entire structure of the discipline of practical reason in the last (fourth) "noble truth" of Buddhho's teaching. A differential analysis would however not be possible here for the simple reason that for reasons of principle on Scheler's side there are lacking the elements for such an analogy in the constitution of a systematic discipline of practical reason ("canon" in Kant's terminology) on the level of objects of superior degrees (*Gegenstände höherer Ordnung* as specified in Thesis II of the present survey).

As an explicit digression it may be of interest to add here a colophone for the reader in meditative mood, to single out an authentic Buddhist formulation of the fundamental element ideal of the "great renewal of the Christian rule of life" (*Lebenslehre*). In the Buddhist doctrine on the meaning of life and world this is the postulate of *the thesis of pure phenomenism*:

"There is suffering, but none who suffers;  
Doing exists although there is no doer;  
There is extinction, but no extinguished person;  
The path exists, but there is no goer"<sup>72</sup>.

The purpose of the preliminary orientation formulated in the foregoing theses was to single out the *primacy of the ethos of knowledge* as the only criterion adequate to the task of explaining the critical meaning of *transcendental limitation* (*avidyā* in Indian philosophy) of the faculty of knowledge by pure reason. In my formulation of the problem from the European standpoint I started from Kant. The intention of the following concluding remarks is the same, to remain within the range of problems specified by Kant's ethical investigations. They refer to Kant's eliciting the "canon of practical reason" in points of interest for specific analogies with Indian systems of the ethos of knowledge.

The presentation of the "discipline of pure reason" and of its "canon" from the standpoint of "a practical logic" in Kant's "transcendental doctrine of method" enables us to define clearly the conceptual range of terms used both on the European and the Indian side of our survey. These are the comprehensive characteristics encompassing

<sup>72</sup> Buddhagoso, *Visuddhi-maggo*, XXI, 513.

the aspect of *philosophia perennis* (*sanātana dharmah*) on which the present comparative survey is centred.

(a) *The discipline of practical reason*, the title designating the central theme of my comparative survey, is based on Kant's structure of "a complete system of pure reason", explained in the introductory chapter of the part on the "Discipline of Pure Reason" at the beginning of the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method".<sup>73</sup>

"I understand, therefore, by Transcendental Doctrine of Method the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. In this connection, we shall have to treat of a *discipline*, a *canon*, an *architectonic*, and finally a *history* of pure reason, and to provide (in its transcendental reference) what, in relation to the use of the understanding in general, the Schools have attempted, though very unsatisfactorily, under the title of a *practical logic*."

The ethical meaning of the term "discipline" is defined in this context in correlation with the notion of "culture":

"The compulsion, by which the constant tendency to disobey certain rules is restrained and finally extirpated, we entitle *discipline*. It is distinguished from *culture*, which is intended solely to give a certain kind of skill, and not to cancel any habitual mode of action already present. Towards the development of a talent, which has already in itself an impulse to manifest itself, discipline will therefore contribute in a negative, culture and doctrine in a positive fashion."

The distinction of the concept of 'discipline' from that of 'culture' in this sense is still more important for Indian systems of mental culture because it refers to two spheres elaborated to a considerably wider extent. The first term in this context, 'discipline'; corresponds to the Indian notion of *yogaḥ*. The second, 'culture', is designated here by the *only* term equivalent to the Indian meaning of *bhāvanā*, a term usually translated by European authors according to the inadequate analogy with the Christian "mystical theology", with the word 'meditation'. In my understanding, from the standpoint of Indian philosophy the Latin term *meditatio* is explained sufficiently and adequately in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* as the mental attitude of the "radically meditating philosopher"<sup>74</sup>. This corresponds to the attitude of *epoché* in Buddhō's first and second

<sup>73</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A 708–710/B 736–738.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*. Husserliana, Band I, Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1950, p 14: To proceed as the "meditating philosopher, who thereby has become himself transcendental ego", means "to recollect continually himself (*sich fortgehend über sich selbst besinnen*), ... not being satisfied with the vague *ego cogito*, but following the continuous flow of cogitating being and living (*Fluß des cogitierenden Seins und Lebens*)". – Or: "As radically meditating philosophers, we now have neither a science that we accept, nor a world that exists for us. Instead of simply existing for us ... the world is for us only something that claims being" (p. 58, from D. Cairns translation of *Cartesian Meditations*, The Hague 1970). – It would be preposterous here to assume, in a Eurocentric manner, that a connotation of mystical intuition or empathy should be added to Husserl's *Epoché* in order to equate it with the notion of *cittavivekaḥ* in the basic and original Indian systems of *yogaḥ*. Only a differential analysis of the intentional sense of Husserl's *Epoché* with reference to Pyrrho's primordial meaning of the same term might be appropriate. – See also n. 64 above.

