dispositions: both the material dispositions of its body and the so-called "non-material" dispositions of its empirical will. Furthermore, the person recognizes that it is rational, and knows that it has sensations, emotions, beliefs, etc. because unless the capacities making these things possible are in place - unless a person could experience pain, share thoughts with a friend, think about what ought to be done, and, most importantly, represent 'I think' - its ability to even question these capacities would be undermined. This is not to say that every apparent manifestation of one such capacity is incorrigible. One can wonder whether or not one is angry, or feeling pain, or believing 'that p'. And subsequent experience may, in fact usually does, bear on the answers to such questions. But that a person is rational and that a person does sometimes feel pain or anger is not something that can be questioned in a meaningful way. Kant's argument to demonstrate this is that his own, personal experience would be incoherent unless those abilities were presupposed, because Kant sees clearly that one cannot start from a subjective position and then build a world. Instead, Kant asks us to consider what is required if there is to be coherent experience. His question is: How could a rational being, endowed with a body and a particular form of sensibility, be possible? And he answers this question by considering the formal requirements for such a being. He shows us the formal constraints for coherent or unified experience. Because Kant does not argue from his own, subjective viewpoint, but rather from the concept of a person, he has no trouble accounting for other minds.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{21} I gratefully acknowledge many conversations and classes with Gordon Nagel. His pioneering work on Kant has given me a foothold on the Kantian system. I also would like to thank J. F. E., L. Perasso, D. Savan, C. Sharp, the CPA referees and the referees of this journal who read and commented on earlier drafts of this paper.

The Ethos of Knowledge in Kantian and in Buddhist Philosophy

Remarks on some Theses from Standpoint of European Philosophy

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Thesis I

There are philosophies which cannot even be thought by those who do not live in accordance with their postulates.

This principle is postulated, at least formally and implicitly, by all systems of Indian philosophy and their methods of instruction in wisdom, from their early beginnings (pre-Aryan in Jainism and post-Aryan in the upaniṣads) until the late medieval scholasticism and its disintegration under the pressure of later foreign invasions.

I consider this statement as the first thesis of the first philosophy in the meaning of the classical terms prima philosophia and philosophia perennis (Sanskrit: sarvataṃ dharmām).

This existential attitude does, however, not imply, and should not prejudice, a philosopher's viewpoint concerning the hypothesis, prejudicial for modern European philosophies, on the dialectical contradiction of rationalism and irrationalism, and its fundamental importance for metaphysical speculation. What I have in view in this respect is a return to Kant's critique of transcendental dialectic.

The following attempt to elicit the thesis aims in the first place at a historical re-examination and re-establishment of the theme of the ethos of knowledge (Erkenntnis) to the central place which it originally occupied in the organic whole of Kant's philosophy. A wider understanding and the renewal of an approach to Kant out of his own central conception requires, unfortunately, now more toil than ever before at unblocking landslides, clearing undermined grounds and removing pitfalls and traps spread around a narrow groove by which critical transcendentalism was supposed to be brought down, either dialectically or pragmatically, to the narrow-minded and short-sighted perspectives of an "antimetaphysical" and even totally "antiphilosophical" scientific positivism, or still worse to semanticist formalism.

For our historical orientation the thesis on the ethos of knowledge can be elicited from Kant's intention to establish the discipline of the practical reason as a link
connecting the metaphysical and the ethical faculty of knowledge (Erkenntnisvermögen) as stated in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason:

"So far, therefore, as our Critique limits speculative reason, it is indeed negative, but since it thereby removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason, may threaten to destroy it, it has in reality a positive and very important use. At least this is so, immediately we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical employment of pure reason – the moral – in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility. Though (practical) reason, in thus proceeding, requires no assistance from the speculative reason, it must yet be assured against its opposition, that reason may not be brought into conflict with itself."

Some aspects of this basic relation between the "speculative" and the "practical" reason, significant for the sequel of our investigation, have been explicated already in the first edition, particularly in the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method":

"It is humiliating to human reason that it achieves nothing in its pure employment, and indeed stands in need of a discipline to check its extravagances, and to guard against the deceptions which arise therefrom. . . . The philosophy of pure reason . . . serves not as an organ for the extension but as a discipline for the limitation of pure reason, and . . . of guarding against error. . . . There must, however, be some source of positive modes of knowledge which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which, it may be, give occasion to error solely owing to misunderstanding, while yet in actual fact they form the goal of liberation of the reason."

This last sentence, and especially the expressions underlined by me, correspond almost literally to the formulation of the fundamental tenet in all significant systems of Indian philosophy.

The postulate of "a discipline for the limitation of pure reason . . . against error solely owing to misunderstanding", corresponds, in all scholastic systems of Indian worldviews (darśanas), to the preeminent motive of their philosophy perennis, as mentioned above, to start from a-sādhyā, literally "un-science", as the transcendental (paramērthā) reason of "misunderstanding", epistemologically elicited and elucidated in the prolegomena to all those systems as their theory of māyā. Schopenhauer's approach to Indian philosophy through this Vedantic term as the broadest analogical principle for all subsequent positive attempts at comparative philosophy, has been recognized beyond any reasonable doubt at least on the fundamental level of the proposed Indo-European dialogue.

Among the oldest Anjaliṣu is the title of Kena ("by whom") formulates and elicits this initial question of transcendental subjectivism: "By whom willed and directed does the mind alight on its objects?" (Radhakrishnan's translation).


Buddha's most concise definition of anāgayā as the first cause and prajāna mobile of the whole "chain of suffering" – the causus viaeans on whose elucidation his "first noble truth" is based – implies the analysis of "interdependent origination" (pāṭicca samupādi) of factors (saṅkhārā) or constituent properties of mental and material phenomena (nāma-vida) and the existential reason of their constitution in and by the empirical discriminative consciousness (viśīnaṁ).

"Due to nonessence are the factors (constituent of phenomena); due to constituent factors is the (empirically discriminating) consciousness . . . "

Thus mental and material factors are the reason of consciousness, and consciousness is the reason of mental and material factors (of phenomena)."

