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A Statement of Aims

SHAKTI is a new monthly journal which deals with the contemporary intellectual challenges that face modern Indians.

For a country like India, the relationship between traditional ideas and the empirical phenomena of today's world of rapid change is fourfold. **Shakti** aims to develop this relationship creatively.

FIRST, creative achievement requires identification with the ultimate source of emotional energy of our country. This is the unique experience of our own people crystalised in our self-determined ideals. Studies produced by visiting scholars are often sadly out of focus. These studies must be re-examined by a country's own scholars before they can yield operationally valid ideas. **Shakti** seeks above all an understanding of Indian politics with reference to the state of our own social and political doctrines.

SECOND, to effectively fight dogmatic opinions and to create conditions for reviving 'frontier" thinking, **Shakti** tries to examine the entire range of our traditional social culture in order to discover organising principles which will be in sympaty with our new needs. We reject reckless iconoclastic behaviour which has in the past marred inter-cultural contact.

THIRD, the traditional Indian Mind was evolved in an atmosphere which did not fear death and mass destruction in which today's humanity finds itself caught. The traditional points of view if sensibly interpreted can lead the way to truly modern ideals, **Shakti** believes that Indian intellectuals can avoid the frenzy and violence which are the product of narrow and selfish nationalism alien to our tradision. Indian thought should make an effort to cope with problems presented by today's technology through developing a form of communication which restores fearlessness.

FINALLY, the Indian philosophical and political tradition is so clearly committed to maintain human rights and freedom that it can play an important role, by way of example, to communities which have experimented with revolutionary ideologies and are now facing ideological exhaustion and confusion. This has resulted from developments which were needlessly destructive of individual rights.

Our Programme for Forthcoming Issues

SHAKTI's editorial direction is limited to encouraging our writers to ask fully and freely the right questions. We believe that Indian intellectuals need to be relieved of the burden of absolescent questions based upon issues which are devoid of significance. **Shakti** uses but the English language but the climate of its journalism will always be that which exists under the clear blue sky of our own land. We endeavour to provide serious readers with authoritative articles on subjects in fields like: politics, economics, philosophy, art, culture, foreign policy and strategic studies.

Shakti aims at excellence rather than at building up a circulation which extends to all and sundry.



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RUPEES TWO

build. One could perhaps explain this protracted period of construction by saying that it began when there was little sense of urgency. But even under the present emergency, and with the best of efforts, a stretch of this road only one mile long could be completed only in two years. After construction roads must be kept in a state of repair, which by itself involves running costs and proper organisation. In the Himalayan region landslides are common and water oozes in strange ways out of unexpected openings, causing cracks and erosion of roads and plastering surfaces with debris. Snow-mowers and ice-breakers are perpetually in use at Zoti La, the vital pass of Srinagar-Leh road, but have not mastered its obstructions.

Road-building in high mountains is a matter of high finance, for the cost per mile may be anything from $50,000 to 200,000. In view of the large sums involved, foresight and planning of a high order are required, and, in the case of India, the entire project has to be fully integrated in the national Five Year Plans. Search for economy as well as efficiency has led engineers to ask for better, more modern tools; and it may be that eventually technique will be as important in these matters as human will, funds, labour and material.

And yet it is now recognised that howsoever big the effort, roads alone cannot provide all the answers to the logistics of the region. India would soon be completing nearly 8,000 miles of them but would be only touching the fringe of the problem, so large is the surface to be covered. There would remain areas which could never be reached by roads, and there might take place battles which may make no use of the roads already in existence, depending rather upon *ad hoc* routes for penetration and guerilla fighting. Some of the best roads would always be blocked, ice-bound and boulder-bound, part of the year.

In this context air communications in the mountains are vital and indispensible. Both on the Indian and Chinese sides a large number of air strips have been constructed. In winter and during the monsons air communications are often the only means of contact between the forward posts and the base. In the event of a large-scale air war between India and China, the mountain area, which is only 150 miles wide each side of the crest, may be of marginal importance. However, such a war is not contemplated at present. The stress is on capturing and holding land, and, on the Chinese side to be as close to the line of guerrilla operations as possible. It appears that presently, as perhaps in the long run, land lines are more important than air lines.

DIFFERENT people would no doubt react differently to the herculean road-building operations now on in the high mountains. Indian hermits who have always been in search of Himalayan sancturies; the Chinese pilgrims who once came to India along impossible routes, suffering terribly; the Christians who carried the cross over the Himalayas into Tibet, half dead—men such as these would welcome them. So would explorers, anthropologists, botanists, mountaineers, and especially the traders who have always sought, but never found, the short and safe routes between India and Tibet. So would also the many million mountain peoples who have remained backward for lack of communications with the outside world.