*jhānam* (discipline of conceptual and discursive thinking = *vitakka-vicāro*), taken over in the same terms and meaning at the beginning of Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtrānī*<sup>75</sup>.

(b) In the introductory chapter of Kant's extensive discussion on "The Canon of Pure Reason" "the correct employment" of the canon is restricted to the region of the "practical employment of reason":

"I understand by a canon a list of the *a priori* principles of the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition ... But, when no proper employment of a faculty of cognition is possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is ... completely impossible. There cannot, therefore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty – for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical, and consequently, transcendental logic, in this respect, is merely a discipline, and not a canon. If, then, there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason – in which case there must be a canon for this faculty – this canon will relate, not to the speculative, but to the *practical use of reason*<sup>76</sup>."

Kant dedicated to the explication of this canon and of its "architectonic" the last 60 pages of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, "Methodology of Pure Practical Reason" is presented summarily on the last 20 pages. In the comparison with Indian systems and their "architectonic", the doctrine and the discipline of *yogaḥ* in the basic part of Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtrānī*, and still more extensively in the system of the Buddhist gnoseological idealism of *viññāna-vādaḥ*, presented as *yoga-cāraḥ*, had the exclusive purpose of eliciting this transcendental discipline in the canon of "practical logic".

(c) The archetypal model (*Urbild*) of the wise man, taken over by Kant from the Stoics, was described at the beginning of this survey with reference to the rational essence in the structure of Kant's ethics. This stern presentation of rational value of the *transpersonal model* of concrete virtues forming the character of a personality is elicited in the part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* dealing with the "ideal of pure reason" as "transcendental ideal" (*prototypon transcendental*). In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant defines character as "a consistent practical habit of mind according to unchangeable maxims"<sup>77</sup>. The postulate of Kant's ethical rationalism is:

"Principles must be erected on concepts; on any other foundation there are only passing moods which give the person no moral worth and not even confidence in himself, without which the consciousness of his moral disposition and character, the highest good in man, cannot arise<sup>78</sup>."

The unity of personal character is expressed in the principle of action (*Handlung* understood here in a meaning adequate to the Indian notion of *karma*) so that "this

<sup>75</sup> I, 2, 17, 42 ff.

<sup>76</sup> *Critique of Pure Reason* A 796–7/B 824–5.

<sup>77</sup> *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak V, 153. – Schopenhauer's theory of constancy to the inborn character (in his essay on the freedom of will) does not differ fundamentally from Kant, but only in its metaphysical explanation of the will as "thing in itself".

<sup>78</sup> *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak V, 158.

action and everything in the past which determined it belong to a single phenomenon of his character, which he himself creates...<sup>79</sup>.

Kant's "critical elucidation" of the "fundamental law of pure practical reason" (Remark to Corollary), explaining the "holiness of will", points to problems pertaining essentially (without, of course, any explicit historical reference) to the sphere of common interest to both Kant and the *yogah*:

"This holiness of will is, however, a practical ideal which must necessarily serve as a model which all finite rational beings must strive toward even though they cannot reach it. The pure moral law, which is itself for this reason called holy, constantly and rightly holds it before their eyes. The utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is to make sure of the indefinite progress of its maxims toward this model and of their immutability in achieving constant progress. This is virtue, and, as a naturally acquired faculty, it can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case never becomes apodictic certainty, and as a mere persuasion it is very dangerous<sup>80</sup>."

In all Indian systems, even in the *nyāyah* logics, the *yogah* insists on the affirmation of its special capacity to cross even beyond this limitation of apodictic certainty in pure insight. For us this is the limit and the end-point of the analogy with Kant's gnoseological criticism.

(d) It can be seen from the aforesaid that in Indian philosophy the *criterion of apriority*, and consequently the possibility of *apodictic knowledge*, in comparison with Kant, is emphasized to an extent as much wider in its scope as the range of its critical limitation remains vague and deficient. The *level* of criticist limitation attained in transcendental philosophy (that on principle would be impossible without a 'Copernican turning', which found its primeval expression in the principle of *avidyā*<sup>81</sup> in Indian philosophy) was certainly the highest in the idealism of the Buddhist "theory of knowledge" (*vijñāna-vādaḥ*), while *advaita-vedāntaḥ* remains comparatively dogmatic within the monist framework of its metaphysical theses pre-established by the material *a priori* of orthodox revelation (*vedaḥ*).