The "goal of liberation of the reason" from the transcendental illusion conceived as māyā is in this connection the way of elimination by the same liberating reason of "link" (mādaṁ) constituting this chain – one by one in their proper sequence of existentials (in the meaning analogous rather to Heidegger's term for such structures of categories) – from "death and death" to their source in birth, and up to their ultimate constituents in empirical consciousness, chained by the transcendental nonexistence of māyā. This way of reasoning by phenomenological reduction, in its purport to existential maturing, is called "the path of purification" (tissābti-magga) emerging from a clarified ethos of knowledge. Its goal – described with partly different connotations in various systems of Indian philosophy – is generally designated as liberation – mokṣaḥ. The specific designation in Pāli Buddhism, vi-mitā, emphasizes most explicitly that it is "liberation from . . .", and not "liberation to . . .", in the meaning of the ultimate attainment of mokṣaḥ (śānti), which is "extinction without remainder" (an-āstikā).

Schopenhauer had in view the same existential turning when criticizing Kant's return to an unconditioned cause, to a first beginning in his Transcendental Dialectic, which for Schopenhauer "is by no means established in the nature of our faculty of reason". This "is, moreover, proved in practice by the fact that the original religions of our race, which even now have the greatest number of followers on earth, I mean Brahmanism and Buddhism, neither know nor admit such assumptions, but carry on to infinity the series of phenomena that condition one another . . . Kant, who by no means wishes to maintain his pretended principle of reason as objectively valid, but only as subjectively necessary, deduces it even as such only by a shallow sophism . . . Such a historical investigation would have saved Kant from an unfortunate necessity in which he is now involved . . ."

In the sequel of the quoted passage on the "error" and "the goal of liberation of the reason", Kant explicates the attitude of the practical reason as follows: "How else can we account for our insatiable desire to find firm footing somewhere beyond the limit of experience? . . . Presumably it may look for better fortune in the only other . . ."
path which still remains open to it, that of its practical employment. There is therefore no canon of its speculative employment; such employment is entirely dialethic. Consequently, if there be any correct employment of pure reason, in which case there must be a canon of its employment, the canon will deal not with the speculative but with the practical employment of reason.\footnote{Critique of Pure Reason A 796 f.}

Unlike the earlier and the later European philosophy, Indian systems have concentrated most persistently on elaborating just this aspect of the pure reason (buddhā kalpaṇa), designated usually with the generic term yogaḥ ("discipline") under its various aspects (cf. e.g. yogaśāstra in Buddhism).

The following further references in the Critique of Pure Reason are significant for Kant's rational approach to this problem:

"As this concerns our attitude to the supreme end, it is evident that the ultimate intention of nature in her wise provision for us has indeed, in its contemplation of our reason been directed to moral interests alone.\footnote{A 821/829.}

"In this way all investigation of nature tends to take the form of a system of ends...\footnote{A 816/817.}"

"In this marvelous faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law first reveals to me, I should indeed have, for the determination of my existence a principle which is purely intellectual.\footnote{A 841.}"

Discussing the problem of a critical solution of the antinomy of pure reason, Kant singles out also the basic transcendental structure of ethics as a "pure rational science":

"In addition to transcendental philosophy, there are two pure rational sciences, one purely speculative, the other with a practical content, pure mathematics and pure ethics.\footnote{A 482/483.}

Thus the rational foundation of Kant's ethics has been established in his first Critique. In this background he found his closest historical connection with the "fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals" in Indo-European philosophy as laid down in the ethos of knowledge taught by Socrates, by the Stoics and the kindred schools of Hellenistic philosophy, about whom Schopenhauer has noticed, mainly from his studies of Indian philosophy, that the whole complex of ideas in the later Greek and Roman philosophy would appear as a "colonial paradox" from any viewpoint except that of Eastern asceticism.\footnote{A 370 f.}

"This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed Moral Philosophy. On account of this superiority which moral philosophy has over all other occupations of reason, the ancients in their use of the term 'philosophers' always meant, more especially, the moralists; and even at the present day we are led by a certain analogy to entitle

\footnote{Critique of Pure Reason B 840/841.}

anyone philosopher who appears to exhibit self-control under the guidance of reason, however limited his knowledge may be.\footnote{B 175.}

"Plato very well realized that our faculty of knowledge feels a much higher need than merely to spell out appearances according to a synthetic unity, in order be able to read them as experience. He knew that our reason naturally exists itself to forms of knowledge which so far transcends the bounds of experience that no given empirical object can ever coincide with them, but which must not the less be recognized as having their own reality, and which are by no means mere fictions of the brain. - Plato found the chief instances of his ideas in the field of the practical, that is, in what rests upon freedom, which in turn rests upon modes of knowledge that are a peculiar product of reason.\footnote{A 568/569.}

These are explicitly designated as 'notions of virtue, not derived from experience'.

"It is in regard to the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where the experience, in this case of the good, is itself made possible only by the ideas - incomplete as their empirical expression must always remain'.\footnote{A 488/489.}

"Without soaring so high" as Plato, for whom the archetypal ideal was "an idea of the divine understanding", Kant compares his model of human perfection with "the wise man" of the Stoics, who "is, however, an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a case serves as the archetype for the complete determination of the copy, and we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of the divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed. Although we cannot concede to these ideals objective reality (existence), they are not therefore to be regarded as figures of the brain; they supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it; providing it, as they do, with a concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, and thereby enabling it to estimate and to measure the degree in the defects of the incomplete\footnote{A 375 f.}."