But these operations are not taking place against a religious, scientific or humanitarian background. They are taking place against the background of border wars, frontier violations and ceaseless tension, declarations of bellicose intent and deployment of massive forces by China, and the flight of frontiersmen from their homelands.

It seems indeed that two different races and civilisations, so far kept very distinctly apart by the mountain barrier, are moving close to each other step by step in serious confrontation. Whether ultimately this is for the better or for the worse only future can tell—for the present it is for the worse. In either situation, however, the mountain roadways would play a vital role.

The early break of Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union permitted greater branching out in the field of philosophic enquiry, then mere restriction within the compass of Marxist-Leninist thought. The present writer claims to speak neither as a Marxist philosopher nor as a Hegelian, in his exposition of one of the chief schools of thought in Yugoslav philosophy.

Marxism and Existentialism in Yugoslav Philosophy

Cedomil Veljacic

THE contemporary left-wing Hegelian existentialism can be approached, in its historical perspective, at least from three existing view-points.

The first, with which you most probably may be inclined to associate the trend that I have in view, is the approach of J.P. Sartre. Until recently, at least, it was considered by the thinkers I am familiar with to be the least adequate and close to their conception. For several years Sartre remained more neglected by my colleagues than some representatives of the Christian School of French existentialists (particularly Mounier's Personalist movement), with regard to a constructive attitude in social ethics and else. Throughout the fifties there was a pronounced Yugoslav reserve towards the author of "Being and Time". Since Yugoslav existentialism is very openly and frankly a committed philosophy too, a hypothetic discussion with Sartre would until recently have taken into consideration. Sartre's divergent political commitments as an important factor for the judgment of the instrinsic value of his philosophy.

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I can see a serious change only since about one year. Two factors have brought about what I consider an essential approchment.[1]

The first is due to Sartre's new conception of what he calls "neo-Marxism" in his second extensive philosophical work, published in 1960, *Critique de la Raison dialectique*. As in some other books of his, the extensive introduction is of a particular importance. Its title is *Question de methodes*, it was published separately in 1957, and since then translated also in English. The *Critique of Dialectical Reason* is a treatise on "Praxis". In elaborating this basic concept Sartre seems to come, in a few points at least, very close to the starting position of the Yugoslav philosophers (see Annex). I wish to point out here the basic ideas of the first two parts of Sartre's book. He tries to show first that man is by nature committed to the economic praxis. Here he is in essential agreement with Marx. In the second part Sartre explains how this basic human practice becomes historical action ("From the Group to History"). His explanation of the whole process wants to remain consequent to his position in *Being and Nothingness* as regards the other man's reality (basic for his *Dasein's* theory). "There would be no trace of even partial totalization if the individual, were not *himself* totalizing.

1. *Sartre visited Yugoslavia even before, lectured there and discussed with several philosophers,*

The whole structure of the historical dialectic rests on individual praxis in so far as it is already dialectical" (p. 165.) "Freedom and necessity are one and the same... It is an individual construction whose sole agents are individual men carrying out their functions as free activities" (p. 377). It is irrelevant for us how far this latter conclusion may seem convincing or not in its rather over-classically stereotypical formulation. We were used with Sartre even before to such surprises as *e.g.* a candid copulation of the Kantian categorical imperative with the crudest behaviourist psychology in his *Existentialism and Humanism*. In this case the Yugoslav philosophers have their own approach to the problem of man whose commitment is challenged directly by the alienation of his products on the basic economic level, as we shall see later.