Thus the analysis of transcendental structures in noetics reached very far in several directions pursued by specific systems of Indian philosophies (*darśanam*) already in the early period of their scholastic development. Perhaps the most beautiful in its architectonic, and probably the oldest model of such elucidation of the transcendental structure of noetic faculties and their limits traced *a priori* has been preserved in the system of

*sāṃkhyah* (categorization). This impression appears enhanced by the testimony of its antiquity in Śāṃkara's criticism of *sāṃkhyah* and the origin of this system (*in Brahmasūtra-Śāṃkara-bhāṣyam*). The same aprioristic principle is acknowledged on a still more fundamental level in the logical structure of gnoseological criteria as *prāmāṇam*, or preliminary critical determination of "means of knowledge" recognized in an epistemological system.

The formal and syllogistic tradition of European logics, although basically oriented toward the same structural model of "nature-lore" as the Indian *nyāya-vaiśeṣikah* systems, tended always stronger in its development to attain the purity of objectivistic independence and detachment from transcendental-critical determination by epistemological systems. The pre-Kantian empiricist and post-Kantian positivist trends provoked, especially in connection with English colonial prejudices, disorientation in "modern" attempts of comparative philosophical interpretation also on this point. Due to the total ignorance of Kant, in the interval between Hume's empiricism and the short-lived pre-Hegelian idealism in the typical historical discontinuity of English philosophy<sup>82</sup>, the aprioristic understructure of rational knowledge remained eliminated *a limine* from "modern" studies of Indian epistemological systems (*Erkenntnistheorie*), after a brutal and hardly pseudo-critical rejection of the first genuine attempt by W. Jones, to single out some *prima facie* historical documentation on the relation of Aristotelian logics to the Indian<sup>83</sup>, which in a positive case might have turned the interest of the subsequent comparative studies in an opposite, universalist, direction, or at least not more prejudiced by europocentrist biases than the earlier Christian (especially Jesuit)<sup>84</sup> attempts to a more adequately interested approach.

In the sphere of the ethos of knowledge the criterion of apriority is formulated by Kant (in the "Analytic of Pure Practical Reason") by *exclusion of the influence of empirical factors on the insight of pure reason*. In the following section (the same as in the earlier quoted elucidations of the *natura archetypa*) the phenomenological descrip-

<sup>82</sup> J. M. D. Meiklejohn, the first English translator of the Critique of Pure Reason (in 1854, after an earlier offer by Schopenhauer to translate the main works of Kant in English had been rejected in 1830-ies) complained in his Preface: "Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent – it has been his lot to be either unappreciated, misapprehended, or entirely neglected..."

<sup>83</sup> In "Asiatic Researches", Vol. IV, p. 163, W. Jones quotes Persian authors, particularly referring to "Dabistan", in support of the thesis (as summarized by Schopenhauer in § 9, Book I of *The world as Will and Representation*) "that Callisthenes found among the Indians a finished system of logics which he sent to his uncle Aristotle". In 1874, a German author, C. B. Schlüter gave one of the first comparative analyses of the Indian and Aristotelian syllogism. Later indologists, from Winternitz to Keith, neglected more and more and rejected this and similar deeper philosophical problems of comparative interest.

<sup>84</sup> As the time when Kant was still a young student, the Jesuit "Lettres édifiantes" published several philosophically interesting interpretations of various Indian systems and their differences, particularly on the problem of idealist metaphysics. Two outstanding authors on these subjects, about 1735–1740, were Jesuit Fathers Pons and Calmette.

<sup>79</sup> *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak V, 99. – See Buddhō's often repeated statement that "living beings are heirs of their actions" (*Majjhima-nikāyo*, discourse 135).

<sup>80</sup> *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak V, 32 f.