Max Scheler, insisting on the difference between Kant's and Christian ethics, tends often to equate Kant's attitude to that of the Stoics, e.g. in their doctrine that "only due to a connection of duty and 'righteousness' a good person may also be happy". "The postulate of a supreme good and of a moral world-order is based on this connection of their 'ought' (Sollenverknüpfung).\footnote{A 376 f.}"

Discussing in the sequel the problem of idealism with reference to these "connections of the emotive state and moral value", Scheler compares Stoic ethics with its Buddhist analogy, with a view to emphasize the contrast of both to Christianity. In rejecting the view of "the Stoic and the old Stoics who considered spathy, i.e. dulling of the sensuous feelings, to be good", Scheler
reproaches all pre-Christian "ancient ethics that they knew only this method of dulling (Abmuthung) or that of an arbitrary misinterpretation of suffering as a judgment of 'reason' (the Stoics: 'Suffering is not an evil'), i.e. of illusionism and autosuggestion against pains and sufferings of the life. The Buddhist doctrine, on the other hand, knew only the method of objectifying suffering through the knowledge of its (presumed) ground in the very essence of things and a resignative settlement therewith." **

Remarkable, implicitly for Scheler's thesis too, but also much beyond it, for the adequate meaning and the essential position of the moral value of apatheid (aayekhá in Buddhism) in these systems of ethics is for our context Kant's apology of this pre-Christian basic virtue of moral character in the "Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics", under the heading, "Virtue necessarily presupposes Apathy (considered as Strength)". **

"This word (apatheia) has come into bad repute, just as if it meant want of feeling, and therefore subjective indifference with respect to the objects of the Elective Will: it is supposed to be weakness. This misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to that state of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference. In the former the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on the moral feeling... The true strength of virtue is the mind at rest, with a firm, deliberate resolution to bring it into practice. This is the state of health in the moral life."**

If we translate and interpret the word "law" in the aforementioned statement with the Indian dharma, the eliciting of terms emphasized by Kant — "moral apathy" and "mind at rest" — may appear as a quotation from a Buddhist abhidhammo (= peri phanomena) text.

In the best known and most often repeated sequence of reductive processes of emotional states of mind (aapetha, aayekha in the specific meaning of these Buddhist texts) on the levels of phanam (meditative absorption leading to the one-pointedness of mind), "moral apathy" as "want of emotion" in "the mind at rest" is described as the state of aapetha, described in the transition of stages of "purity of attention" (sati-parisuddhi) from the third to the fourth and last nipa-phanaan (formative consciousness) as follows: **Equanimity about formations (Gestaltungen) — equanimity about insight — reduction of intentionality to the pure flux of consciousness (bhaavatva-sam).**

For our prima facie analogy it deems hardly necessary to extend this documentation to the farther comparison of these attentional states with Husserl's distinction of noema and noesis. It may suffice to add for our context that the preliminary stage of the first phanaan consists in reduction of emotional and volitive adherence, and the second in reduction of intellectual intention and attitude toward noematic contents.

The basic formula of the third phanaan begins with the statement that the so dispassionate meditator (sāṅkhyā) "remains in equanimity (aapetha, aayekha); mindful and fully aware, he feels with his body that ease which the noble ones talk of when they say: 'He who has equanimity and is mindful dwells at ease'. So he attains the third phanaan, and abides therein."**

Kant, in the Critique of Practical Reason ("Critical Resolution of the Antinomy of Practical Reason"), formulated a similar statement of fact: **

"Do we not have a word to denote a satisfaction with existence, an analogue of happiness which necessarily accompanies the consciousness of virtue, and which does not indicate a gratification, as 'happiness' does? We do, and this word is 'self-contentment' (Selbstzufriedenheit), which in its real meaning refers only to negative satisfaction with existence in which one is conscious of sending nothing, Freedom and the consciousness of freedom, as a capacity for following the moral law with an unyielding disposition, is independence from inclinations..."**

In the preceding chapter of the same Diacritic of Pure Practical Reason Kant considers that **

"Philosophy as well as wisdom itself would always remain an ideal, which objectively is represented completely only in reason and which subjectively is only the goal for the person's existing endeavors. No one would be justified in profiting to be in possession of it, under the assumed name of philosopher, unless he could show its infallible effect (in self-mastery and the aforesaid interest which he predominantly takes in the general good) on his own person as an example. This the ancients required as a condition for deserving that honorable title."**

The superiority of the practical reason over the 'speculative' or dialectical is formulated as the basic tenor of the Critique of Practical Reason in the Profilter: **

"The concept of freedom, in so far as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, is the keynote of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other concepts (those of God and immortality) which, as mere ideas, are unsupported by anything in speculative reason now attach themselves to the concept of freedom and gain, and with it and through it, utility and objective reality. That is, their possibility is proved by the fact that there really is freedom, for this idea is revealed by the moral law."**

In the concluding chapter of the same work, "Methodology of Pure Practical Reason", Kant elicits the spring and the development of the theoretical reason from the practical and its dependence on the cultivation of the ethos of knowledge: **

"Now there is no doubt that this necessity and the consciousness of cultivation of our reason which judges concerning the practical must gradually produce a certain interest even in its own law and thus in morally good actions. For we ultimately take a liking to that the observation of which makes us feel that our powers of knowledge are esteemed, and this esteem is especially furthered by that wherein we find moral correctness, since reason, with its faculty of determining according to a priori principles what ought to occur, can find satisfaction only in such an order of things."**

The Canon of the pure use of reason, mentioned by Kant in the statement quoted above, which "will deal not with the speculative but with the practical reason", can be

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1. Ibd., p. 358.
2. R 256 (Ak 6), 406 f.
3. Cf. Visuddhi-magga, Part II, Ch. IV, 156-170, on "equanimity of ten kinds".
4. Ak V, 117.
5. Ak V, 1085.
7. Ak V, 159-160. 
compared with the understanding of the discipline of yoga, significantly developed in various systems of Indian philosophies. The extent of the analogy can be best conceived from Kant's summary on the "Methodology of Pure Practical Reason" where he endeavors to show the importance of its innate character and its obvious necessity in education. He regrets both the lack of an adequate elaboration of this discipline in theory and its neglect in educational practice.

"Certainly it cannot be denied that in order to bring either an as yet uneducated or a degraded mind into the path of the morally good, some preparatory guidance is needed to attract it by a view to its own advantage or to frighten it by fear of harm. As soon as this machinery, these leading strings, have had some effect, the pure moral motive must be brought to mind. This is not only because it is the sole ground of character (a consistent practical habit of mind according to unchangeable maxims) but also because, in teaching a man to feel his own worth, it gives his mind a power, unperceived even by himself, to pull himself loose from all venal attachments (so far as they would fail dominate him) and, in the independence of his intelligible nature and in the greatness of soul to which he sees himself called, to find himself richly compensated for the sacrifice he makes."