The second symptom of approachment seems still to weigh more than this first one which has not yet exercised its full effect on the Yugoslav side. It is a new personal approach. D. Pejovic, stayed recently in Paris for some time. The result of his visit was a contribution on *Jean-Paul Sartre* published in *Praxis* (International edition, No. 1, 1965, pp. 71-86.) The background of his analysis of Sartre's literary and philosophical evolution is still the *Being and Nothingness*, an inadequate one for our purpose, as I believe. His final positive judgment on Sartre is therefore mainly of a personal and psychological nature : "L'oeuvre de Sartre est une provocation, son engagement profond, et grande sa resonance a travers le monde. Sielle a reussi a nous donner une idee de la situation de i'homme d'aujourd' hui—et pas seulement de l'intellectual—dans le monde de la deshumanisation, de la depersonnalisation et du totalitarisme, c'est deja enorme."[2] It is regrettable that after having based his analysis of Sartre's activity on *Being and Nothingness* for more than ten pages, Pejovic dedicates hardly one page to the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, and starts by summarising it himself with the following words : "Nous ne pouvons exposer ici, meme tres brievement, l'ensemble des problemes de cet epais volume. Nous nous contenterons de dire qu'a notre sens il constitute le premier essai d'une *philosophie de la pratique* au sens marxiste d'action revolvtionaire."[3] At the end of this short glimpse, Pejovic quotes the most remarkable introductory statement by Sartre in this work, on which they certainly do agree : "...nous etions convaincus en meme temps que le materialisme historique fournissait la seule interpretation valuable de l'histoire et que l'existentialisme restait la seule approche concrete de la realite" (p. 24.[4]) It is interesting to single out from this statement also that Sartre seems, just as the Yugoslav philosophers of this trend, to reject the so-called "dialectical materialism" of Engels as the basis of a philosophy of nature, as irrelevent and probably also detrimental for their philosophical humanism oriented exclusively toward the human being in its "historicality".

THE second trend referred to at the beginning of this chapter can still be considered to come closer to that Yugoslav than Sartre, though they may regard it as

2. *"Sartre's work is a provocation, his commitment is deep, great is its resonance throughout the world. If it has succeded to give us an idea of the position of man to-day—and not only of the intellectual in a world of de-humanisation and totalitarism, this already is huge."*

3. *"We cannot present here, not even in short, the problems contained in this thick volume in their totality. We shall satisfy ourselves to say that in our view this is the first essay of a philosophy of practice in the Marxist sense of revolutionary action."*

4. *". . . we were convinced at the same time that historical materialism offers the only valid interpretation of the history and that existentialism remains the only concrete approach to reality."*

philosophically limited to one field of practical interest which as yet has not particularly attracted them. It is based on existentialist psychoanalysis—not that of Sartre, but directly Freudian. It could be considered as American, though its best known representative, Erich Fromm, came from Germany, the same as Herbert Marcuse, quoted next to him. Fromm's books are widely read and translated also in Yugoslavia. The whole problem of "Psychoanalysis and Philosophy" has been recently commented by D. Pejovic in his presentation of a book of Marcuse in Yugoslav translation—*Eros and Civilization*. However, Fromm's books, like *Escape from Freedom* or *Man for Homself* and *Sane Society*, have been the first to raise a deeper interest. The same can be affirmed for *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, which corresponds particularly to the increasing interest for Zen Buddhism and for the essays of D.T. Suzuki, of which some more have been added to the recent Yugoslav translation. Personal relations with Fromm have become closer since some years and his visit to Yugoslavia. The first and earliest problem of common interest was that of alienation and its social roots, whereby Yugoslav philosophers lay more stress to the economic aspect than to the purely psychological.

THE third trend is the Yugoslav one on which we shall concentrate in the continuation. While Fromm's approach to socio-psychological problems originates from Freud, the Yugoslav philosophers formulated their question ontologically from the very beginning. In this respect the subject of their inquiry was always closer to Sartre's philosophical level. Though, the decisive fact for their orientation was that they have been under a direct and personal influence of Heidegger. Sartre's allegiance to Heidegger has always impressed us rather by the spectacular effects of his pilgrimages to the old *guru* from Schwarzwald, while some young Yugoslavs have taken active part in Heidegger's seminars at Freiburg.

As hinted above, the first important difference between Sartre and the existentialist aspects in Yugoslav philosophy consists in the circumstance that Sartre's commitment reflects his speculative, let us say sophisticated, dealing with political problems in public life (as was his approach to Stalin), while Yugoslav existentialists are primarily committed in direct social aspects of the existential crisis of the human personality itself in problems of man's alienation from his "being and having" (to use the analogy with G. Marcel). Their stress is laid on the distressful situation in this ultimate ontological layer. It is because of this ontological humanism or anthropological ontologism that their stand-point has to be marked as existentialist. We shall approach this problem in the next chapter with the aim to introduce a few more names and problems that they are actually preoccupied with. It would not be possible here to delimit the already historical background of Heidegger's influence on the formation of their ontological framework (a work which has not lacked Heidegger's personal approval in several points).