<sup>81</sup> One of the best formulations of the *noetic* turning from the "knowledge" of object towards "ignorance" of the subject of knowledge, mentioned at the beginning of the present survey, was the initial question of *Kena-upaniṣad*: "By whom willed and directed does the mind alight on its object?" – while the complementary *noematic* character of the object of knowledge is underscored in the 9th stanza of *Īśa-upaniṣad*: "Into blinding darkness enter those who worship ignorance (*avidyā*), and those who delight in knowledge (*vidyā*) enter into still greater darkness, as it were." (Radhakrishnan's translation.)

tion of archetypically evident characteristics appears to correspond to the essential marks of the primeval Indian designation of *avidyā* (as transcendental limitation of the faculty of knowledge), due to which Indian philosophy *as a whole* was intended to constitute the transcendental structure for a system of critical idealism grounded on the ethos of knowledge:

“... the justification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason could be made with sufficient certainty through merely appealing to the judgment of common sense, since everything empirical which might insinuate itself into our maxims as a determining ground of the will immediately reveals itself through the feeling of enjoyment or pain which necessarily attaches to it in so far as it arouses desire, and pure practical reason immediately refuses to take it as a condition into its principle. The dissimilarity of rational and empirical grounds of determination is made recognizable through the resistance of a practically legislating reason to all interfering inclinations, which is shown in a peculiar kind of feeling which does not precede the legislation of practical reason but which is, on the contrary, first effected by it, as a compulsion. That is, it is revealed through the feeling of respect of a kind that no man has for any inclinations whatever, but which he may feel for the law alone. It is shown so saliently and prominently that no one, not even the commonest mind, can fail in a moment to discover in an example that, though he can be urged by empirical grounds of volition to follow their attraction, he can be expected to *obey* nothing but the pure practical law of reason<sup>85</sup>.”

Thus “the difference of the doctrine of happiness (*Glückseligkeitslehre*) from the doctrine of morality (*Sittenlehre*)” constitutes the basic layer and the first intention of Kant’s formulation of that *discipline of pure practical reason* which will be criticized and excluded by Scheler as insufficient and inadequate foundation for his *axiological doctrine*, for reasons understandable from the standpoint elicited in the foregoing analysis.

### Concluding Thesis

*In the total hierarchy of noetic intentions of the pure reason the metalogical dimension of the ethos has to be considered as a specific faculty of cognition of superior degree.*

By this *phenomenological insight* we do not presume to have attained or prejudiced the possibility of an “absolute knowledge”, and still less to have contested the justification of that scepticism which G. Santayana opposed to the “animal faith” and proposes to cultivate in an authentic meaning of the ethos of knowledge as “the chastity of the intellect” which “it is shameful to surrender too soon or to the first comer: there is nobility in preserving it coolly and proudly through a long youth, until at last, in the ripeness of instinct and discretion, it can be safely exchanged for fidelity and happiness”<sup>86</sup>.

The same skeptical virtue was praised *above all* also by Buddhō. For his supreme ideal of *nibbānam* (Sanskrit: *nirvāṇam* = extinction) the only adequate synonym, in

descriptive definition, was “to become cool” (*sīti-bhāvo*), a designation in which the accent is laid on the *non*-ecstatic and non-transcending subjective measure of the “thusness” (*tathatā*) of cognitive awareness (*Erlebnis*): *yathā-bhūtam*, so “as it is” given. E. g.:

“As soon as the colour basis has been apprehended by the consciousness of the cognitive series with eye-consciousness, he stops; he does not fancy any aspect of beauty etc. beyond that<sup>87</sup>.”

Such statements in connection with Buddhist abstract art of pure contemplation (*jhānam*) correspond essentially to both Pyrrho’s and Husserl’s meaning of *epoché*. It may be worthwhile to hint in this concluding remark at the most suggestive description of the same “pure phenomenological situation” by Husserl:

“Let us suppose that we are looking with pleasure in a garden at a blossoming apple-tree, at the fresh young green of the lawn, and so forth... Let us pass over to the phenomenological standpoint. The transcendent world enters its ‘bracket’... on the ground of the phenomenologically reduced experience of perception and pleasure, as it fits into the transcendental stream of experience...<sup>88</sup>.”

Returning to our context and skeptical understanding of *epoché* in its widest comparative scope, I wish to specify in this concluding thesis that instead of pleading for any doctrine of absolutism (be it in Hegel’s or in Husserl’s phenomenological terms) my intention remains limited to the specific character of another *humanistic aspect of knowledge*, so far neglected in European philosophy.

It is in accordance with this intention that the present introductory paper proposes to elucidate with a *prima facie* documentation its first thesis.

<sup>85</sup> *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak V, 92–3.

<sup>86</sup> *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, New York 1923, pp. 259–260.

<sup>87</sup> Commentary on *Udānam* I, 6, quoted and commented in Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli’s translation of Buddhaghosa’s *Visuddhimagga*, I, 1, 53. (Cf. *The Path of Purification*, Colombo 1956, p. 20–21, and later editions.)

<sup>88</sup> *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, §88, p. 182–3. Transl. W. R. Boyce Gibson.