The arduous effort required by the ideal attainment described here, notably in expressions underlined by me, can be compared with descriptions of yoga as the discipline of ascetic ardour (tapah) emphasized already in the early apauruṣā. Thus, e.g. Varunā (the vedic Uranus) teaches his son Bhṛgū:

"Through austerity (tapah) seek to know brahma. Brahma is austerity. " [It can be seen from the sequel how far the meaning of brahma here is analogous to the Umagrepode in the philosophy of Jasper]. "He performed austerity; having performed austerity he knew that life (prāna) is brahma ... mind is brahma ... consciousness is brahma ... bliss is brahma."

Even though Buddha was against exhibitions of yogic "powers surpassing that of ordinary men for the lay folks clad in white garments", and recognized only "three sorts of wonders which I, having myself understood and realised, have made known to others: the wonder performed by psychic power, by prophesy, and by education"; he however (unlike Kant) admitted in another text* that by fulfillment of moral precepts (śīla) even the traditionally recognized models of miraculous achievements may be attained:

"If a bhikkhu should frame a wish to exercise supernormal powers (ābhiśīka): ... Let me hear with a distinctly clear hearing, surpassing that of men, sounds both celestial and human, far and near ... Let me by my own mind investigate and discern the minds of other beings ... Let me call to mind many previous states of existence ... Let me with a distinctly clear vision, surpassing that of men, behold beings as they pass from one existence and spring, up in another existence ... Let me, through the destruction of moral corruption, in the present life and in my own person, attain to freedom from moral corruption, to deliverance of the mind, to deliverance by wisdom - then he must be perfect in the moral precepts, bring the thoughts in a state of quiescence, practice diligently the meditative absorptions (jhānas), attain to insight, and be a frequent of lonely places."*  

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* Ak V, 152.
* Tatātirīya-upaniṣad, III, 1-4.
* Mañjūsīna-nikāya b.

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I am far from considering Buddhist’s moral disincarnation against performing miracles for the purpose of attracting and converting “common worldlings” (pashubandha) for the purpose described in the text quoted above that “this town, Nalanda, of ours would become still more devoted to the Exalted Buddha” – as an attitude corresponding to Kant’s precepts for “the education of youth” in the “Methodology of pure practical reason”.

Albeit Kant’s statements quoted in the sequel may still suggest a worldwide parallel with Buddha’s yogacāram (practice of spiritual exercises) as far as at least “the miracle of education” is singled out as the highest and the only serious feature in the described circumstances.

"If we attend to the course of conversation in mixed companies consisting not merely of scholars and subtle reasoners but also of business people or peasants, we notice that besides storytelling and jesting they have another entertainment, namely, arguing ... Now of all arguments there are some which excite more readiness participation ... than others about the moral worth of this or that action from which the character of some person is to be made out ... One can often see the character of the person who judges others revealed in his judgments."

"Do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon most subtle examination of practical questions put to them, and why, after laying the foundation in a purely moral catechism, they have not searched through biographies of ancient and modern times with the purpose of having examples at hand of the duties they lay down, so that, by comparing similar actions in various circumstances, they could begin to exercise the moral judgment of their pupils in marking the greater or less moral significance of the actions. They would find that even very young people, who are not yet ready for speculation of other kinds, would soon become very acute and not a little interested, since they would feel the progress of their power of judgment, what is most important, they could confidently hope that frequent practice of knowing and approving of good conduct in all its parts, and of noting even the least deviation from it with sorrow or contempt, would have a lasting impression on them for the one and dis出局 for the other, even through this practice is pursued only as a game of judgment in which children could compete with one another."

"I assert further that, if in the admired action the motive from which it was done was esteem for duty, the respect for the law, and not any pretension to inner greatness of mind or noble and meiotic sentiment, is that which has the most power over the mind of the spectator."

"With these remarks I have intended only to point out the most general maxims of the methodology of moral cultivation and exercise ... The manifold variety of duties requires specific definitions of each kind, etc."*

* Ak V, 153.
* Ak V, 154.
* Ak V, 156-f.
* Ak V, 161.
* Cf. the second chapter, 47-50.
reason. Motives of actions for the sake of fruit are evil. Disciplined by pure reason one renounces to both, good and evil deeds. Therefore restrain yourself by the discipline (of yoga). Yoga is the skill in deed."

In the first section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, dealing with the "Transition from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morals to the Philosophical", Kant formulates the proposition:

"An action done from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire."

Later, in the "Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics", Section X ends with the statement:

"The power (fauhâs) to overcome all imposing sensible impulses ... regarded as strength (vera) is something that must be acquired by the moral spring (the idea of the law) being cleared by contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of reason in us, and at the same time also by exercise."

The advantage of the rational insight in the Indian analogy of the discipline of practical reason (yogâ) in comparison with the Christian "Logics of the heart" is one of the keystones in Nietzsche's praise of Buddhism. There is no doubt for me that his maxim "beyond good and evil" was taken over from Indian, specifically Buddhist, sources. In his longest and best known statement on Buddhism in Antichrist Nietzsche points out as an advantage of Buddhism its "deep difference from Christianity" in that it stands "beyond good and evil" which he explains in the sequel:

"For the same reason, he does not ask his followers to fight those who think otherwise; there is nothing to which his doctrine is more opposed than the feeling of revenge, sympathy, retribution (Not by enmity is enmity ended - the exciting refrain of the whole Buddha...). And all this is quite right: these emotions would indeed be utterly unbearable in view of the basic hygienic purpose."

In Ecce Homo he reverts to the same quotation from Dhammapada (I, 5):

"Not by enmity is enmity ended; by friendliness enmity is ended; these words stand at the beginning of the doctrine of Buddha. It is not morality that speaks thus; thus speaks physiology."

Kant was explicit enough in his appreciation of the Stoic model of the ethos of knowledge and of the advantage of its humanist measure and limit in comparison with Plato's entailing of archetypal ideas in the sphere of divine transcendence. Nietzsche's


Metaphysics of Morals, Ak VI, 397.


The Discipline of practical reason is a discipline of transcendental logics.

The relation established by Kant's analysis between the region of pure theoretical and that of practical reason can serve as a classical model for a theory of knowledge where the scope of the metaphysical problem is determined by structural intentions encompassing heterogeneous regions of objects of superior degrees (Gegenstände höherer Ordnung in the meaning of Meinong's terminology).