In this general *tour d'horizon* it may be worthwhile to add that in the views expressed by some of my colleagues the basic intention of existentialist humanism seems to be compromised also by Jaspers, in a conservative commitment practically opposed to that of Sartre, as much as Jaspers' ontological trend is opposed theoretically to both Heidegger and Sartre. For that reason Jaspers' extensive philosophizing on the western culture from a Christian and sometimes too heavily Biblical standpoint is also considered less cute and less original than Heidegger's "paan" approach to the subject of our cultural heritage. It is not difficult to understand that in a traditionally Slavic atmosphere—which still may exist in time if not in space, among our pre-war teachers—a philosophy of culture as elaborated by Jaspers may easily be potentiated through the association with Berdyaev. Heidegger's personal influence may have made the anta-

gonism to Jaspers only more accute for our younger generation.

What I said until now was an attempt to indicate a few points of reference concerning the situation in which the Yugoslav approach to existentialist philosophie s took place during the last ten years, I referred to this "approach" or "attempt" until now as to the "third trend" among those that either may seem or be recognized as similar to each other in some aspects or tendencies towards a "leftist" commitment. I am sure, my colleagues in Zagreb would not like to be classified in this way or another, and I know also that they do not even like to be called "the Zagreb School", though it happens more and more frequently among us to call them so.

Whatever their intimate reasons may be, I feel they are right in so far as they represent and feel to represent above all *one generation* of our thinkers. Committed thinking, as their humanist philosophy is, can obviously be only the thinking of one generation, since problems, situations and even facts concerning the position of man, that they have to face, can be shared only by one generation which neither can commit itself to the obligations of the previous generation, in spite of the natural pressure exercised upon them to do so, nor can they oblige the next generation (which in our case is already that of their own students) to their ideas and ideology. At least, such things cannot happen any longer in a world where tradition has been so deeply compromised as it is in Europe now, and where, philosophically speaking, closed systems of encircled speculation are not considered to represent anything more than so many traps. Above that, for them as a group, condemned to form one and the same generation in space and time, facing a common constellation of social facts implies also a critical minimum of human coherence. Such a minimum of being-together is indispensable to form a nucleus not only in order to effect a social committment in one's own time, but also to enable oneself to communicate with other human beings who for that very reason have to be respected as ontologically real—and eventually, in order to be able to live in a real world at all. I shall try to make it clearer in the continuation why some negative aspects of existentialist subjectivism, into which particularly Sartre's theory of freedom has been involved, did not arise for Yugoslav existentailists at least until now in such a radical form.

An ideal hermetic living in a vaccum cannot be determined in adherence to any human *consciousness* of space and time. Should we however suppose its metaphysical possibility, then its last noticeable expression would be a metaphysical escapism (5). As impossible as our committed thinkers consider such a metaphysical situation (and this is one aspect of their ontologism), escapism, as a hypothetic intentional relation of the speculative dimension of human being, *does* enter the phenomenological sphere of their analytic of worldliness—as part of the central problem discussed recently among them, the problem of alienation, which is not only a psychological one, as already mentioned.

I SHALL try to give now a few glimpses into the genesis of their thought and experience in philosophizing from the background of their mental training. I have mentioned

5. *Here Berdyaev's anti-otnological position is meant particularly, his interpretation of Kierkegaard's philosophy exclusively as "expression of Kierkegaard's existence" without any whatsoever possibility of rational exteriorization, not even through Jaspers' theory of "cyphers". (See, Berdyaev's statement in the discussion following Jean Wahl's lecture, A short History of Existentialism Engl. transl. in "Philosophical Library", New York, 1949.)*

already that I am speaking of the post-war generation of philosophy students in one Yugoslav university, Zagreb. The situation in the other big university, Beograd, is very much different. The difference is reflected also in the structure of the department and of the curricula. In Beograd, the influence of the logical positivism, both from the British and Polish schools, has been very strong. Here I shall speak only about the university to which I belong, Zagreb, which became the breeding ground of new ideas in a cross-road location between the East and the West. In our case this location has still to be understood in strictly European limits, which I personally regret and do my best to break somehow and to some extent by stresing the importance of such thinkers as Nishida, Koyama, Suzuki, Hisamatsu and others in Japan, and also of those who, in India, try to retrace the historical foundations of Nāgārjuna's *śūnyatā-vāda*, if only as historians—T.R.V. Murti or K. Venkata Ramanan. From the vedāntin stand-point, T.M.P. Mahadevan, its most prominent representative today, has shown most sensitivity for some other aspects of existential philosophizing along its religious lines.