The integration of the transcendental region of the Critique of Pure Reason into the wider scope of the Critique of Practical Reason establishes also for the discipline of the pure practical reason its transcendental-logical function fundamental for the constitution of a formal-ontological region sui generis. The structural importance of this region and its theoretical location are clearly specified (although not explicitly elicited) in the concluding chapter of the first volume of Husserl's Ideas:

"What we have said applies automatically to formal Arxiology and Praxia as well as to the formal ontologies to be set alongside them as theoretical desiderata, and resting on values (in a very broad sense of that term) of goods - in short, of all the ontic spheres which are correlates of the effective and volitional consciousness. – The reader will notice that the concept of 'formal ontology' has broadened its meaning in the course of these discussions."

The structural constituents implied by the thesis, as formulated from the standpoint of modern European philosophy, cannot be explicated systematically within the frame of the present documentary survey. Instead of a systematic proceeding it may suffice

The Jain indeterministic theory of truth, akâvâd-dikâd, corresponding to Pyrrhoanoudenmallon, later formulated in seven modes (sapta-kâhâgi) and seven criteria (nâyâd) whose contents are to some extent even homologous to Pyrrho's tropa, was reduced by Buddhists to the teradasma (cat-satâ) principle of Indian polyvalent logic. (See further references in footnotes 66 and 74.)

A characteristic example can be found in Nietzsche's discussion upon the "aeonic ideals" in the Genealogy of Morals, III, 24.

The essential function of encompassing heterogeneous regions of such objects in the structure of metaphysical problems has been elicited specifically by my teacher P. Vuk-Pavlovic in Erkenntnisver nouvelles and Metaphysik (Bullentino Internacional of the Yugoslav Academy, Vol 5, Zagreb 1932."

In einem neuen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophy, §1, p. 328. Transl. W. R. Bryceiction.

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establishing the guiding principles for the structural divergence of the intentional directions of two ethical disciplines: Scheler’s ethics of “material values” and Kant’s discipline of “practical reason”. In this outline the primacy of the “ethics of material values” as constituting the “ultimate depth-level” can be taken for granted, provided that the problem of the discipline of practical reason of superior degree, constitutive for the metaphysics of ethics (in the meaning of “metaphysics” as stated above). This intentional dimension is understood here in analogy to the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals in Kant’s outline of both basic problems, formulated in Kant’s terminology in statements as the following:

“The two parts of moral philosophy are distinguished as treating respectively of Ends and of Duties of Conduct,”

“But it does not follow that everything the doing of which is virtue is, properly speaking, a duty of virtue. The former may concern merely the form of the maxim; the latter applies to the matter of them, namely to an end which is also conceived as duty.”

“Virtue being a coincidence of the rational will, with every duty firmly settled in the character, is, like everything formal, only one and the same. But, as regards the end of actions, which is also duty, that is, as regards the matter which one ought to make an end, there may be several virtues.”

As distant as Scheler’s idea of the material “end” of a virtue may be from that of Kant, on the one hand, and Kant’s phenomenological analysis of the “material elements” of specific virtues in their “architectonic” structures, according to the “General Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals in the treatment of Pure Ethics” from Scheler’s “hierarchy of values”, on the other hand, Kant’s statements, relevant for their basic distinction, are clear and sufficient for the requirements of our outline.

The specifically metaphysical and consequently moralical character of the problem results on this level from the intention of transcending the archetypal level to which Scheler’s ethics is limited. It is understandable, at least ex hypothesi, that the problem of the ethos of knowledge has to be located on the higher level, dealing with “metaphysical elements of moral philosophy”. Kant has elicited it consequently within purview of the “general principles of the metaphysics of morals in the treatment of pure ethics” as the central theme of his Critique of Practical Reason.

Thesis III

The transcendental-logical problems concerning the analysis of material values on the noemtic level have to be distinguished from the heterogeneous constitutive intentionality and finality of the discipline of practical reason on the noetic level.

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10 Formalismus, p. 329.

* Metaphysics of Morals, Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, R. 225 (Ak VI, 381).
* R 242 (Ak VI, 394 f.).
* R 243 (Ak VI, 395).
* R 251 (Ak VI, 425).
Buddhist ethics\(\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, \S\ 147, p. 305.}\) can show how far the "way" indicated here should be understood as an authentic "way of purification" in the ascetic direction of a discipline of practical reason. In the negative direction (due to his Christian commitment) Scheler's distillation towards asceticism can hardly go beyond his refutation of Kant's ascetic leanings by their reduction to "Stoic" influences comparable rather with earlier Buddhist than with later Christian backgrounds (as mentioned above). He ascribes to the "inheritance of puritan traditions" in Kant's religious education an attitude for which there is "always only a negative criterion for recognizing what is morally good. Thus good willing occurs against all 'propensities' that might come into consideration, but it never results from a positive insight that the will is good".\(\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, \S\ 147, p. 305.}\)

Scheler's distinction of the two levels of ethical investigation is based on his criterion for determining the different ontological status of values and duties (Sollen):\(\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, \S\ 147, p. 305.}\)

"On principle values are given in indifferently with reference to existence and non-existence. All duty (Sollen) refers, on the contrary, to the sphere of existence (or non-existence) or value."

Nowwithstanding such existential indifferency of values in their intrinsic constitution, Scheler's personalism is grounded on the thesis that "the being of the person stands beyond its willing."

Against Kant he maintains that "neither the notion of 'duty' nor that of 'nomic' can form the starting point of action", and therefore must not be considered as the standard on which the distinction of good and evil should depend\(\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, \S\ 147, p. 305.}\).

On this point Scheler agrees with Hegel's objection to Kant that ethics grounded on the notion of obligation (Pflichtboll) and considering duty as the original ethical phenomenon can never obtain a correct attitude to the actual world of moral values. If by conversion of Scheler's statement that "the being of a person stands beyond its willing" we may establish that a person's will reaches beyond its being, and also (in connection with the quoted statement) that its intentions transcend the level of the region of "emotional root and source" of the personal essence, then we may take it for granted as well that Scheler's delineation of personal being and essence implies at least a possibility of establishing the discipline of practical reason in the region of will recognized as autonomous.

On the Indian side it was essential for their eliciting of the discipline of practical reason to single out as the central problem of their metaphysics of morals the "way of purification" and its ultimate aim of "liberation" (moksha) or "extinction" (nirvāṇa) in transcending and "abandoning both good and evil", "virtue and sin" (karma-klesha, samsāra, nirvāṇa).
paścita-pāpa paśčiya) from the standpoint of their acetic turning. Consequently I cannot consider the formulation of the problem of "superman" by Nietzsche as a purely accidental analogy (and often a homology in deduction referring explicitly to Indian, mainly Buddhist sources). Although the Buddhist term mañju-puruṣo, "the great man," seems more adequate to the common archetypal notion, the literally identical term to "superman" = adhi-puruṣaḥ is also employed, specifically in vedic exoteric literature.

Scheler’s criticism of Kant, from the standpoint of the stratification of emotional and volitive levels of ethical experience (Erelööw) culminates perhaps in the formulation of his disagreement with Kant’s “endeavour to deny wholly the value-nature of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in order to replace it by ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ (‘gerechtigung’ and ‘verfehlung’). Not less inadmissible is Kant’s denial of any reference of good and evil to all other values.”

These and similar objections, typical for Scheler’s criticism, can be summed up in the following conclusion:

“For his (Kant’s) ethics it follows consequently that the totality of value-facts has to be distinguished into elements of formal lawfulness and of sensual pleasure.”

Apart from the criticist intention of Scheler’s phenomenological analysis, in as far as it is directed against the onecoidness of Kant’s ethics, the statements quoted until now seem to be sufficient to confirm the thesis that Kant’s limitation of the ethical discipline to the region of practical reason (“beyond personal being”) and the “emotional root and source” of values constituting the factual givenness of human existence, as “human, all too human” essentially correspond not only to the Stoic, but still more fundamentally to the Indian understanding of the norm (dharma, rta) designated in terms of Kant’s metaphysics of morals as “formgeschälichkeit” with reference to the lower layer of “sensual pleasure” (Simenlast, nāpa-rāgah).

Scheler had, at least partially, a correct idea of the historical relationship of this rational trend in Kant’s ethics with the doctrine of the “Stoics and elder Skeptics” in contradistinction from “the great innovation in the Christian rule of life (Lebensreheb).”

In the universal frame of philosopha perennis an essentially and not only formally terminological analogy to the Stoic and Kantian model of stratification of existential

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"For Buddha’s own formulation of his acetic turning compare his first statement after his spiritual awakening, in Dhammapada 153-4, and in Agastya-nikāya IV 5, 3. Cf. my article Why is Buddhism a Religion?, in ‘Indian Philosophical Annual’, Vol. VI, 1979, University of Madras.


"Cf. Minorutsu-nirūma VI, 2, 16.

"Formalismus, p. 46-7.

"Formalismus, p. 177.


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values has been elaborated most extensively in the ethical system yogah in India. Based on the analytical foundation of the sánkhyā-bhakti anthropology, the oldest Indian system which could be best defined as a doctrine dealing with "the position of man in the universe", the structural development of the discipline of practical reason in yogah is worked out by the method of an authentic phenomenological reduction, rita-sativā, which may have served as model to the original meaning and application of epoke in pyrrho’s trópos. Despite the neglect of this discipline in the ethics of modern European activism, its negative aspect has still found a sufficiently adequate confirmation in Scheler’s criticism:

“From this it appears that all immanentistic ethics, e.g. such ethics proceeding from the conception of duty (Pflichtbekenntnisse) at the pravolential moral phenomenon, and attempting to omit the idea of good and evil, of virtue and sin etc. only from that position, will from its inceptive point have only a negative, critical and repressive character.”

Thus the point on which Scheler’s ethics might perhaps find its closest approach to the Indian conception of yogah as the “way of purificational”, implies the recognition of a typical function of ethical duty serving as a link with the higher level of interiorization of practical reason. The significance of this negative knowledge, on which is grounded the “critical and repressive” discipline of practical reason, will be further explicated in the sequel.

Ad II – In his analysis of “Kant’s moral law in its different formulations”, Scheler distinguishes “the laws of value-comprehension (Begriffsamsumgesetz) in so far as they are laws of acts (Aktegesetze) from original laws of will (ursprüngliche Willensgesetze).” In this context he is ready to acknowledge the validity of Kant’s definition of the practical reason within the limits of “correct negative knowledge”.

“On the other hand it seems to me that on principle Kant had a correct negative knowledge that these laws regulating the will are not simple applications of logical (theoretical) laws, i.e. such that they have only to be applied on moral conduct in so far as it is an object of inference, but in any case an immediate laws of moral conduct itself even though – as he assumes it – primarily as laws of willing and not of valuing. This is how I understand Kant’s thesis that in them ‘reason is immediately practical’.”

Ad III – Scheler’s critical examination of “Laws and types of judgements (Berteilung)” in connection with concrete relations between the region of emotional value-experience and the region of willing, arising from actual ethical problems, is exemplified in an analysis characteristic for our topic. It refers to the disposition to purify (Läuterung) moral intentions (Gereimung) by measuring “the totally different depth-

"The probability of direct Jain and Buddhist influences on the formulation of Pyrrho’s method and in predominantly ethical intention is the topic of my essay The Indian Origin of Pyrrho’s Philosophy of Epoke, in “Indian Philosophical Quarterly”, October 1985.

"Formalismus, p. 126.

"Formalismus, p. 105f.

"Formalismus, p.

"Formalismus, p. 315."
layers of the feeling of displeasure (Unlust) varying in dependence of the value-contexts by which their intentional aims are informed. In Scheler’s example the displeasure felt in the case of repentance (Reue) is compared with the displeasure felt as “the evil of punishment (Straflast).”

“These two feelings pertain to totally different depth-areas. And yet it is an unavoidable effect of the evil of punishment that it makes the inner look of the wrongdoer to the deeper spheres of his person where he may behold his moral constitution (Nehemienbegriff). In this sense the punishment gives him an opportunity of moral purification through atonement. An analogous function of mediation is recognized by Scheler in the recognition of duty („norm and imperative“), in the statement:  “The notions of the duties to believe and to love can be meaningful if we consider that a norm and an imperative exist only for the purpose of inner transformation by acts of will enabling us to perform an act of faith or an act of love.”