This is more specifically my approach to the problem of existentialism, an approach from the view-point of a constructive and universalist philosophy of culture which very often brings me nearer to Jaspers. The main preoccupation of my younger colleagues is much more radical and revolutionary in confronting the phenomenal aspect of history from their ontological orientation. Theirs is not so much a historical thinking as it is an effort towards the "thinking of the Being" itself by itself (*das Denken des Seins*, to put it in Heidegger's terms). To use a rather far fetched analogy, it is not the thinking consciousness as *ātman*, but rather the *brahman-thought* in its fundamental being that concerns them primarily.

Two influences may have strengthened this emphasis on the ontological aspect of the thought as Being: Heidegger directly and more intrinsically and then the Hegelian background of their basic mental training, in its specific dialectical version, deduced from some purely philosophical essays of young Marx (a subject of studies very modern in post-war years, even in Germany).

I shall deal first with Heidegger's influence which was chronologically later, but also stronger, in the evolution of this version of Marxist existentialism. Then I shall try to reconnect it with Marx and Hegel. In order to make the approach to this genesis less abstract, I shall first tell you a short birth-story, a *jātaka*, recited by a Yugoslav *yogācārin*.

I mentioned at the beginning that the prewar generation of our academic philosophers was influenced mainly by the German transcendentalist philosophy, largely of a Kantian pattern, at least as far as the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann still was grounded thereupon. This was a standard which in our university survived the war in the person of one of Hartmann's direct students. Hegelian philosophy in its roughest Marxist version of a Russian Stalinized pattern was very popular among students of my generation, since our pre-war Marxism was mainly intellectual, due to the conditions of hyperproduction of an intellectual proletariat. Thinking of it now, it seems to me that, for purely pedagogical reasons, it was a grave mistake of our teachers, or at least a very unfavourable circumstance, that Hegelian philosophy had been so much neglected or even ignored by them.

For the new generation, at the end of the war, it was taken for granted that philosophical education has to be based not only on a Hegelian historical foundation, but possibly on such Marxist trends as can be traced back on Engels' popular book on the *Dialectic of Nature*. The revival of such superseded tendencies would have fatal effects in our time and conditions for any progressive development of both the scienti-

fic and philosophic thought. Thanks to the new liberal atmosphere in the intellectual life of the country, at least since 1948, (political break with the Stalinist regime in Eastern Europe), the older generation of academic thinkers did its best to prevent the danger of a stagnant dogmatism and to save a minimum of western criticist heritage.

Heidegger is supposed to be personally very proud of the fact that in his entire masterpiece on *Being and Time* he never used in the deduction of his own ideas the word "consciousness". My first reaction was rather that of regret. Considering my early appreciation of Heidegger as the man who edited Husserl's lectures on the "Phenomenology of internal time-consciousness", and also to some extent with regard to my associations with Indian philosophy for which Heidegger's intuitionist interpretation of *Kant as Metaphysician* was particularly welcome to me (it comes close to K.C. Bhattacharya)—I was keen to hear more about Heidegger's anti-Kantian position. I was told that he actually regretted to ever have written a book on Kant. Thus his allegiance to Hegel seems to coincide with his rejection of Kantian transcendentalism in fundamental ontology.

It was on this turning point that the Yugoslav existentialists found the systematic possibility for their version of a Marxist philosophy of existence. It appears to them that a dialectical theory of matter, visualized already by young Marx at the point of departure from Hegel, implies essentially the same conception of a *purely and exclusively anthropological ontology*, concerned, as the entire Marxian thought, with the human being alone, and completely unconcerned with any kind of matter dehumanized for scientific purpose or else. Only when comprized in an anthropological finality, matter can be conceived in dialectical relation to actual (human) being, since only in this intentional relation its reality is warranted by the self-illuminating evidentness of that ontological being itself[6]. Beyond that relation of *human dependence of the matter* no *dialectical* theory of matter could be, nor has ever shown to be of any avail. This can be checked throughout the development of the modern scientific thought. The epistemology of *science* may be concerned with the phenomenal sphere of any kind of ontic facticity, while *philosophical* thought is interested only in the being which understands itself in its immediateness, and that is only the human being. Bergson's interpretation of the contemporary science, based on biological rather than mechanical principles, could still serve, in my view, as a support to the existentialist thesis (notwithstanding Heidegger's critique of the Bergsonian theory of time for missing the existential "historiological" point). These are the reasons why science, with its entire apparatus of logical thinking is not and should never more be conceived as a theoretical background of philosophy. Even Husserl's idea of a "philosophy as pure science" is considered, formally at least, as the expression of a *contradiction in adjecto*. It is obvious from this view-point that any attempt, even in the earlier history of ideas, to write a "Dialectic of Nature" must appear as the gravest misunderstanding of Marxian philosophical thought.