Such insights of conscience in need of purification reveal both the import of the practical discipline and the significance of the transcendental structure of the reason which even in this consonance of ethos and knowledge becomes “immediately practical”. This appears to be true at least from the standpoint of the suggested analogy between Kant’s formulation of the ethos of knowledge and the Indian explication of the discipline of purification leading to its ultimate consequence in the realization of clear insight (vijayasana). The possibility of the development of an analogous dimension in Kant’s discipline of practical reason is indicated in his summary and partial considerations on pedagogical application of his “methodology of practical reason”. Although Scheler’s investigations were carried out in the opposite direction, aiming at the immediate affective awareness of values, he did not neglect to consider in his references some dimensions of the Indian analogy. Just on the point of central importance for our study of the ethos of knowledge, Scheler refers in a differential analysis to the Buddhist alternative concerning the function of “purifying” and “clearing” the consciousness (pratissam-citta, pratissam-manasa = clara intentione) by which the introversion (Einkehr) into the “deeper layers of being” is revealed. In his far-reaching comparison of the “stöcal and old sceptical rule of life” concerning apathy, on the one hand with the Christian and on the other with the Buddhist understanding of suffering and bliss, Scheler criticizes from the standpoint of his Christian commitment the deficiency of these pre-Christian doctrines of life as suffering.

Christianity, characterized in this context explicitly as “rejection of the negative ascetic method”, does not consider “the redemption from suffering and evil to be the

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b) Formalismus, p.

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7) Buddhaagga, Visuddhi-magga, XXI, 513.
the aspect of philosophy permeated (swarnanaa dharma) on which the present comparative survey is centered.

(a) The discipline of practical reason, the title designating the central theme of my comparative survey, is based on Kant's structure of "a complete system of pure reason," explained in the introductory chapter of the part on the "Discipline of Pure Reason" as the beginning of the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method."

I understand, therefore, by Transcendental Doctrine of Method the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. In this connection, we shall have to treat of a discipline, a canon, an architecture, and finally a history of pure reason, and to provide (in its transcendental reference) what, in relation to the use of the understanding in general, the Schools have attempted, though very unsuccessfully, under the title of a practical logic.

The ethical meaning of the term "discipline" is defined in this context in correlation with the notion of "culture":

"The compulsion, by which the constant tendency to disobey certain rules is restrained and finally extirpated, we enable discipline. It is distinguished from culture, which is intended solely to give a certain kind of skill, and not to cancel any habitual mode of action already present. Towards the development of a talent which has already in itself an impulse to manifest itself, discipline will therefore contribute in a negative, culture and doctrine in a positive fashion."

The distinction of the concept of 'discipline' from that of 'culture' in this sense is still more important for Indian systems of mental culture because it refers to two spheres elaborated to a considerably wider extent. The first term in this context, 'discipline', corresponds to the Indian notion of yoga. The second, 'culture', is designated here by the only term equivalent to the Indian meaning of bhakṣaṇa, a term usually translated by European authors according to the inadequate analogy with the Christian "mystical theology", with the word 'meditation'. In my understanding, from the standpoint of Indian philosophy the Latin term meditatio is explained sufficiently and adequately in Hume's Cartesian Meditations as the mental attitude of the "radically meditating philosopher". This corresponds to the attitude of epoche in Buddha's first and second

 Citation: Critique of Pure Reason A 708–710/B 736–738.

13. Cf. Cartesianische Meditationsen und Pariser Vortrag, Husserlana, Basel, I. Haag, M. Niboff, 1952, p.14. To proceed as the "meditating philosopher, who thereby has become himself transcendental ego", means "to recoil continually himself from cogitans (as he calls himself),... not being satisfied with the vague ego cognitum, but following the continuous flow of cogitant being and living (Fluss des cogitans den und Lebens)." Or: "As radically meditating philosophers, we now have either a science that we accept, nor a world that exists for us. Instead of simply existing for us... the world is for us only something that claims being" (p.58: from D-Cairns translation of Cartesian Meditations, The Hague 1970). - It would be preposterous here to assume, in a Euro-centric manner, that a constitution of mystical intuition or empathy should be added in Hume's Epoche in order to equate it with the notion of atten- tion/kapha in the basic and original Indian systems of yoga. Only a differential analysis of the intentional sense of Hume's Epoche with reference to Pyrrho's primordial meaning of the same term might be appropriate. - See also n.64 above.

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- Shankar (disciplined and discursive thinking = vatakka-vicāra), taken over in the same terms and meaning at the beginning of Patanjali's Yoga-sūtra.

(b) In the introductory chapter of Kant's extensive discussion on "The Canon of Pure Reason" "the correct employment" of the canon is restricted to the region of the "practical employment of reason":

"I understand by a canon a list of the prior principles of the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition... But, when no proper employment of a faculty of cognition is possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is... completely impossible. There cannot, therefore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty--for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical, and consequently, transcendental logic, in this respect, is merely a discipline, and not a canon. If, then, there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason--which case there must be a canon for this faculty--this canon will retain, not the speculative, but to the practical use of reason."

Kant dedicated to the explicitation of this canon and of its "architectonic" the last 60 pages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the Critique of Practical Reason, "Methodology of Pure Practical Reason" is presented summarily on the last 20 pages. In the comparison with Indian systems and their "architectonic", the doctrine and the discipline of yoga in the basic part of Patanjali's Yoga-sūtra, and still more extensively in the system of the Buddhist gnosological idealism of Prajñāpāramitā, presented as yoga-cāraṇa, had the exclusive purpose of eliciting this transcendental discipline in the canon of "practical logic".

(c) The archetypal model (Urbild) of the wise man, taken over by Kant from the Stoics, was described at the beginning of this survey with reference to the rational essence in the structure of Kant's ethics. This stern presentation of rational value of the transpersonal model of concrete virtues forming the character of a personality is elicited in the part of the Critique of Pure Reason dealing with the "ideal of pure reason" as "transcendental ideal" (prototypon transcendental). In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant defines character as "a consistent practical habit of mind according to unchangeable maxims". The postulate of Kant's ethical rationalism is:

"Principles must be rooted on concepts: on any other foundation there are only passing moods which give the person no moral worth and not even confidence in himself, without which the consciousness of his moral disposition and character, the highest good in man, cannot arise."