Since we have to adhere with an ontologist version of existentialism, it has to be emphasized that from this view-point authentic philosophical thought can be conveyed only as pure and immediate ontological thought, as the existential expression of the being (Greek, *to on*) itself. Its object is the thing-for-myself and not the thing-in-itself. To make it less abstract by an

6. *The word "ontological" is used in the meaning specified by Heidegger as "being aware of itself" and of its existence (Daseins-bewusst). Other kinds of being, as the "objectified" matter of the science, are merely "ontical" and cannot, therefore, give primordial evidence on reality.*

example, let us remember Heidegger's formulation, in *what is Metaphysics?*, of the problem of *the* philosophic question itself. This formulation is almost literally identical with that of old Chinese and Japanese Zen masters: In existential philosophy, just as in Zen-Buddhism, we must not *ask* questions. To get a satisfactory answer we must *be* a question, or at least become question in the "ripening" of our inner being. (Cf. Bergson's use of the same simile in a sense more immediately connected to the idea of *karma* in Indian philosophy, where actions are interpreted as ripened fruits falling to the ground.)

To express it with a technical term peculiar to Marxist *praxis*: The authentic philosophical thought is not only unique, it is "monolithic". In this sense it is designated as *a*-rational. Philosophy, therefore, cannot be considered any longer as an academic "discipline" consisting of specialized branches such as logics, ethics etc. These "disciplines" can have a *raison d'etre* only if considered as a more or less closely connected group of "cultural sciences" (as "humanities" are often understood), but for that very reason they cannot be summed up under the heading of philosophy. Philosophy as a prospective or simply perspectivistic synthesis of essential achievements of various sciences (either "natural" or "moral" or both) is not only practically impossible, as positivist attempts have best shown, it is considered moreover to be directly responsible for *the* tragical misunderstanding which has brought modern civilization to the existential verge of collapse. Therefore, positivism in general, but in our days "logical positivism" particularly, is considered as the most abhorred enemy by our existentialist thinkers, just as bad as it was for Jaspers more than thirty years ago (see his *Man in the Modern Age*).

The most embarrassing question, especially for those who approach these issues from a point more or less prejudiced by Sartre's bias, seems at the first glance to be: How to reconcile the purely humanist ontologism, concerned only with the human being itself, with the well known materialist theory based in its final shape on the mathematically documented determinism of a political economy claiming to be scientific in a rationalist sense?

I am far from being an expert to interpret Marx' *Capital* in one way or another. I am sure that my colleagues concerned with this problem know much more about it. Yet, they would abhor from basing or defending their philosophical tenets on any kind of heteronomous exegetic quotations. Marx has not to be quoted for or against, but understood in the limits of his historical situation. Though a "scientific" theory of dialectical materialism seems to be absurd from the view-point discussed here, an economic theory of dialectical materialism can be deduced very adequately from the premises of this anthropological ontology. The emphasis goes even beyond that. The entire ontology would lose its realistic foundation if it could not find it just in a political economy. It appears to me that this consequence can easily and with enough convincing strength be deduced from the basic principle on which this entire philosophical structure is founded:

Matter has been created by man, by human praxis, and not vice-versa, as the mechanicist materialism wants to convince us.

Only under this supposition a *dialectical* theory of matter is possible. It can be expressed very adequately in terms of Heidegger's ontology of the *homo faber*: Matter is not *Sache*, but *Zeug*, or as the Greeks (Aristotle) designated it more correctly: *pragmata*, the product of practical activity.[7] A thing minus the investment of

7. *"Zeug" has been translated as "equipment". Heidegger, in Being and Time deduces his meaning of this term from the original Greek, pragmata: "The Greeks had an appropriate term*

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human purposiveness and the amount of (essence-creating) labour, a "thing-in-itself" deduced from the primordial "thing-for-myself" (or rather "for-ourselves"), is a negative abstraction. Matter *exists* only in human correlation. Seen from this angle, matter is simply economic matter, commodity-substance, or, as this was designated since ever, a "good". However, above that and before that, matter is a human problem, and more that—a human urge. Under this premise it is rather the consequence than the cause of all human troubles, of the entire "unsatisfactoriness", of "care" and "anguish" in life. *Homo faber* is the suffering man. Speaking in metaphysical terms we could say that the source of his suffering is given with the imperfect character of his activity—to be alienable. His product can be taken away from him. This deprlvation (the "cheat" of nature, pointed out already by Hegel as the moving force of history) becomes, on the other side, the moving force of universal dynamics in life. Before being "condemned to freedom" (as Sartre puts it), man has been condemned to action.

Thus both ontology and political economy result in a theory of ethics[1]. The starting problem of this ethical theory is that of alienation or estrangement. This new approach to ethics has been discussed since some time by many authors from various sides and approaches. It is not specific for Marxist theories of existence. Before the Yugoslav approach however, as far as I know, it was the introvert, escapist, or at most the general psychoanalytical version that was elaborated more extensively.

We have to take it for granted, and my "existentialist" colleagues had many difficulties to explain it from the very beginning, that it is simply not true that existentialist philosophies are purely "negative" and that they have not contributed to the endeavours of our time to attain positive humanist solutions to the deep metaphysical disturbances of our actual civilization. Existentialist philosophies have beyond any doubt done more than anybody else to single out and to diagnose the seriousness of the actual situation of our human condition. As for the remedies, we can say at least that for none of them, not even for the Catholic trend, there is a blind belief.

In connection with these inter-relations within the widest frame of the philosophies of existence, one more information pertaining to my closer subject may be interesting. French personalist movement, alluded to above, (and particularly E. Mounier) has recently attracted the attention of a few young research workers of our whose age is still under thirty. It is too early to speak much about them as our next generation, the one that very obviously differs from the

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for 'Things' : pragmata—that is to say, that which one has to do within one's concerned dealings (praxis). But ontologically, the specifically 'pragmatic' character of the pragmata is just what the Greeks left in obscurity ; they thought of these proximally as 'mere things'. We shall call these entities which we encounter in concern 'equipment' (Zeug)."

On the philosophical problem of praxis, as understood by the Yugoslav philosophers, I find it at this moment the most advisable to attach, in an annex, a few pages from the recent paper of Danko Grlie, Practice and Dogma, published in the first issue of the international education of Praxis (No. 1, 1965). This article has been attacked in a local newspaper by an "orthodox" Marxist, as it often happens. A foreign journalist used this skirmish as subject for a sensationalist reportage, which gave world-wide publicity, due to an overestimated political importance, to Prof. Grlic, known with us as one of the best polemical authors. (cf. in India, The Statesman, July 19, 1965).

1. As far as I know, nobody has tried until now to understand and to interpret Heidegger's basic work, Being and Time, as a treatise of ethics, concentrated on the chapters on moral Conscience, which form the middle and the core of that book.

war-generation of the first explorers of existentialist currents. It seems to be psychologically symptomatic that this later generation had rather a peculiar development as far as their mental training is concerned. In an age when the older generation has to fight heavily to maintain the standards of the basic humanist education against the danger of technicization of all kinds of schools (and we are all very firm, among philosophers, in our humanist solidarity), these few young men came to us with a serious knowledge of classical languages and culture, both Greek and Latin, ancient and mediaeval. Some of them have shown also deep interest in Indian philosophy. Some of the preceding generation are inclined to consider this unexpected and rather violent turning towards humanities as a sign of a new conservative fashion. Though this case is obviously more a coincidence than a trend in our educational conditions, these few young people have shown an embarrassingly thorougher training in classical studies than even my generation had got before the war, not to speak of the post-war endless reforms of education.

It is not my intention to attribute either excessive or premature importance to any single aspect in the new turning of the philosophical thought in Yugoslavia and in my university since the war. Without undue generalisation, even within this relatively small intellectual circle, it can be affirmed in the conclusion that all philosophers attached to our university agree in one point which is not that of existentialist principles, but not very far from it either : to expose the danger of dehumanization of an over-technicized civilization. This danger seems to be greater in the field of education than in the field of nuclear armaments in our days. Some of us feel that the existentialist scope of problems may be too narrow to encompass all that in the actual world-culture is philosophically worthwhile to survive. But I am confident that we all would agree that philosophy for us means essentially the philosophy of culture.

Exract from an article by *Danko Grlic*, in *Praxis*, Zagreb, 1965, internate. edition No. 1

Practice and Dogma

. . . Regardless however, of whether practice includes or does not include theary—or whether both practice and theory can be comprehended only through some third thing, which determines the possibility of establishing this relationship—the question nevertheless arises : 'can practice be determined at all simply on the basis of its relation (immanent or transcendent) to theory' ?

A particular concept may sometimes not be determined and wholly explained only through a positive statement of the content immanent in it and it is extremely important for the delimitation of its scope and the comprehension of its meaning that it also be determined negatively towards that which is really opposed to it as its counter-concept. What is, then, opposed to human practice?