The unity of personal character is expressed in the principle of action (Handlung understood here in a meaning adequate to the Indian notion of karma) so that "this
action and everything in the past which determined it belong to a single phenomenon of his character, which he himself creates....""

Kant's "critical elucidation" of the "fundamental law of pure practical reason" (Remark to Corollary), explaining the "holiness of will", points to problems pertaining essentially (without, of course, any explicit historical reference) to the sphere of common interest to both Kant and the yogācāra:

"This holiness of will is, however, a practical ideal which must necessarily serve as a model which all finite rational beings must strive toward even though they cannot reach it. The pure moral law, which is itself for this reason called holy, constantly and rightly holds it before their eyes. The utmost that finite practical reason can accomplish is to make sure of the indefinite progress of its mains toward this model and of its remembrance in achieving constant progress. This in virtue, and, as a naturally acquired faculty, it can never be perfect, because assurance in such a case never becomes apodictic certainty, and as a mere persuasion it is very dangerous..."

In all Indian systems, even in the nyāya-logics, the yogācāra insists on the affirmation of its special capacity to cross even beyond this limitation of apodictic certainty in pure insight. For us this is the limit and the end-point of the analogy with Kant's gnoseological criticism.

(d) It can be seen from the aforesaid that in Indian philosophy the criterion of apriority, and consequently the possibility of apodictic knowledge, in comparison with Kant, is emphasized to an extent as much wider in its scope as the range of its critical limitation remains vague and deficient. The level of critical limitation attained in transcendental philosophy (that on principle would be impossible without a "Copernican turning", which found its primeval expression in the principle of sviṣṭaµ̄ra) in Indian philosophy was certainly the highest in the idealism of the Buddhist "theory of knowledge" (vijnāna-sabda), while advanta-svādhyāya remains comparatively dogmatic with the present framework of metaphysical theories pre-established by the material a priori of orthodox revelation (svadha).

Thus the analysis of transcendental structures in noetics reached very far in several directions pursued by specific systems of Indian philosophers (Śāktyārama) already in the early period of their scholastic development. Perhaps the most beautiful in its architectonic, and probably the oldest model of such elucidation of the transcendental structure of noetic faculties and their limits traced a priori has been preserved in the system of

Note:

* J. M. D. Mecklenburg, the first English translator of the Critique of Pure Reason (in 1854, after an earlier offer by Schopenhauer to translate the main works of Kant in English had been rejected in 1830-31) complained in his Preface: "Indeed, Kant's time in this century has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent — it has been his lot to be either unjustly, misapprehended, or entirely neglected..."

* In "Asiatic Researches", Vol. IV, p. 163, W. Jones quotes Persian authors, particularly referring to "Duvalt", in support of the claims (as summarized by Schopenhauer in § 9, Book I of The world as Will and Representation) "that Callimachus found amongst the Indians a finished system of logic, which he sent to his uncle Anaximenes". In 1874, a German author, C. B. Schleiermacher gave one of the first comparative analyses of the Indian and Aristotlean syllogisms. Later indologists, from Winternitz to Keith, neglected more and more and rejected this and similar deeper philosophical problems of comparative interest.

* As the time when Kant was still a young student, the Jains "Litties d'indianes" published several philosophically interesting interpretations of various Indian systems and their differences, particularly on the problem of ideal metaphysics. Two outstanding authors on these subjects, about 1735-1740, were Jesuit Fathers Potts and Calmeus.
The description of archetypically evident characteristics appears to correspond to the essential marks of the primal Indian designation of avadāna (as transcendental limitation of the faculty of knowledge), due to which Indian philosophy as a whole was intended to constitute the transcendental structure for a system of critical idealism grounded on the ethos of knowledge:

"...the justification of moral principles as principles of a pure reason could be made with sufficient certainty through merely appealing to the judgment of common sense, since everything empirical which might insinuate itself into our maxims as a determining ground of the will immediately reveals itself through the feeling of enjoyment or pain which necessarily attaches to it so far as it arouses desire, and pure practical reason immediately refuses to take it as a condition into its principle. The dissimilarity of rational and empirical grounds of determination is made recognizable through the resistance of a practically legislating reason to all interfering inclinations, which is shown in a peculiar kind of feeling which does not precede the legislation of practical reason but which is, on the contrary, first effected by it, as a compulsion. That is, it is revealed through the feeling of respect of a kind that no man has for any inclinations whatever, but which he may feel for the law alone. It is shown so saliently and prominently that no one, not even the common mind, can fail in a moment to discover it in an example that, though he can be urged by empirical grounds of volition to follow their attraction, he can be expected to obey nothing but the pure practical law of reason."  

Thus "the difference of the doctrine of happiness (Glückeslehre) from the doctrine of morality (Sittelehre)" constitutes the basic layer and the first intention of Kant's formulation of that discipline of pure practical reason which will be criticized and excluded by Scheler as insufficient and inadequate foundation for his axiological doctrine, for reasons understandable from the standpoint elicited in the foregoing analysis.

Concluding Thesis

In the total hierarchy of normative intentions of the pure reason the metalevel dimension of the ethos has to be considered as a specific faculty of cognition of superior degree.

By this phenomenological insight we do not presume to have attained or prejudiced the possibility of an "absolute knowledge", and still less to have contested the justification of that scepticism which G. Santayana opposed to the "animal faith" and proposes to cultivate in an authentic meaning of the ethos of knowledge as "the charity of the intellect" which "it is shameful to surrender too soon or to the first commer: there is nobility in preserving it coolly and proudly through a long youth, until at last, in the ripeness of instinct and discretion, it can be safely exchanged for fidelity and happiness".

The same skeptical virtue was praised above all also by Buddhio. For his supreme ideal of nibbāna (Sanskrit nirvāṇa = extinction) the only adequate synonym, in

6 Commentary on (Udāna 1, 6, quoted and commented in Bikkhu Nanamoli's translation of Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga, i, 3, 55. (Cf. The Path of Purification, Colombo 1996, p.20-21, and later editions.)