If we intend to determine negatively this central concept of Marx's thought according to Marx's fundamental view / although not always in accordance with certain of his own observations and accidental distinctions, in some places where practice is even opposed to theory/we could, I think, argue that human practice stands in opposition to all that is passive, merely meditative, noncreative, all that is adaptation to the world, a yielding to the nature of the world and to its particular social conditions. True human practice, consequently, is not acceptance of the "facts", of objective reality and its laws, of moral or ideological imperatives or accepted norms, of something heteronomous, in which man is always at a disadvantage and is the pawn of superior forces, spiritual or material. Human practice—as opposed to animal adaptation—could be defined as the true transformation of the world, a transformation which is historically relevant, as an active interference with the structure of reality. Human practices is, therefore, not different from animal "practice" through being—or at least not only through being—always theoretical as well, but primarily because it transforms the world, and does not conform to it, the world being always—epistemologically speaking—its object. Human practice is not creating itself and not created, because of particular condirions transcendent to it, bccause it is not—to use the old term of spinoza—only natura naturata, but also natura naturans. Consequently, put more simply, practice which deserves this name, is always creative. It is not at all an ideal or actual state, but an unceasing living process af alteration and transformation. However, this process is not a process destined sometime to terminate in inactivity, it is not a process meant to stop being a process, not even on account of those factual "imperfections" of modern reality which aim at a conflict-free "perfection". It seeks to attain no ultimate and final "results", no life of bliss in this or the other world, in paradise or some promised land. Future practice, towards which contemporary practice is open and is leading us, will again be transformation. Accordingly, this practice will never completely satisfy "true" human nature, and the belief in such concrete, wholly unalienated nature is itself a sort of mythological alienation.

Therefore, practice is a negation of the eschatological view, which believes in the end of the world, the end of history, and the end of the possibility of the "eternal" development of human nature, i.e. believes in the final "stabilisation" of human nature and society.

Naturally, to define human practice (i.e., practice worthy of human beings) as transformation is still not to define it adequately in content. Certain questions are necessarily implied—in order to avoid a banal relativism—of the quality, purpose and meaning of this transformation. But, even without any closer definition, without distinctions—which could, for instance in opposition to more natural change, be looked for in the sphere of historically relevant change, a change, consequently, including the concept of progress as well—such an "empty" definition of practice as transformation can also have quite concrete repercussions in the theoretical and sensuous-real sphere of human activitety.

Man's fundamental vocation, his constitutive characteristic, and his mission (both as theoretician and practician in a narrower sense) become so—to consider only certain ideological repercussions of practicce thus understood—no longer a passive acceptance of everything that has once, somewhere been established as correct, no "transplantation" of earlier theoretical postulates to our time (or simply their "elaboration" under "our specific conditions"), no 'application" of certain eternal principles to our reality, but a revolutionary transformation of these principles. Man cannot, as for instance a philosopher, have the ambition to transform the world if he does not at the same time transform his own ideas and principles. It is, therefore, an inevitable pre-requisite for him—in order to constitute himself as human—to be actively, personally, ceaselessly engaged in fighting for possibilities of an invariably new, increasingly progressive, non-standard thought and action. Practice, thus, ceases to be an inert insistence on something existent, some status quo ante, or, again, a self-controlled life in the past or present. On the countrary, it is made up of such human penetration into all spheres of reality that it transcends the existing, and includes elements of projection into what is, as yet non-existent, the future. Such human practice cannot be resignedly made to conform io some general category, to the scheme of certain superhuman forces or meterial conditions. For, this practice means self-awareness of the fact that the existence of these forces is made possible, and the conditions created and changed, by man, the subject of real historical changes, leading from the "kingdom of necessity" to the never sufficiently free and never fully liberated "kingdom of freedom". Practice is thus opposed to everything established, dogmatic, rigid, static, once-for-all determined, fixed, standard ; to everything that has become dug into the past and remained hypostatised. From this point of view, dogmatic practice canot be practice at all ; therefore, it is in fact, contradictio in adjecto, an insoluble contradiction, which can only conditionally be used as a term, in order to make clearer the counter-term, i.e. anti-domatic practice or, simply, practice. For, schema or dogma, invariable emphasis on the same principles, a "faithful" adherence to whatever has once been proclaimed true, are nothing but a substitute for practical importance. Therefore, a strict attachment to any once-stated theses (even if they are the so-called fundamental theses) cannot be made to conform to the sense of the concept, the quintessence of all that Marx mean by human practice.